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ABSTRACT 
The Evolution of Political Violence in Jamaica 1940-1980 
Kareen Williams 
 By the 1960s violence became institutionalized in modern Jamaican politics. This 
endemic violence fostered an unstable political environment that developed out of a symbiotic 
relationship between Jamaican labor organizations and political violence. Consequently, the 
political process was destabilized by the corrosive influence of partisan politics, whereby party 
loyalists dependent on political patronage were encouraged by the parties to defend local 
constituencies and participate in political conflict. Within this system the Jamaican general 
election process became ominous and violent, exemplifying how limited political patronage was 
dispersed among loyal party supporters.  
 This dissertation examines the role of the political parties and how they mobilized 
grassroots supporters through inspirational speeches, partisan ideology, complex political 
patronage networks, and historic party platform issues from 1940 through 1980. The 
dissertation argues that the development of Jamaican trade unionism and its corresponding 
leadership created the political framework out of which Jamaica’s two major political parties, 
the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) and People’s National Party (PNP) emerged. Within the evolution 
of their support base Jamaican politicians such as Alexander Bustamante utilized their influence 
over local constituencies to create a garrison form of mobilization that relied heavily upon 
violence. By investigating the social and political connection between local politicians and 
violence, this dissertation examines how events such as the Henry Rebellion in 1960, the 1978 
Green Bay Massacre, and the public murder of the PNP candidate Roy McGann in 1980 
demonstrate the failure of traditional Jamaican political patronage to control extremist violence 
among grassroots supporters, giving rise to a general public dissatisfaction with the established 
Jamaican leadership. This transformation of the political system resulted in the 
institutionalization of political violence by the late 1960s, and a pattern of general elections 
destabilized by vicious conflicts between JLP and PNP gangs. This political violence was 
reflected in the rise of gang dons such as Jim Brown and Wayne “Sandokhan” Smith who 
became independent of the patronage system through their exploitation of the drug trade. 
Consequently, modern Jamaican politics in the twenty–first century is fractured and local 
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The Problem of Violence in Modern Jamaican Politics 
The problem that this dissertation seeks to address is the relationship between the 
evolution of modern politics in Jamaica and politically related violence. The history of modern 
Jamaican politics has largely been told as the story of the growth of the two-party system and 
its relationship to labor unionization, the evolution of a political elite, the development of the 
mechanisms of grassroot mobilization, party campaigning processes, and the maturation of the 
Westminster model, namely a democratic parliamentary system of government that supports a 
prime minister, legislature, and cabinet. A significant amount of the scholarship on modern 
Jamaica is devoted to analysis of these relationships and institutional systems. However, what 
is often less adequately recognized or addressed in this scholarship is that this formal system of 
Jamaican politics is sustained by another world of organized activity, namely the political 
violence connected to party politics. This study will argue that politically motivated violence has 
not been incidental to Jamaican politics; rather, it has been endemic to the political system. 
This dissertation investigates how political violence evolved from 1938 through 1980. 
My inquiry focuses on how political parties and their leaders mobilized grassroots supporters 
through ideology, demagoguery, inter-party conflict, and political patronage, and utilized the 
rhetoric of political campaign speeches to incite acts of aggression in an effort to defeat their 
rivals. This study argues that the development of the union movement in the 1930s and 1940s 
created the framework and set the stage for political violence in modern Jamaica, particularly 
between the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) and People’s National Party (PNP). The Great Depression 
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of the 1930s had devastating consequences for the world, but especially for the Caribbean, 
where restrictive immigrant policies led to deportation and halted migration. Undoubtedly, 
though, migration had been the major employment opportunity and economic outlet for 
Jamaicans since the 1800s when the island ceased to be a leading sugar producer. 
Consequently, the depression created the desperation and poverty that empowered the 
development of the union movement, as laborers seeking employment and better wages, and 
hoping for lasting changes, joined the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) because the 
union represented one of the few organized structures that could effectively take on the state.  
Although unionization itself did not lead to horrifying violence, laborers had to deal with 
the colonial structure of Jamaica and employers’ use of violence to maintain power and control. 
This is not to imply that prior to the emergence of the union movement, there were protests of 
various sorts and the colonial authority reacted cohesively as they would to the labor unrest of 
1938. During the riots, the British colonial authority utilized a two-fold process to contain and 
manipulate the development of the union movement and the formation of the political parties. 
The first stage involved utilizing the judiciary and police force to detain popular leaders, such as 
Alexander Bustamante, in May 1938 and again in September 1940 for inflammatory rhetoric, 
followed by the detention of radical socialists for the People’s National Party (PNP)—Richard 
Hart, Arthur Henry, Frank Hill, and Ken Hill—because “the Governor considers it imperative to 
exercise control over these men before they have further opportunity to influence the ignorant 
masses who are unusually receptive to such propaganda.”1 The second stage involved the 
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colonial authority’s exploitation of the existing tension between Bustamante and Norman 
Manley. They did so because they recognized Bustamante as less of a threat since he focused 
on consolidating his power base and was willing to work with the colonial authority. On the 
other hand, Manley and the PNP “was fundamentally anti-government and subversive,” 
thereby, more dangerous because Manley was willing to challenge the power of the British 
government in Jamaica. Consequently, Manley had to be contained, and the colonial authority 
effectively used the JLP to prevent the PNP from consolidating its power base among grassroots 
supporters, which resulted in escalating violence due to party politics.2 But once again, the 
focus of this dissertation is not the role of the colonial state per say, although it obviously 
frames the context of the period up until 1962. Rather, the focus of this dissertation is on the 
rivalry that developed between the People’s National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labor Party 
(JLP); and this is because of the gradual evolution of violence such that by the later period of 
1965, violence was a taken-for-granted dimension of the political process in Jamaica. I will 
argue in this dissertation that this evolution constitutes a process of institutionalization; by 
which I will mean that from the 1940s onward, there emerged a fairly stable—if informal (not 
state-sanctioned)—gangs connected to the political parties that were involved in the systematic 
intimidation and, sometimes, aggression against rival gangs in order to secure control of 
political territories, that is, constituencies. 
After establishing the connection between local politicians and violence during this 
earlier period of political development, this dissertation turns its attention to an examination of 
how later events such as the Henry Rebellion (1960), the Green Bay Massacre (1978), and the 
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public murder of the People’s National Party (PNP) candidate, Roy McGann (1980), were 
systematically related to the development of party politics in Jamaica. I argue that events such 
as these represent the outcome of the institutionalization of political violence in the structure 
and processes of Jamaican politics by the 1960s.3 
In my research into Jamaica’s modern political history, I discovered that the current 
literature overlooks the direct role of many Jamaican political leaders in the instigation, 
encouragement, or condoning of political violence. In the current literature, the majority of 
scholars focus on Jamaica’s political history within the context of constitutional decolonization, 
the early years of post-independence Jamaica, the debates about the socialist and communist 
impact on Jamaica, ideological rivalries between the parties, and political disintegration. For 
example, preeminent scholars of the early period such as Victor Reid, George Eaton, and Philip 
Sherlock contribute to the current literature by studying Jamaica’s renowned political 
leadership (in particular, Norman Manley, founder of the nationalist movement and its main 
political organ the People’s National Party, and first premier in 1955–1961; and Alexander 
Bustamante, the leader of the labor movement, founder of the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP), and 
first prime minister of Jamaica 1962-1967); but they neglect the major problem of political 
violence in modern Jamaica and its connection to its leadership.4  
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These political biographies concentrate exclusively on a traditional political narrative 
related to Bustamante’s and Manley’s leadership in Jamaica’s independence movement and 
their role in the establishment of Jamaican party politics. I have defined political leadership in 
terms of political cohesion as directing policies and political patronage as well as maintaining 
authority over party supporters. The problem with the current literature is that these 
biographers are insiders, straddling the worlds of activism and scholarship; but in the post-
independence era, the men they study had the power to shape the history of Jamaica and what 
the country could accomplish. Although the literature describes Bustamante and Manley as 
shrewd enough to manipulate the political process, these works fail to examine not only 
institutionalized but inter-party violence as well. I am holding Jamaica’s political leaders 
accountable for the violence because during the 1938 labor conflict, these men encouraged the 
poor to confront the state, expecting violence but promoting rebellion, anyway. And this tactic 
transitioned into the political sphere, creating a system in which violence became endemic to 
modern Jamaican politics.  
One valuable source used in this dissertation is The Jamaica Daily Gleaner, which was 
founded in 1834 in Kingston by brothers Joshua and Jacob De Cordova, wealthy Texas land 
agents who traveled between the United States and Jamaica, where they had several 
businesses. Since the majority of local papers focused on farming and the Stock Market, the De 
Cordova brothers wanted to provide the island with a daily paper that was more informative 
with literature, arts and science, and other forms of amusement. However, men who were part 
of the plantation class launched the paper on the cusp of the British government’s ending of 
slavery in its colonies. Even in the twentieth century, The Daily Gleaner reflected planter 
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ideology, which was elitist, anti-union, and somewhat anti-PNP. From the post-labor rebellion 
era of 1942 to date, the paper has often allied itself with the Jamaica Labor Party, the 
government of big business, and supported favorable U.S. policies, reduced taxes, and de-
regulation. The Daily Gleaner’s reportage, though at times antagonistic to progressive change, 
still remains important to current scholarship investigating Jamaican politics, society and 
economy.5 As one of the oldest and most respected newspapers on the island, The Daily 
Gleaner represents a source for my study, because unlike other local tabloids, The Daily Gleaner 
frequently has editorials devoted to political analysis and the rise of gang violence.6 
In spite of its politics, The Daily Gleaner documented the labor rebellion and the rise of 
unionization. The violence associated with the 1938 labor rebellion is very often understood as 
connected to the activism generated by unionization as well as by state repression; and it 
cannot be ignored because Jamaica’s political parties evolved out of the union movement. My 
argument emphasizes that violence was not confined to the periphery of party politics; rather, 
it became integral to the political system. Initially, Jamaica’s political parties served as an 
extension of the trade union movement. Certainly, the use of violence as a political tool 
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became more apparent on February 15, 1946, during a series of confrontations between the 
Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) and People’s National Party (PNP) workers at the Mental Hospital on 
Windward Road in Kingston. The mobilization of supporters on each side into committing acts 
of violence represented a significant milestone in the evolution of partisan violence in Jamaica. 
A series of confrontations between JLP and PNP supporters erupted into a riot encouraged by 
JLP leader, Alexander Bustamante, the self-proclaimed “man of the people.”7 Despite the 
obvious political connection between party leadership and violence suggested in this event, the 
classic political biographies fail to address not only the relationship between the political 
leaders and the institutionalization of violence, but the inability of party leaders to forgo their 
self-interest and genuinely serve the interest of the people.  
Nineteen eighty was a watershed year in Jamaican politics as a result of the number of 
deaths that occurred in the immediate run-up to the general elections in October of that year. 
After 1980, there has been a flood of discussions about polarized politics, ideological 
differences, and their seemingly intrinsic relationship with violence. This violence was 
documented by the local media, in particular The Daily Gleaner, which relished reporting 
Michael Manley’s failure as a leader in sensationalized headlines. For example, on October 10, 
1980, The Daily Gleaner’s headlines declared “a hail of bullets and a river of blood,” in reporting 
the violence that occurred at the JLP-sponsored dance at Gold Street, where four people were 
killed and eleven wounded after thirty armed men dressed in camouflage attacked the 
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gathering.8 Although sensationalized headlines dramatically emphasized the prevalence of 
partisan violence within Jamaican politics, it was the 1980 public murder of the political 
candidate, Roy McGann (PNP), and his bodyguard while campaigning in the JLP constituency of 
Gordon Town that signaled a shift in the political parties’ control of local gangs. This process 
became very evident when Michael Manley and D. K. Duncan were themselves fired upon while 
attending a PNP rally in Spanish Town, at which point D. K. Duncan drew his own gun and 
returned fire on the gunmen. Duncan’s action at Gordon Town was significant because it 
portrayed a local politician engaged in retaliatory violence, which was part of process of inter-
party conflict.  
Without detracting from the significance, scale, and intensity of violence in 1980, this 
dissertation will argue that violence has been a central part of Jamaican politics from its very 
beginnings. The violence of unionization came in part from employers and their reliance on the 
police force; consequently, the violence that erupted was in the wider context of a battle 
between employers and workers. This was evident in the structure of the unionization process 
that began on May 25, 1938, when violent riots erupted at the Frome estates in Westmoreland, 
which resulted in the death of two workers and several being wounded after a confrontation 
with the police.9 Violence accompanied the trade union movement as early as May 26, 1938, 
when Alexander Bustamante usurped and directed the rebellious energy generated by 
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organized labor, encouraging workers to participate in a universal strike. The later violence that 
occurred resulted in the arrest of Bustamante and his lieutenant of the BITU, William Grant, for 
sedition and unlawful assembly. In a later interview after his arrest, Bustamante promised to 
use labor to destroy Kingston if the government attempted to arrest him again.10 Although 
many such extremist statements are attributed to Bustamante, the threat of violence to resolve 
a personal conflict is indicative of the problem that plagues modern Jamaican politics.  
This process was repeated in early 1939 when Bustamante almost destroyed the BITU 
after he attacked his rival A.G.S. Coombs, of the Jamaica Workers and Tradesmen’s Union 
(JWTU), in an effort to displace the union from the island and replace it with the BITU, thereby, 
making it the major union in Jamaica with a monopoly over labor. After 1939, the BITU 
emerged stronger, which allowed Bustamante to effectively dominate the emerging political 
sphere. Since Jamaica’s political parties evolved out of the union movement, the framework for 
endemic violence and corruption was created via the unionization process. However, within 
this process, violence against the labor movement in the late 1930s was also generated by 
employers and state officials’ determination to break the unions via police action. 
History of Modern Jamaican Politics 
What follows is a discussion of the salient features of a number of representative works 
that address the history of modern Jamaican politics. These texts can be divided, if only as a 
heuristic, into three categories: political biographies, radical studies, and revisionist literature. 
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The political biographies interpret the story of modern Jamaican politics through the personal 
history and political careers of Jamaican prime ministers, focusing on their responses to British 
colonization and foreign diplomacy as well as on their influence within the evolution of the 
Jamaican trade union and independence movements and nationalism. The more radical works 
address various aspects of Jamaican political development, ranging from the 1938 labor 
rebellion to the influence of Marxist ideology on the PNP, the rise of the Rastafarian movement, 
and the impact of “dons” on Jamaican politics. These studies create the foundation for 
understanding how the political structure in Jamaica evolved over time. The third (revisionist 
category) documents the process of the institutionalization of partisan conflict and the rise of 
the gang culture within the structure of Jamaican politics. These studies lack a thorough 
analysis of the internal and intimate relationship between violence and politics in modern 
Jamaica. 
Biographical works such as Rex Nettleford’s Norman Manley and the New Jamaica 
(1971), George Eaton’s Alexander Bustamante and Modern Jamaica (1972), Philip Sherlock’s 
Norman Manley (1980), Victor Reid’s The Horses of the Morning (1985), and Darrell Levi’s 
Michael Manley: The Making of A Leader (1989) all examine the history of Jamaica’s prime 
ministers in relation to ideology, the decolonization process, self-government, nation building, 
participation in the labor movement, and rise of the major political parties, the JLP and PNP.11 
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The earliest study that can be characterized as a political biography is that contained in Rex 
Nettleford’s 1971 edited volume, Norman W. Manley and the New Jamaica. It is of seminal 
interest because while not a typical political biography, it contains a long introduction and study 
of Norman Manley’s life and work, followed by a collection of major speeches from 1938 
through 1968. In his essay, titled “Norman Manley and the Politics of Jamaica 1938–1968,” 
Nettleford briefly documents the history of the Jamaican labor movement and rise of the 
island’s political parties.  According to Nettleford, Norman Manley influenced nationalist 
sentiments in Jamaica; he advocated for self-government via independence and the 
socioeconomic uplift for the working poor, beliefs also shared by his cousin and fierce political 
rival, Alexander Bustamante. Moreover, Manley tirelessly promoted universal adult suffrage 
and the development of a viable two-party system. At times, Nettleford presents Manley more 
as a legal scholar preoccupied with issues related to independence and democratization than a 
veteran nationalist politician committed to mass mobilization for progressive change.  
Although Manley’s commitment to participatory democracy and nation building 
influenced the development of modern politics in Jamaica, Nettleford contends that Norman 
Manley’s legacy was his advocacy for the Jamaican people to become self-sufficient and 
independent from British colonial authority. In order to overcome the negative impact of the 
Crown Colony system, Norman Manley fought for organized politics.12 This quest manifested 
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itself in the formation of the PNP by 1938.13 In Nettleford’s view, Norman Manley remained 
committed to establishing a movement towards creating a national political identity. In the 
wake of universal adult suffrage in 1944, after Bustamante’s second release from detention, 
Manley’s vision of a national political system included the idea of a competitive party system 
and, therefore, had an important role for the political opposition. Such opposition could work 
to his own detriment as when a referendum vote was defeated on the West Indies Federation 
in 1962.14 However, what Nettleford fails to provide is an adequate critique of Manley’s 
relationship to the emerging use of violence by political parties. Moreover, Nettleford does not 
address the extent of Manley’s leadership role in sanctioning this political violence. Nettleford’s 
introduction does not deal with violence, and he includes only one 1964 speech in which 
Manley denounced the political parties for encouraging people to participate in acts of partisan 
violence.15  
Manley contended that political violence was not beneficial to organized politics 
because partisan conflicts negatively polarize the populace. But Manley treated violence as 
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isolated incidents rather than acknowledging the deeper endemic connection between violence 
and politics. Despite Manley’s opinion, the parties’ reliance on local gangs to disrupt the 
general electoral process became toxic to politics as the violence adapted, became stronger, 
and was removed from the political sphere to become militarized and, thereby, uncontrollable.   
In contrast with Nettleford’s analysis of Norman Manley, Philip Sherlock’s political 
biography on Manley and his early union career focuses mainly on how Manley transitioned 
from being a member of the King’s Council to a populist leader and founder of Jamaica’s first 
political party. Sherlock’s biography examines Manley’s idealism, family life, politics, and his 
attempt to transform the PNP into a political party dedicated to grassroots mobilization. 
Sherlock contends that Manley believed that colonialism debilitated Jamaica because it 
fomented class polarization, color prejudice, and economic dependency, all of which 
contributed to the island’s economic, social, and political underdevelopment. Although 
Sherlock examines Manley’s idealism and his struggle to empower the people, his study 
(published in 1980, during the height of political gangsterism) never discusses how the union 
movement during its formative years created the foundation for future political violence. Since 
Sherlock and Victor Reid were contemporaries and supporters of Norman Manley, their works 
portrayed Manley as a nationalist leader, dedicated to Jamaican independence, rather than 
analyzing Manley’s impact on institutionalized violence in modern Jamaican politics.  
Sherlock’s study, thus, perpetuates a common interpretation of modern Jamaican 
political history, whereby party leaders remain exempt from blame for encouraging partisan 
conflicts. Furthermore, he does not recognize that Jamaican politicians created a political 
14 
 
system in which violence was endemic. In contrast, Rex Nettleford’s study analyzes Manley’s 
political leadership and is not only critical of his decision to support the West Indies Federation 
referendum vote in 1962 but also recognizes the problems caused by partisan conflicts. Though 
Sherlock briefly examines the conflict between the labor unions, he does not adequately 
explain the main factors that led to unionized violence, such as the role of union thugs hired to 
intimidate and assault those workers attempting to break the strikes.  
A comparable study is Victor Reid’s 1985 The Horses of the Morning, which is a literary 
biographical account of Norman Manley and his participation in Jamaican politics.16 Though not 
a traditional political biography, Reid’s study provides valuable information about the union 
movement, the personality of Norman Manley, and his political ideologies. Reid introduces us 
to Norman Manley in 1938 who, at the time, saw himself as an advisor, not a leader of the 
union movement. Thus, Manley frequently allowed his more charismatic cousin, Alexander 
Bustamante, to dictate union policy and action via the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union 
(BITU).17 Reid argues that as partisan politics evolved, Manley came to believe that he would 
make a better champion for the people and could lead Jamaica into self-government. Manley 
felt that his political rival, Bustamante, remained preoccupied with using political power for 
personal gain.18 Consequently, following the creation of the JLP, Manley consolidated and 
unified the PNP to effectively challenge Bustamante. In comparison with Sherlock, Reid’s 
portrait of Norman Manley shows him standing above condoning acts of violence, as he 
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documents the history of the Manley family and Norman Manley’s participation in local politics 
with little attention to the evolution of partisan violence within Jamaican politics. 
Reid’s study further documents the power struggle between the JLP and PNP that 
dominated the political arena from 1944 to the 1970s and the intricate aspects of localized 
politics. His work centers on the personalities of the Jamaican leadership, analyzing the 
ideological struggles that influenced Manley’s political career.19 However, since the trade union 
movement created the foundation for the development of party politics, Reid’s contention that 
political violence is only an unintended consequence of the union movement is one of the 
major limitations of his study because it tacitly absolves Jamaican party leaders from 
responsibility for creating a political system in which violence remained an integral part.  
Another important biography is George Eaton’s 1975 biography of Alexander 
Bustamante, which focuses on the Jamaican labor movement and its impact on the 
development of the political parties. Prior to Eaton’s detailed biography of Bustamante’s 
political objectives, unionization efforts and nationalism exemplified an intriguing mixture of 
myth and history. Eaton examines modern Jamaican politics through the lens of the 
politicization of Alexander Bustamante and argues that Bustamante’s venture into politics 
served to highlight the general conditions of the working poor. Eaton maintains that 
Bustamante believed that the working poor were often ignored; not only did they need an 
advocate, but their economic and political conditions could also be improved by agitation for 
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minimum wage, workers’ compensation, pensions, and other benefits.20 In 1942, with the 
approach of universal adult suffrage, Bustamante broke with Manley’s PNP and founded the JLP 
in 1943 to contest the upcoming election.  
Eaton asserts that Bustamante’s egotism and basic insecurity generated hostility and 
extreme aggression towards his political rivals, a political tactic that distracted attention from 
social and economic problems.21 Eaton’s critique of Bustamante’s efforts to organize workers 
after the 1938 labor rebellion was that Bustamante was more concerned about consolidating 
his power within the trade union movement than acting to promote self-government, a process 
which would have hastened constitutional decolonization.22 The value of Eaton’s scholarship is 
that he provides a detailed history of the labor movement and its relationship to Alexander 
Bustamante as well as a study of modern Jamaican political development via partisan politics. 
However, much like Nettleford’s work on Manley, Eaton’s biography on Alexander Bustamante 
and the history of modern Jamaican politics fails to analyze the migration of union-linked 
violence into the political arena.23 In contrast, my dissertation will seek to connect the violence 
associated with the labor movement to later partisan conflict.  
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Darrell Levi’s Michael Manley: The Making of a Leader (1989) investigates Norman W. 
Manley’s younger son Michael Manley’s intellectual development, multifaceted personality, 
political journey from journalist to participant in the union movement, and eventual rise within 
the PNP.24 Manley’s ascent to power began between 1952 and 1972 when he worked as a trade 
unionist for the National Workers Union (NWU), representing the working class poor. As a 
union activist, Manley fought for workers’ rights and was initiated into the political arena. 
Manley’s political consciousness made him critical of the political structure and sympathetic to 
the poor in 1972 when he was elected prime minister by popular vote. Relying heavily on 
populist sentiments among the poor, Manley articulated the plight of the working class, 
thereby gaining their loyalty.25 Throughout the 1970s, Manley attempted to end 
underdevelopment and to liberate the country from its colonial legacy. However, the Manley 
regime remained plagued by internal mismanagement, severe IMF austerity measures, foreign 
destabilization, and political violence.26 Levi’s study represents a comprehensive analysis of 
Manley’s political career; he regards political violence as an extension of partisan conflict that 
operated independently of party leadership.27 Levi does not question Manley’s political 
decisions or his tolerance for political violence despite his examination of the destabilizing 
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influences of political gangsterism in the general elections from the late 1970s through the 
1980s.  
Despite the comprehensive analysis provided by these biographies, none of these works 
analyze how violence developed. Rather, these biographies perpetuate a traditional historical 
analysis of this period in which party leaders stand above political conflict. Like previously 
mentioned biographies, Levi’s work does not recognize that Jamaican politicians created a 
political system in which parties relied on violence to maintain their power. In this study, I will 
establish the relevance of the evolution of political violence, emanating initially from the union 
movement to the partisan political arena, and the crucial role of political leaders in instigating 
political conflict through inter-party violence.  
Radical Scholarship 
In this section, I will investigate briefly a number of studies from the Left that examine 
modern Jamaican politics. Trevor Munroe’s The Politics of Constitutional Decolonization: 
Jamaica 1944–1962 (1972) examines the development of party politics in Jamaica in the British 
post-colonial era from 1944–1962, with a major emphasis on constitutional developments.28 
Within this framework, Munroe’s study addresses Jamaica’s transition from Crown Colony 
system to self-government and eventual independence. Munroe’s examination of party politics 
reveals that in the post-colonial era, Jamaica’s political system was controlled by members of 
the elite rather than the mass of the population. Munroe argues that the relationship between 
members of the political elite and capitalist leaders fostered a two-party political system that 
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hinged on destabilizing the unity within the working-class masses, thereby, allowing political 
leaders to exploit the weaknesses of the mass movement. What evolved within this system was 
political polarization with the resurgence of class-color antagonism in the post-independence 
era.29 Munroe documents the process of decolonization and constitutional development; his 
study also addresses the emergence of party politics via constitutional manipulation and 
political corruption. This dissertation will connect the system of party politics that Munroe 
describes to the evolution of political violence. 
In The Cold War and the Jamaican Left 1950–55 (1992), Munroe reassesses the decline 
of the Marxist Left in Jamaica during the 1950s in order to explain the rise of the New Left by 
the 1970s. He argues that the collapse of the Soviet state, coupled with excessive theoretical 
analysis and chaotic intellectual debates about communist theories, prompted a re-evaluation 
of the Marxist Left in Jamaica during the 1950s. Munroe contends that during decolonization, 
colonial institutional state power aggressively combated communism, thus effectively isolating 
the Old Left by 1955.30 According to Munroe, the New Left’s general discontent with the Old 
Left began with mass rebellion against U.S. imperialism, economic dependence, cultural 
domination, and racist policies, followed by the emergence of the Black Power movement that 
challenged the leadership of the middle class during the post-colonial era; the influence of the 
Jamaican labor movement, which educated the masses about democracy and anti-imperialism 
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policies; and the rise of international communist parties around the world.31 With the death of 
the Old Left, the New Left emerged by 1968.  
Munroe argues that the rise of the New Left was possible because the 1960s generation 
of Marxists were not constrained by the problems faced by the Old Left, such as securing 
independence to end the oppressive impact of the Crown Colony system. The Soviet Union’s 
post-1950s neglect of the development of the Caribbean Left fostered even greater 
independence among Leftist leaders.32 Munroe’s work represents an important study of the 
ideological impact of Marxist ideas and activism during Jamaican decolonization in the 1950s 
and, in particular, their impact on the evolution of the PNP.  
In his 1978 study, Arise Ye Starvelings: the Jamaican Labor Rebellion of 1938 and its 
Aftermath, Ken Post contends that the exploitative nature of capitalism on the world trade 
system fosters forms of rebellion that are expressed through “racial consciousness, religious 
revivalism, nationalism, or class consciousness.”33 According to Post, this is reflected in the 
eruption of the labor rebellion in Jamaica, in which discontent about race, class, nationalism, 
and religion allowed the seizure of state power from the British colonial government by 
Alexander Bustamante and Norman Manley, representatives of the new middle class leadership 
who effectively consolidated and organized the labor movement. 
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Post argues that despite the economic, social, and political transformations of the 
1930s, and the emergence of Jamaican labor movement, the island did not experience a real 
revolution because the poor and working class had not yet attained a new level of 
consciousness; rather, they were prepared to accept the existing social structures and looked to 
their leaders to supply solutions to all problems. Post asserts that this failure could be 
attributed to the fact that the Jamaican working class still believed that certain judicial and 
government processes would enable them to realize their demands. Post’s study offers a 
meticulous analysis of Jamaica’s class structure, its economic base, and the ideological and 
political formations that manifested class aspirations.  
Post argues that there were various socioeconomic, ideological, and political factors that 
led to the 1938 labor rebellion: the impact of racism upon opportunities for socioeconomic 
mobility for the working and middle classes, class inequality, nationalism, the plantation system 
that fostered economic dependence via starvation wages, and a repressive political system. 
These factors created the environment for conflict. Post’s work contributes to the established 
literature by providing a detailed history of the labor rebellion and an analysis of union-related 
violence that established the framework for future political violence. Despite the rich 
contributions of this volume, even Post does not fully explore the political use of violence and 
the creation of a mentality of political tribalism (strong political loyalty) within the JLP and PNP 
communities over the spoils of local elections. Since Post’s study is concerned with an analysis 
of the relationship between the British colonial government and the conflicts that sparked the 
labor rebellion, his work does not focus on the dysfunctional evolution of partisan politics. My 
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dissertation will establish a connection between unionization, party leaders, and political 
gangsterism. 
In the sequel to Arise Ye Starveling, the 1989 study, Strike the Iron: A Colony at War 
Jamaica 1939–1945, Post examines the impact of the Second World War on the emergence of 
Jamaica’s two main political parties, the 1944 constitution, and the political impetus for 
“constitutional decolonization.”34 Post studies Jamaica’s wartime economy, social formations, 
politics, and class in order to ascertain how the British colonies responded to the war, not only 
by supplying troops but also as producers of needed material resources. Within this framework, 
Post argues that both the First and Second World Wars precipitated the decline of British 
imperial capitalism and its ruling class. This political and economic change empowered the 
labor movement in 1938, and allowed the working-class poor to destabilize colonial class 
relations, extract more from the economy in the form of high wages, and “force changes at the 
cognitive and political levels.”35 These structural transformations fostered new colonial policies 
and allowed the capitalist system to reproduce itself. They also incorporated politically radical 
elements of communist, socialist, and nationalist, organizations which, Post contends, 
continued up to 1945 to be agents of change. 
Like the earlier book, Strike the Iron provides the context for understanding Jamaica’s 
political history and how violence developed in the aftermath of the 1938 labor rebellion. 
Consequently, Post’s work remains relevant to this dissertation because it contributes to the 
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story of the union movement, the development of partisan politics, and the beginning of 
political tribalism. Due to the focus of Post’s study, his work is not concerned with the character 
of partisan violence.36 
Richard Hart’s Rise and Organize (1989) is an autobiographical account of the main 
causes of the 1938 labor rebellion and the formation of Jamaica’s political parties. It provides a 
personal history about the creation of the PNP and offers insights into the personalities of 
Norman Manley and Alexander Bustamante as well as Hart’s own personal interaction with 
both leaders as a lawyer and labor organizer. Hart argues that the oppressive nature of the 
Crown Colony system, high unemployment, and poverty precipitated the labor rebellion of 
1938, and allowed Alexander Bustamante and Norman Manley to emerge as the leaders of the 
fledgling union movement. However, both leaders had different opinions about how laborers 
should be represented; Bustamante pushed for unionization via the BITU, Manley promoted 
legislative reforms (minimum wage law) to foster change.37 Despite attempts by colonial 
authorities to prevent and control the union movement, workers won the right to unionize.38 
Hart documents how Frank Hill, Ken Hill, Arthur Henry, and himself influenced Manley and PNP 
politics in the 1940s prior to their expulsion from the party in 1952. Although Hart provides a 
historical record of the development of the PNP, his study is more interested in dissecting the 
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personalities and decisions of Alexander Bustamante and Norman Manley in analyzing the 
development of unionization and the role of political leaders in partisan conflict. 
Although these works document the history of how modern politics developed in 
Jamaica after the 1938 labor rebellion, they fail to discuss what is centrally important to this 
study—the evolution of partisan conflict. Munroe, Post, and Hart all examined different aspects 
of the union movement and political development of the PNP; however, these works confine 
violence to the periphery of the Jamaican labor movement rather than connecting it to partisan 
politics.  
Revisionist Literature 
In this third section, I briefly examine works that create the framework for 
understanding politics, government, the union movement, and political behavior in Jamaica 
from the 1960s to the present. In the course of his tenure as prime minister and afterward, 
Michael Manley wrote several books documenting modern Jamaican political developments 
and the impact of foreign pressures on his government. In his first book, The Politics of Change 
(1974), Manley argues that Jamaica’s independence and development had been hindered by 
over three hundred years of British colonialism. According to Manley, Britain’s continued 
control of Jamaica’s natural resources and wealth led to the underdevelopment of the country, 
leaving the local leaders powerless in their efforts to resolve the economic crisis that led to 
dissatisfaction with high unemployment, poverty, class hierarchy, and wage disparity. Manley’s 
argument concerning Jamaican underdevelopment was characteristic of classic development 
theory for Latin America at the time, epitomized by Andre Gunder Frank. Manley regarded his 
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work as an examination of the politics of change and the progressive leadership which 
supported development.39 Manley remains deliberately vague when discussing other historical 
and sociological scholarship. Furthermore, Manley’s study of Jamaican politics and economy is 
more useful as an introductory text on Jamaican society, written from the perspective of a PNP 
prime minister rather than as a comprehensive and original interpretive work. 
In his second study, A Voice in the Workplace (1975), Manley examines the struggles by 
Jamaican workers to establish the trade union movement, the impact of class consciousness 
within the workers’ movement from 1938–70, and workers’ dissatisfaction with the Crown 
Colony system that resulted in the labor rebellion in 1938.40 According to Manley, workers 
articulated their concerns about their civil rights and equality. Moreover, workers wanted to 
secure those rights through political activism. Out of the labor struggles of the 1930s, Jamaica’s 
political parties emerged and what ensued was a battle for power that polarized the Jamaican 
people into armed JLP and PNP constituencies that resulted in violent inter-party conflict. 
Rather than admit that both political parties were responsible for political violence in the 1950s 
and 1960s, Manley blames the JLP and Edward Seaga for political gangsterism, completely 
ignoring the PNP’s defensive response with the formation of Group 69 in the 1950s. 
Manley’s work remains very important to the current literature because of his analysis 
of Jamaica’s labor history and his family’s efforts in creating the PNP. However, Manley fails to 
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examine the relationship between the early labor movement and later acts of partisan violence, 
including his own campaign for prime minister in the 1970s. This was a time when he could 
have articulated his opinion about the impact and evolution of political violence in Jamaica. 
Sadly, Manley seemed somewhat afraid to criticize the toxic political structure that his father, 
Norman Manley, helped create. Acknowledging that partisan politics resulted in violent inter-
party conflict in Jamaica would make the PNP equally culpable for a fragmented political 
structure. 
His third study, Jamaica: Struggle in the Periphery (1982), is an autobiography of 
Manley’s second term as prime minister of Jamaica from 1972–80 and offers an extensive 
analysis of why the PNP’s attempt at establishing a democratic socialist government ultimately 
failed. Manley argues that his election in 1972 was a symbol of hope for the future provided by 
the PNP system of reform programs.41 However, Manley’s democratic socialist agenda 
provoked hostility from the United States, which acted to not only destabilize his government 
but also contributed to the most politically violent stage in Jamaican modern history. Manley’s 
work still has historical significance because he was the architect of the first sustained attempt 
to implement socialist socio-economic policies in Jamaica. Like other democratic socialist 
leaders in the Caribbean and Latin America, Manley tried to provide an alternative model of 
development and democratization that challenged capitalism and Western economic/ 
geopolitical control of the region (British, Canadian, and American).  
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In Violence and Politics in Jamaica 1960–70 (1977), Terry Lacey concentrates on an 
analysis of political behavior and its impact on internal security in Jamaica. Lacey examines such 
historical and contemporary factors as civil disorders, disruption of public services, and partisan 
conflict that created a political vacuum, resulting in a struggle for succession after the British 
withdrawal from Jamaica. He divides his study into three sections: the historical causes of 
frustration, which establishes the main causes of deteriorating internal security; 
“manifestations of frustrations,” which analyzes the increase in violence during the 1960s; and 
a final discussion of the relationship among the forces working to maintain internal security. 
Lacey argues that between 1960 and 1970, the country entered a transitional period, resulting 
in the inevitable disruption of the social order through endemic violence that effectively 
destabilized the political process.42 Lacey investigates a series of violent incidents, such as the 
Henry Rebellion in 1960, anti-Chinese riots in 1965, election violence and a state of emergency 
in 1966–67, and the Rodney riots of 1968, all of which Lacey views as political struggles for 
power and evidence that the government lacked control of internal security. In his assessment 
of internal security, Lacey investigates de facto incidents of violence to distinguish between civil 
disturbances and counter-insurgency efforts to overthrow the government since the 
government’s response differed, based on the particular threat.43 Lacey’s research establishes a 
connection between party politics and political behavior and explains the emergence of what 
Carl Stone later called “garrison politics.” Lacey’s study remains limited to the period 1960–70 
with little acknowledgement of previous conflicts involving partisan violence because, like most 
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scholars, he contends that the institutionalization of political violence began in the 1960s. Using 
the framework created by Lacey in his study, this dissertation examines the evolution of 
political violence from 1940 through 1980. 
Evelyn Huber-Stephens and John Stephens, in Democratic Socialism in Jamaica (1986), 
explore Michael Manley’s attempt in 1972–76 to establish a socialist program in Jamaica and 
the problems which ultimately led to the PNP’s failure in the 1980 general elections. The 
authors argue that modern Jamaica remains hampered by economic dependency, created as a 
consequence of colonization. The struggle that emerged for Jamaican political parties centered 
on developing strategies to overcome dependency and underdevelopment. Consequently, 
Democratic Socialism in Jamaica focuses on the interaction between the two political parties, 
the sweeping reforms implemented by Manley’s socialist government, and the impact of 
economic dependence, reinforced by organizations such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank. Huber-Stephens and Stephens assert that despite the shortcomings of 
democratic socialism, Manley’s efforts to “transform the social and economic structures of 
dependent capitalism within a democratic constitutional framework” offered hope that the 
system could be changed to better serve the people.44  
Huber-Stephens and Stephens emphasize how devastating economic dependence 
affects Third World economies, and, in the case of Jamaica, argue that desperation and 
poverty—fueled by political loyalty—resulted in political violence. The authors acknowledge the 
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use of gang violence in the 1970s general elections but do not fully address how violence 
became a functional part of the political system because the work is focused on an examination 
of the economic consequences of democratic socialism in Jamaica, beginning with the election 
of Michael Manley, not his predecessors. Instead, their study attributes the failure of 
democratic socialism and Jamaica’s destabilization to economic agents, United States Cold War 
policies, and PNP legislation.45 The problem with the treatment of gang violence in this study is 
that it is explained as an economic effect and not recognized as an independent part of the 
political sphere. Since Huber-Stephens and Stephens analyzed Manley’s attempt at democratic 
socialism and the economic fallout that occurred, the authors conducted only a cursory 
examination of partisan conflict as it related to the general elections.   
Carl Stone in Class, Race, and Political Behavior in Urban Jamaica (1973), analyzes 
political behavior, social attitudes, class structure, and voting behavior in Jamaica during the 
1970s general elections.46 Using data he collected through national public opinion polls, 
election statistics, government documents, and census data, Stone argues that Jamaican 
politics embodies a power structure dominated by “feudal political overlords,” who polarized 
the Jamaican populace, based on international response to the pressure of competing United 
States capitalist versus Soviet Union communist interests. That was represented with increased 
inter-party conflict that erupted in violence around the general elections or, at times, was used 
to embarrass local politicians for failing to improve the toxic political structure of modern 
Jamaica. The legacy of partisan politics is a Jamaica where violence has adapted, become 
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stronger, and is removed from the political sphere to become militarized by local gangs. The 
end result is a political system that has failed to help the Jamaican people because collective 
violence was used as a political tool to articulate policy pressures. 
Stone proposed a nationalist path for Jamaica that would allow the country to have 
relations with the U.S. or the Soviet Union without becoming a victim of either nation. Stone’s 
study provides the foundation for understanding not only voting behavior but also the social 
attitudes, public opinion, and political behavior of the Jamaican populace, which are relevant to 
understanding the story of political violence in Jamaica. Stone’s study is extensive. The most 
significant weakness in this work is that he recognizes only demonstrative acts of violence and 
not politically motivated organized violence. Stone argues that “demonstrative violence 
attempts to influence those who exercise state power by disruptive but limited use of 
coercion.”47 Although this definition works in theory, political violence in the 1980 general 
elections resulted in over eight hundred people dead, and the local police were overwhelmed in 
their attempt to control the JLP stronghold in Tivoli Gardens that rebelled against government 
authority. The scale of death as a consequence of pre-election violence does not equal a merely 
limited use of coercion as Stone suggests. Rather it underscores a flawed political system, in 
which the mid-1970s political violence overwhelmed democratic politics in Jamaica. This points 
to the preeminence of structural factors such as the foundation of institutionalized political 
violence in Jamaica as well as the fault of charismatic leadership.  
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In Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica 1960–72 (1991), Obika Gray analyzes the 
development of radical social movements and change during the post-independence period. 
Gray’s historical examination goes beyond a recounting of events. His book encompasses not 
only a study of political violence but also an inquiry into the development of localized rebellion 
among Rastafarians and the so called ‘rude boys’ and the formation of radical political 
organizations such as the Unemployed Workers Council and the Young Socialist League (YSL).48 
He connects the rise of rebelliousness to the influence of Black Power thought from the United 
States and the leadership of Walter Rodney. Gray asserts that the transitional period proved 
problematic for Jamaican democracy as the political system was weakened by social 
movements.49 Although the radical movements of the 1960s did not displace the government, 
Gray argues that they exerted great influence on Jamaica’s political development by 
transforming the terms of the political debate by influencing the PNP’s policy in the 1970s. 
Moreover, Gray contends that these radical groups influenced the PNP’s use of popular 
culture, reggae music, and symbolism via the mythical ‘Joshua’s Rod,’ allegedly bestowed upon 
Manley by Emperor Haile Selassie and which featured prominently in the 1972 elections. 
Identifying with the poor “sufferers,” Manley’s PNP promoted governmental policies that had 
popular appeal. Despite the challenges of the 1960s through 1970s via independent civil 
disorders and increased partisan violence, Gray states that the dominant party’s supremacy 
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over national policies continued.50 Although Gray’s study is comprehensive where radicalized 
politics are concerned, he does not fully explore the relationship between political leaders and 
their exploitation of grassroots supporters.  
In his second and most recent work, Demeaned but Empowered (2004), Gray argues 
that the predatory nature of Jamaican politics empowered the poor inasmuch as through the 
use of gun violence the lumpen proletariat managed to acquire social power and social 
mobility, but at the expense of many others. Gray asserts that motivation for political violence 
was linked to the “winner-takes-all” nature of politics and the failure of political patronage to 
provide for all party supporters, which forced people within these political enclaves to turn to 
local gang leaders such as Claude Massop and Jim Brown for protection and financial 
assistance.51 The process was similar to Pedro Escobar and the Cali drug cartels in Columbia and 
drug lords, the Felix Arrellano brothers in northern Mexico. 
According to Gray, Michael Manley and the PNP’s 1972 political campaign of “Better 
Must Come,” an appeal to popular culture, provided validation for the “sufferers’” lifestyle and 
empowered the poor to continuously challenge the power and hegemony of the state (JLP 
authority).52 Gray argues that in the mid-1960s, institutionalized violence became a means by 
which poor communities could empower themselves, which was still evident as late as 
September 1998 when the community of Matthews Lame in west Kingston rallied en masse to 
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protest the arrest of the local don, Donald “Zeeks” Phillips.53 This situation reflected an 
evolution and deterioration in the political process whereby the masses of the urban poor no 
longer relied on the government for financial support or protection. Gray’s interpretation 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the degradation of the political system and the political 
activism of the Jamaican working-class. Using Gray’s study as a foundation, this dissertation 
establishes that the violence of the 1960s and 1970s evolved from partisan politics of the 
earlier period. 
Laurie Gunst’s Born Fi` Dead (1995), investigates the association between the Jamaican 
gang culture and politics. Although this study is sensationalized journalism aimed at vilifying 
political violence, Gunst exposes the political exploitation of the Jamaican gang culture. She 
asserts that the legacy of British colonialism, economic dependency, and political corruption 
contributed to creating a system of institutionalized political violence whereby poor “ghetto 
youths” became the foot-soldiers for the political parties.54 Moreover, Gunst contends that the 
pervasive influence and control of gangsterism within Jamaican partisan politics and the 
structure of political behavior explains how the gang culture became entrenched in Jamaica as 
well as the United States during the 1980s, after their usefulness as thugs to the political parties 
was over.55 Furthermore, Gunst attributes the violence and cruelty of local gunmen to the 
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influence of Hollywood western films, which glorified violence and affected a generation of 
young men who wanted to emulate their western heroes like Clint Eastwood.56  
Gunst concludes that based on this political environment, high unemployment, poverty, 
and political corruption, political violence became entrenched by the mid-1960s. Although 
Gunst investigates the causal link between the development of gang culture and the political 
parties, she fails to fully establish a concrete relationship among local gangs, the impact of 
drugs, and the influence of American foreign policies on the poor, all of which contributed to 
the problem.57 Relying exclusively on interviews conducted with gang members, Gunst presents 
a disturbing but limited picture of localized violence because the study does not fully examine 
the history of garrison politics of the 1960s. However, Gunst’s documented oral histories 
remain important in my work since the Jamaican government shows no interest in gathering 
statistics related to “political violence.” Such government data would undermine political 
leaders’ credibility and ability to control internal security. Using the contributions of Laurie 
Gunst’s study, this dissertation seeks to historicize politically related violence through an 
analysis of the political system from 1938 through 1980.  
Unlike Gunst, Brian Meeks demonstrates in Narratives of Resistance (2000) that political 
violence was not just a Jamaican problem. Meeks’s work represents a leftist comparative 
analysis of contemporary social, political, and intellectual resistance to hegemony in Caribbean 
societies. Through a series of essays, including the “Henry Rebellion; Counter Hegemony” and 
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“Remembering Michael Manley 1924–1997,” Meeks discusses the manifestations of popular 
resistance to foreign domination in Jamaica and Trinidad. For example, Meeks’s study of the 
Henry Rebellion contends that culture and ideology play a role in fostering revolutionary action. 
And in the case of Jamaica, a rebellious traditional culture (coupled with a history of 
courageous militarism demonstrated via the Morant Bay rebellion of 1865, Alexander Bedward 
millenarian movement in 1920, Marcus Garvey’s deportation from the United States in 1927, 
and the Rastafarian movement) laid the foundation for the Henry Rebellion.58  
The Henry Rebellion was orchestrated by father and son, Claudius and Ronald Henry, 
who used their control of the African Reform Church to encourage a guerrilla-type revolution 
among members of the Rastafarian community to overthrow the Jamaican government. Meeks 
concludes that the Henry Rebellion failed because the pre-emptive government raid against the 
church eliminated any element of a surprise attack; and the majority of Jamaican people were 
unaware of a revolutionary movement and would have been unwilling to participate in a 
rebellion at a time when avenues of migration were open to the United States and Great 
Britain.59  
In his second essay, Meeks reflects on Michael Manley and his contributions to Jamaican 
politics after his death in 1997. Although Meeks summarizes Manley’s childhood, entry into 
politics via the National Workers Union (NWU), and his eventual control of the PNP in 1969 
upon his father’s retirement from politics, his analysis centers on Michael Manley’s 1972 
                                                          
58
 Brian Meeks, Narratives of Resistance: Jamaica, Trinidad, the Caribbean (Jamaica: UWI Press, 2000), 37–45.  
59
 Meeks, Narratives of Resistance, 44. 
36 
 
political campaign. Meeks contends that once Michael Manley assumed control of the PNP, he 
launched a campaign that exploited black consciousness and social awareness created by the 
Rodney Riots in 1968, and used these currents to tap into popular culture through reggae music 
to mobilize and politicize the poor.60 Consequently, Manley won the 1972 elections and began 
modernizing Jamaica through a series of programs such as Jamaica Adult Literacy Program 
(JAMAL), aimed at ending illiteracy, drafting of new laws to prevent wage disparities between 
the sexes, a housing development program, and the bauxite levy which increased revenue for 
the government.61  
Meeks argues that these programs came at a cost because what followed in 1974 after 
Manley resurrected democratic socialism was the systematic attack by the Opposition party, in 
conjunction with the United States government, against PNP strongholds “with the twin 
purpose of demoralizing the hardcore democratic socialist support and discrediting Manley’s 
ability to govern.”62 Despite the violence that followed, Meeks states that Manley is 
remembered by the people of Jamaica as the man who fought for the poor.63 Meeks’ study 
remains very relevant to contemporary Caribbean literature because he articulates and 
documents how social and political movements were used to mobilize the poor and 
disenfranchised. 
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The final intellectual study is Anthony Bogues’ Black Heretics, Black Prophets: Radical 
Political Intellectuals (2003). Bogues divides the black radical intellectual tradition within the 
African Diaspora into two categories, the “heretic” and “prophetic.” He argues that this study is 
necessary because black intellectuals are not given credit for their original thought. Rather, 
black intellectual ideas exist only in relation to and because of accepted schools of thought. In 
this series of essays, Bogues identifies and clarifies movements associated with the 
contributions of black intellectuals in the Caribbean and United States in the twentieth century. 
Bogues then establishes an association between black radical thought and moments of social 
and political unrest, such as the 1938 labor rebellion against colonial economic policy as well as 
such social movements as Rastafarianism. 
Through an examination of Rastafarian Claudius Henry, Bogues shows how as a black 
radical, Henry articulated the possibility of full decolonization and liberation of Jamaica from 
colonial rule, an ideological view which became a key feature of Rastafarian ideology in 1960.64 
The problem with Claudius Henry’s proposal for decolonization is two-fold: first, the 
Rastafarians were considered by the wider Jamaican society to be a cult of criminals who 
violated the law by smoking ganja in religious ceremonies; second, the Rastafarians were very 
vocal about their portrayal of the white man as the oppressor of blacks and this clashed with 
the popular Jamaican sentiment whereby the people assigned blame to local authorities rather 
than attribute problems to the British government.65 Although the Rastafarians were politically 
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marginalized, the 1960s exemplified an important era for decolonization movements in Africa, 
Asia, and the Caribbean; and, in this respect, the Rastafarians articulated national political ideas 
that resonated widely. 
Although the existing scholarship on Jamaican political leadership, nationalism, political 
economy, and violence is extensive, there remain several areas which need additional research. 
Authors such as George Eaton to Darrell Levi examined only certain aspects of political 
leadership. The association between political leaders and partisan violence or the development 
of the gang culture in many of these studies remains under-researched, since party leaders 
were not held accountable for partisan conflicts or asked to explain their tolerance for political 
gangsterism. 
My study reveals how violence associated with the labor movement established the 
foundation for political conflicts. The stage was set by the Crown Colony government, which 
enforced oppressive laws such as the Trade Union law of 1919 that prevented workers from 
participating in the basic mechanisms of unionization. Peaceful picketing or demonstrations 
were often treated as illegal or disorderly assemblies, which resulted in the use of force by 
police officers to intimidate and arrest union leaders. This legal precedent meant that the labor 
rebellion of 1938 was founded in violent conflict.66 The Frome Riots began on May 2, 1938, 
after workers had protested a reduction from their wages of three to six pence a day. One 
thousand workers gathered to demonstrate and demand that the estate’s paymaster, Mr. A. 
Lindo, resolve the problem. During the standoff, strikers actively prevented trucks and morning 
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laborers from working as scabs with acts of intimidation and violence, including the destruction 
of property and fighting with the security forces being used to deter the strike.67  
Although the workers’ early efforts to protest were spontaneous and lacked centralized 
leadership, Alexander Bustamante’s attempt to emerge as the undisputed representative of the 
people was successful, and he intervened in the Frome negotiations. By May 26, 1938, workers 
participated in a universal walkout; violence erupted when the police fired on a large mob of 
women and children who were obstructing Matthews Lane and Beeston Street. What followed 
this conflict was the arrest of Bustamante and William Grant for sedition and unlawful 
assembly.68 After Bustamante’s arrest, he was interviewed by The Daily Gleaner, and he 
promised that “we are going to burn Kingston down, if they ever send me back to prison, 
Kingston will be a mass of ruins.”69 The fact that Bustamante could promise to retaliate with 
violence hints that the union movement was being used by Bustamante to exercise his 
authority over the poor and to settle old scores with others. This abuse of power was repeated 
on September 7, 1940, when Bustamante, addressing waterfront workers, displayed a general 
disregard for workers when he strategically used rhetoric that implied violence by promising to 
destroy Kingston if laborers’ demands were not met. Bustamante stated that “I have stood for 
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peace from the first day, I have been in public life, but my patience is exhausted. This time if 
need be there will be blood from the rampage to the grave.”70  
The evolution was evident in the Mental Hospital strike of February 15, 1946, when 
Bustamante ordered JLP grassroots supporters to riot to protect the party’s interest. This type 
of political exploitation was possible because political leaders via the unions generated 
Messiah-like devotion and loyalty among grassroots supporters. This unflinching loyalty meant 
that party supporters never questioned the decisions or actions of their leaders. Rather the 
grassroots supporters acted to protect their respective constituents from the opposition party. 
The tragedy of this political reality was the politicization of ghetto youths, resulting in their 
increased use of violence to settle disputes. I contend that the party leaders of Jamaica not only 
manipulated grassroots supporters, but that there also existed a relationship between party 
leaders and gangs promoting electoral violence.  
The two major events which signify this transition involved Prime Minister Alexander 
Bustamante and Minister of Development and Welfare, Edward Seaga. In the 1930s, Alexander 
Bustamante warned, “There will be bloodshed. I expect everyone in this country to follow… The 
niggers in this country shall rise. This will be war. We want revolution in this country and before 
whites destroy us, we will destroy them. The Negro blood has been shedding for the past 102 
years and the time has come when we shall shed theirs.”71 Playing on Black Nationalist 
sentiments, Bustamante encouraged his supporters to use violence to accomplish his goals. This 
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type of exploitation is at the root of inter-party conflict, which affected Jamaica’s political 
structure. 
The second event occurred in 1965 at a ceremony at National Heroes Park, where a 
monument was being erected to honor Paul Bogle. Edward Seaga, as Minister of Development 
and Welfare, made his most notorious speech to a hostile crowd and threatened his PNP 
opponents, saying “I can bring the crowds of west Kingston. We can deal with you in any way at 
any time. It will be fire for fire, and blood for blood.”72 The fact that two prominent political 
leaders could publicly promise to use their supporters to incite acts of violence illustrates that a 
relationship existed between local politicians and the gang culture. This connection raises 
several questions: How did the relationship between political leaders and gangs evolve? At 
what point did political violence become institutionalized? And why does the existing 
scholarship fail to discuss the relevance of the association between partisan politics and 
political gangsterism? 
Through further examination of the socialist and revisionist scholars, I found that the 
general consensus regarding political violence emphasizes that it began by the mid-1960s with 
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the rise in gun violence. Although scholars such as Terry Lacey, Michael Kaufman, Obika Gray, 
Darrell Levi, and Laurie Gunst have documented the history of politics and rising political 
violence, they do not explain how political violence evolved over time. What role did party 
leaders play in the institutionalization of political violence? And at what stage in Jamaica’s 
political history did violence become endemic to the system? Even if gun violence signifies the 
development of new forms of political conflict by the mid-1960s, several incidents that 
preceded this period contributed to the evolution of political gangsterism. This study will show 
how party leaders, through their speeches, ideology, and political patronage, contributed 
significantly to this violent partisan conflict. Although contemporary studies (such as Obika Gray 
Demeaned but Empowered (2004)) show the correlation between local politicians and the dons 
in 2000, this research does not extend to the past and Jamaica’s most revered political 
families.73  What dominates the literature instead are biographies about the Manley family, 
Alexander Bustamante, and Edward Seaga, and revisionist scholarship that is limited to a 
particular subject matter such as colonialism, independence, economic dependency, partisan 
conflict, and the rise of local gangs and dons. 
Rather than condemn Alexander Bustamante and Norman Manley for creating politics 
dominated by party symbolism, polarized politics, a corrupt patronage system, and political 
violence, the existing literature treats political violence as a problem on the periphery of wider 
society. In these works, the analysis begins after political violence became institutionalized in 
1966, and various prime ministers are removed from the debate regarding their contribution to 
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the problems with contemporary politics in Jamaica. My dissertation creates a time-line that 
begins with the labor rebellion of 1938 through the election of Edward Seaga in 1980 to 
establish a consistent analysis of the evolution of political violence under the various prime 
ministers of Jamaica. It shows how Jamaican politicians waged a political campaign which 
resulted in the transformation of political violence. Based on interviews, I argue that while 
there is a definite change between the types of violence used in 1944 and those of the 1970s, 
Jamaica’s political elite manipulated and corrupted the general election process from its 
inception in order to maintain control over the Jamaican government. 
In my first chapter, I provide historical background about Alexander Bustamante’s rise 
to power, his political ideologies, and the socio-political factors that contributed to local 
discontent, within the context of political exploitation and electoral corruption. Additionally, I 
illustrate how, during the post-rebellion era, political leaders created a flawed system of 
government. In chapter two, I highlight Norman Manley’s regime and his implementation of 
socialist policies to enhance the powers of the Jamaican government. I explore the Henry 
Rebellion, rise of socialism, and the controversy surrounding the West Indian Federation in 
order to address Norman Manley’s unrealistic attempts at reform. Chapter three focuses on the 
leadership of Donald Sangster and Hugh Shearer and how they responded to the eruption of 
violence in the form of the Green Bay Massacre. Chapter four traces the rise of Michael Manley 
and his government’s destabilization during the 1970s through a collaboration of the JLP and 
U.S. interference. The chapter also examines the implications of the very public murder of 
political candidate, Roy McGunn. Finally, chapter five analyzes the role of Edward Seaga in 
Jamaican political violence. This chapter examines Seaga’s relationship with the U.S., speeches, 
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position on gang violence, campaign practices, and his attempt to destabilize Manley’s regime 
in the 1970s. This dissertation shows how political violence, sponsored and condoned by 
leaders, evolved from 1938 through 1940. It argues that violence was not peripheral to politics; 

















Busta Leader Fe` Life 
Introduction 
In the 1930s, Jamaica was still governed by the Crown Colony system, which created a 
‘psychology of discontent’ for a variety of reasons.74 Economically, Jamaica—like many of the 
Caribbean colonies—was forced to rely on agriculture through the production and exportation 
of such crops as banana and sugar in order to develop. With the disruption caused by the 1938 
labor rebellion, the British government ordered an investigation by the Royal Commission into 
the violence and the demands of labor. Members of the Royal Commission contended that one 
of the consequences of underdeveloped industrialization was high unemployment. As a result 
of this system, laborers seeking employment remained dependent on white plantation owners 
despite starvation wages that reproduced the cycle of poverty and intensified the 
desperation.75 The poverty of Jamaican laborers was further complicated by a population 
explosion after 1921 when the population totaled 858,000. By 1936, that number had increased 
to 1,139,000 due to reduced emigration.76 Much like the rest of the world, Jamaica was 
suffering from the effects of the Great Depression of 1929. The depression affected not only 
the economy, but also most importantly, it curtailed migration, which traditionally served as an 
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outlet for surplus laborers in the West Indies. Initially, in the early 1900s, West Indian laborers 
found employment in Panama, constructing the Panama Canal and working on sugar and 
banana plantations in Cuba, Costa Rica, and other Caribbean islands.77  Coupled with the 
implementation of restrictive policies on immigration to Britain and the U.S. during the 
depression, inter-Caribbean migration also declined. Cuba, headed by Ramon Grau San Martin, 
enacted the Fifty Percent Law in 1933, which mandated that fifty percent of workers in the 
agricultural industry and commerce be Cubans; otherwise, all foreigners without visas were 
deported.78 With migration closed, the pressure of poverty and desperation began to build. 
Consequently, a large labor pool increased competition that resulted in lower wages and even 
higher unemployment among poor laborers as the unemployment rate reached 27 percent. 
This tension erupted in the labor rebellion of 1938. 
Unemployment was a complex issue in Jamaica because of class and race prejudice but 
also because agricultural employment was seasonal. Out of the post-emancipation era, a social 
hierarchy based upon race emerged that restricted members of each class to their particular 
niche in society.79 “Color affects the job you get. Color certainly helps as regards a job. If I were 
fairer I could get a better job. Fair people have a better chance in Jamaica. If you are black you 
may not get anything to do. If you have a little cleaner color you may get through quicker than 
the black one,” observed Fernando Henriques in 1953.80 
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In addition to the dilemma of racism, unemployment, emigration, and unhealthy 
working conditions, members of the Jamaican working class encountered problems with the 
standard daily wage, which was not tied to the amount of work or the length of time on the job 
but rather to a standard daily wage. In Jamaica, the daily wages in agriculture varied from ten-
and-a-half pence to one shilling per week for twelve hours of work; however, these rates were 
contingent upon sex and skill. Workers often protested to members of the Royal Commission 
that they did not know the rates of pay until after the job was not completed, nor could they 
bargain collectively with management for the establishment of a minimum wage, for 
workmen’s compensation, or for improved labor conditions.81 These grievances contributed to 
the labor rebellion of 1938. The rebellion is taken to mark the beginning of modern Jamaican 
political history, and out of it evolved labor unions and political parties. The development of 
modern politics resulted in the polarization of the working class and the institutionalization of 
violence within the system.82 Local leaders acted in their own self-interest by not only polarizing 
local constituents but also by corrupting the system of government and using violence in order 
to maintain power. This framework was founded when workers took action against their 
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Perhaps, the single most important figure in the process of labor mobilization and party 
formation is Alexander Bustamante. Bustamante is often described as an outspoken and 
passionate orator who, despite his social class and skin color (he was considered a white 
Jamaican), fought for the common man. Born William Alexander Clarke on February 24, 1884, 
to Robert Clarke (a white farmer) and Elsie Hunter (a colored woman), he possessed moderate 
wealth.83 Growing up in rural Jamaica prepared William Clarke for a future in farming. Despite 
his position as overseer at Belmont, a local plantation in Kingston, William Clarke decided to 
leave Jamaica. He traveled to Cuba in 1905, where he worked for a tramcar company that had 
operations in both Cuba and Panama.84 Clarke also journeyed to Spain, where he acquired his 
surname Bustamante. Before his return to Jamaica, Bustamante had lived in New York City, 
where he worked as a dietician; but according to Bustamante himself, he acquired his wealth by 
speculating on the American Stock Market.85  
Since Bustamante was secretive and often fabricated the history of his past, he was 
wrapped in a cloak of enigma when, at the age of 50, he returned to Jamaica in 1934 and 
established himself as a money lender and an advocate for the common man.86 Over the course 
of the next four years, Bustamante created a political image by actively engaging in political 
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debate through the mass media, using his knowledge of trade unions gained from his travels.87 
As early as April 25, 1935, letters written by Bustamante appeared in The Daily Gleaner on a 
variety of subjects, ranging from unemployment and protection of local industry to criticism of 
local government.88 Bustamante participated directly in politics by speaking at local events 
sponsored by labor leaders, such as Allan George St Claver Coombs, founder of the Jamaica 
Workers and Tradesmen Union (JWTU) in 1936 to protect the rights of laborers.89 Although 
Bustamante was slowly making a name for himself as a man of the people, he would not gain 
national recognition until the labor riots of 1938. 
Fueled by poverty and desperation, the labor rebellion began on January 6, 1938, when 
workers went on strike at the Serge Island Sugar Estate, demanding a wage increase from ten-
and-a-half pence to 2/ shillings per ton for cane cutters. Owners argued that the sugar industry 
could not afford these wages. Around 1,400 workers, armed with machetes and sticks, 
protested by picketing the factory, blocking the roads, intimidating other workers, and battling 
with police in the streets.90 Through this confrontation, labor leader Bustamante achieved 
national recognition when he volunteered his services as mediator for the labor dispute. 
Bustamante, along with the owner of the plantation (R. Ehrenstein) addressed the workers. He 
discouraged the strike and asserted that the current rate of ten-and–a-half pence was 
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adequate, but asserted that Ehrenstein was willing to grant a concession to workers of 1/ 
shilling per ton.91 Workers became disruptive and rejected the offer, calling Bustamante a 
traitor for not fighting on behalf of laborers, at which point Bustamante and Ehrenstein were 
granted a police escort off the plantation in order to restore order.92 
Ultimately, at the conclusion of the Serge Island conflict, 34 strikers were hurt and 60 
others were arrested for inciting the riot and intimidation.93 Despite the conclusion of the Serge 
Island Estate strike, labor agitation continued to erupt throughout the island as Bustamante and 
other labor leaders attacked local legislative leaders for failing to implement measures to 
relieve unemployment, poverty, and homelessness, or to address the problem of fluctuating 
wage rates.94 
The problem that workers encountered were multifaceted, and these issues received 
political attention in 1938. Local leaders criticized and blamed the governor, Sir Edward 
Denham, for failing the people by downplaying the significance of the labor riots.95 The Daily 
Gleaner, Jamaica’s most popular newspaper, reported that Bustamante criticized the governor 
when he sponsored the new Road Traffic Law in 1938, which stipulated that owners of 
passenger cars must pay a ten-and-six-pence fee for a vehicle examination conducted by the 
police. Local chauffeurs were outraged because their current earnings totaled 12/- pence per 
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week.96 As one of the leaders organizing the chauffeurs’ strike, Bustamante denounced the 
governor for his promotion of the law. Denham, Bustamante asserted, could not relate to the 
problems confronting the poor. Bustamante further encouraged city chauffeurs to join the 
newly formed Chauffeurs Union, which 150 joined at the rally.97  
Bustamante frequently wrote to members of the British Parliament in order to 
ingratiate himself with the colonial authority, while promoting the cause of labor. In his letters 
to members of parliament, which were published in The Daily Gleaner, Bustamante argued that 
local leaders were conspiring to conceal the problem of poverty within the Jamaican 
economy.98 Bustamante further claimed that workers were suffering from starvation, sickness, 
and homelessness. Because of the starvation wages that were paid, workers could not 
adequately provide for their families. In his letter to members of parliament, Bustamante did 
not exaggerate when he asserted that “thousands upon thousands of able-bodied men and 
women willing to work, overrun the towns and districts hungry, ragged from the want of 
employment, thousands of children run the villages not able to go to school because of a lack of 
food and clothing. When the people dared to stage a hunger demonstration they were met by 
police armed with rifles displaying bayonets that were used to disperse the crowd.”99 
Bustamante further blamed the state apparatus headed by Governor Denham and local 
capitalist (business sector) for perpetuating the problems that laborers encountered via police 
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oppression, and he warned the British parliament that violence like that at Serge Island Estate 
would continue until something was done to help the workers.100 
The consequence of the starvation wages paid to laborers and the suffering of their 
families provoked the labor rebellion of 1938. These economic conditions resulted in the 
eruption of further violence when the police tried to suppress the labor strikes intended to 
demand higher wages. The reality for poor laborers in Jamaica was that poverty was 
maintained by the low wages that workers were paid per day for work. One shilling (1/-) equals 
ten cents, and 1d was the equivalent of one penny, based on the decreased monetary value of 
laborers’ wages. Bustamante did not exaggerate when he said that the working man and his 
family were starving.101  The figures below reflect this concern. 
Table 1 
Comparison of wages paid in Kingston and outer Parishes 
 
Kingston 
  Public Works Private Employers 
Employers Daily                 
Pay 
Laborers Per 1932 1937 1938 1938 1932 1937 1938 1938 
Day 




 Richard Hart, Rise and Organize: the Birth of the Workers and National Movement in Jamaica, (London: Karia 






Men   3/- 3/- 3/- 3/- 3/- 3/- 3/- 3/- 
Women   1/3 1/3 1/6 1/ 10 ½ 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/ 10 ½ 
Artisans Daily                 
Pay 
Carpenters Per 7/- 7/- 7/- 7/- 7/- 7/- 7/- 7/- 
Day 
Mechanics   8/- 8/- 8/- 8/- 7/- 7/- 7/- 7/- 
Blacksmiths   8/- 8/4 7/6 7/6 7/- 7/- 7/6 7/6 
 
Other Parishes 
  Public Works Private Employers 





Laborers Per 1932 1937 1938 1938 1932 1937  1938  1938 
Day 
Men   2/4 2/4 2/5 2/10 1/9 1/9 1/11   
Women   1/1 1/1 1/1 ¼ 1/d 1/- 11d   





Carpenters Per 5/6 6/- 6/4 6/7 4/7 5/-  5/2   
  
Day 
Mechanics   7/- 7/- 7/4 7/4 5/3 5/7 5/9   
Blacksmiths   6/- 6/6 6/3 7- 4/7 5/- 5/-   
102 
This table reflects the fluctuating nature of the wage system in Kingston and the surrounding 
parishes. Laborers were typically paid an average wage of 2/4 to 3/ for unskilled work, and 
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higher wages were paid to artisans. Women however, were always on the low end of the wage 
scale, whether they were located in Kingston or the outer parishes.103  
The spark that ignited the conflict into a working-class struggle was the eruption of 
labor-related violence at the Tate & Lyle Frome Sugar Estate in Westmoreland, on May 2, 1938. 
The disturbance occurred when laborers employed by Frome discovered that their pay packets 
reflected a reduction in their wages, ranging from three to six pence per day.104 Enraged 
laborers attacked the pay office and destroyed property and threatened to assault the pay 
master, Mr. A. Lindo, whom they blamed for the deductions. Due to a lack of action on the part 
of the estate owners, laborers declared a strike.105 A crowd of a thousand or more laborers 
picketed the central factory. In an effort to defend the picket line, the strikers prevented 
delivery trucks from reaching their destination and morning laborers from getting any work 
accomplished. When the police arrived, they confronted a crowd armed with stones, knives, 
and machetes (cutlasses). The angry crowd threw stones and other such implements at the 
police; the police responded by firing shots into the crowd, which forced them to disperse.106  
Alexander Bustamante once again offered his services as mediator and met with Mr. 
Lewis A. Grant, one of the Frome estate managers, and discussed the changes that were being 
implemented to improve labor conditions. “Changes included proper medical care for laborers, 
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among whom ‘hookworm’ was a problem, and a regular dentist.”107 Bustamante was also 
shown plans for a housing development project to accommodate Frome workers, but the 
problem of low wages remained. Bustamante argued that the plans to improve the estate were 
adequate, but workers needed more money to survive.108 In defense of the workers, 
Bustamante further blamed the governor and police for the aggressive actions used against the 
workers at Frome, and he warned that more violence was to be expected if something was not 
done to help the workers and their families.109 
An investigation into the Frome Riots by the Royal Commission uncovered several 
problems within the Crown Colony system, which precipitated the labor rebellion of 1938.110 
Members of the Royal Commission reported that the riots at Frome were partially the result of 
a previous error, where a newspaper advertised that Tate & Lyle was seeking laborers and 
promised a dollar a day.111 Thousands of unemployed and desperate laborers descended on the 
Frome Estates, and those not hired were allowed to remain in the area, further intensifying the 
agitation.112 Violence erupted when laborers received their pay packets and discrepancies were 
reported. When estate owners denied that one dollar a day was feasible, workers called a 
strike. Laborers interviewed by reporters for The Daily Gleaner complained that Tate & Lyle was 
to blame for the strike because they forced workers to work seven days a week for little pay. 
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Workers were used to working five days a week with weekend free to farm and provide food 
for their families. Poor living conditions, low wages, and a lack of labor leaders created chaos.113 
According to the Royal Commission report, this situation was exacerbated by Bustamante, who 
promoted the strike and encouraged workers to disrupt Frome Estates production. In 
promoting his political ideals, Bustamante constantly referred to the Frome Riots in speeches 
aimed at maintaining the ‘psychology of discontent.’114 Frome laborers influenced by 
Bustamante’s inflammatory speeches, formed road blocks, and armed themselves to prevent 
Frome Estates from conducting business. Violence erupted when police confronted a hostile 
mob of laborers outside the main gates at Frome. Bustamante argued that aggression used 
against laborers at Frome was unnecessary, stating, “why did not the police aim at the feet of 
the people if they wanted to restore law and order as they say? No; they aimed deliberately at 
the hearts of the people who were agitating for their bread, I saw one woman who would in the 
next four or five months become a mother suffer and die from a bullet in the forehead.”115 
Bustamante’s graphic account of the violence involved at the Frome Estates was aimed at 
dramatizing the tragedy of the riot for his own benefit, a tactic that he would successfully 
exploit as a politician. 
May 1938 marked the pinnacle of labor dissatisfaction in Jamaica and what followed 
throughout the year was a series of planned strikes all over the island. These disturbances 
granted Bustamante national attention as the recognized leader of the common man and 
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ignited a social upheaval that politicized working-class Jamaicans and altered the colonial 
administration.116 Wharf workers disrupted business in Jamaica when they struck for higher 
pay. Workers received nine pence per hour but wanted 1/ shilling instead. Stevedores also 
demanded time-and-a-half for overtime, public holidays, and night work. United Fruit Company 
wharf owners rejected the laborers’ demands because they believed that the current rate of 
pay was generous.117 After negotiations broke down, the owners promised to return to the 
bargaining table, but only after workers returned to work. Desperate workers attempting to 
maintain the purpose of the strike threatened fellow workers if they tried to return to work 
without achieving their goal of 1/ shilling per hour. Bustamante, as the leader of the wharf 
strike, recognized his growing popularity among the populace when he declared, “this is not a 
military revolution; it is merely a mental revolution. I say and I shall repeat that if there is going 
to be a master of this field (labor relations) in Jamaica, if there is going to be a dictator, then, I 
am going to be that dictator.”118  
Bustamante’s fame increased during the wharf strike when he and fellow union leader, 
St. William Grant, were arrested during a labor meeting and charged for allowing people to 
assemble unlawfully and disobeying police order to disperse. They were denied bail because of 
their role in unlawful assembly.119 The arrest of the labor leaders intensified labor agitation. 
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Wharf workers refused to negotiate with owners or go back to work until Bustamante and 
Grant were released from jail.120 The process was further complicated by an extemporaneous 
island-wide strike in support of the labor leaders’ release.  
Workers also voiced their dissatisfaction with the local economy and the government. 
According to The Daily Gleaner reports, there was no warning of trouble when the strike 
occurred and no notice was given to any employers when the workers walked off the job. “No 
violence was used in closing the stores, no attempt at pilfering or robbery.”121 Garbage men 
specifically helped to blockade and shut down the city. Violence occurred when strikers and 
police clashed. “Serious trouble flared up early in the day when a large mob of men, women, 
and children obstructed an armed police party at Matthews Lane assaulting them with stones 
and bottles. The police fired at the crowd and 2 persons, a woman and a boy, were killed, and 
another boy was seriously wounded.”122 The police assault against innocent civilians at 
Matthews Lane resulted in a riot developing among laborers, property damage, looting, and 
further violence. 
Amid the confusion resulting from the labor leaders’ arrest, Bustamante’s cousin 
(Norman Manley, Kings Council and Jamaica’s leading criminal attorney) became the mediator 
for the BITU. In this interim period, Manley negotiated with the Conciliation Board on the 
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workers’ behalf and managed to attain major concessions from wharf owners. Manley also 
pledged his support to Bustamante by achieving his release from jail on May 27. Upon his 
release, Bustamante met with the Conciliation Board and then announced at a labor rally that “I 
have been out of jail for only a few hours but I have got everything for you.”123 A crowd of 
15,000 laborers gathered to hear Bustamante and other union leaders discuss the benefits of 
the labor negotiations. An enthusiastic crowd chanted, “We will follow Bustamante, we will 
follow Bustamante till we die, Bustamante the chief.”124 This declaration of loyalty by 
grassroots supporters to Bustamante, which transitioned out of the union movement, was 
detrimental to the evolution of partisan politics.  
As a consequence of his appeal, Bustamante established himself in local politics as the 
“Messiah” of the common man in Jamaica. The ability of local leaders such as Bustamante to 
manipulate unconditional loyalty among grassroots supporters ultimately distorted 
unionization and the political process as they exploited patriotism, encouraged partisan politics, 
and used patronage to maintain power. The framework of this process was evident in June 
1938 when Bustamante threatened the local government with violence if his authority was 
questioned: “if they ever send me back to prison, Kingston will be a mass of ruins. We are going 
to burn Kingston down.”125 Bustamante’s threat to use violence as a part of labor tactics 
contributed to the development of conflict within modern Jamaican politics. Violence was 
recorded in the Governor’s correspondence in 1938, seen in the table below, which 
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demonstrates increased acts of violence against laborers as the labor rebellion escalated in 
1938.  
Table 2 






Killed       Seriously         Total 
Police and Local 
Forces 
Killed             Total 
69 Frome 
May 2 
4              9             8           21 3         3 
94 Kingston 
May 22–24 
2            17             53           73 6         6 
95 Caymanas 
May 26 
4             4  
98 Spanish Town 
May 26 
2                   2           4 4         4 
114 St. Elizabeth 
& Clarendon 
June 2 
2                               2  
118 Islington & 
St. Mary 
June 3 
3          2                                 5  




1        2                                    3 1     1 
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126 St. Catharine 10        7                   109    119 14    14 
126 
In the period following his release, Bustamante spent the next several months 
consolidating his power base in order to become, according to George Eaton, the undisputed 
boss of the trade union movement by forming a single union movement with himself as leader. 
With the emergence of numerous and independent unions, Bustamante faced a challenge from 
rival union leaders such as Allan George St. Claver Coombs, leader of the Jamaica Workers and 
Tradesmen’s Union, who openly questioned his right to leadership.127 Consequently, 
Bustamante engaged in a vindictive process to depose his rivals, using slander and treachery to 
destroy not only Coombs’ reputation, but his union as well.128  
Through the JWTU, Allan Coombs had established a power base in Montego Bay among 
banana workers. When Bustamante decided to challenge Coombs for power, he succeeded by 
getting the Spanish Town branch of the JWTU to cede their allegiance to the Bustamante 
Industrial Trade Union (BITU).129 In order to further undermine Coombs’ control of the area, 
Bustamante participated in an inadvisable strike by store clerks. The Northern Clerks 
Association planned a staged walkout by store clerks to protest the 9 o’clock closing time of 
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stores instead of 6 o’clock on weekends. Clerks were also protesting the firing of their 
colleagues, and asked Bustamante to negotiate for the clerks. He won the clerks’ reinstatement 
and a 6 o’clock closing time on weekends.130 This intervention allowed Bustamante to gain not 
only a foothold in Montego Bay, but to also displace the JWTU, forcing Coombs to withdraw to 
other communities within St. James where his union dominated local politics.131 
The problem Bustamante confronted in 1938–39 were multifaceted because he not only 
had to deal with dissent within the union from his second in command, St. William Grant, but 
he also had to contend with a rebellious labor force engaging in independent acts of protest.132 
St. William Grant, however, proved to be the most disruptive because he challenged 
Bustamante for leadership in the summer of 1938 by demanding a more dominant position in 
the union and that his name should appear in the union title of the BITU. Grant also accused 
Hugh Buchanan of treachery, Laurie Wellington of malicious gossip, and others of graft. Grant 
argued that his loyalty was being questioned when he had always supported Bustamante so 
much so that he went to jail for him; Grant also contended that the union was being 
undermined from within and it must be purged of traitors.133 Bustamante responded to Grant’s 
demands by expelling him from the union that he helped to create.134  
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Once his power base was solidified, Bustamante focused on expanding the union and 
exploiting the adulation of the populace in order to emerge as the only honest and loyal leader 
of the people. Bustamante had enough opportunity to prove his worth with the eruption of 
labor strikes all over the island. On May 28th, workers in Clarendon protested on the streets, 
enforced road blocks, and cut telephone wires to prevent the police from arriving. 135 On May 
29th and 30th, workers in Manchester, armed with sticks and cutlasses, protested in the streets 
and barricaded the roads. The crowd would only disperse when the military fired warning shots 
and, using bayonets, attacked the crowd. Similar incidents were further reported throughout 
the rural parishes.136 Labor leaders blamed the colonial government for failing to implement 
economic and political policies that would uplift the black working class. 
Norman Manley argued in favor of an independent government when he attacked the 
British government for their mismanagement and destructive control of the colony. Manley 
contended that due to that colonial control, the Jamaican legislative laws remained weak 
because local leaders possessed no real power.137 The local economy was dominated by the 
British, who not only depleted Jamaica’s natural resources but also maintained a colonial 
system that exploited the working class. As a consequence of the oppressive nature of the 
Crown Colony system, which caused the labor rebellion and eventually the workers efforts to 
unionize, Jamaica’s first political party emerged. The People’s National Party (PNP) was 
launched on September 18, 1938, in an effort to create a government that would displace the 
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local legislative administration appointed and controlled by the British government.138 
Consequently, the PNP national platform promoted self-government, economic and social 
development, enforcement of constitutional laws, universal adult suffrage, and protection of 
local industries, in an effort to uplift and protect the Jamaican populace.139 The British 
government responded to the radical movement by sending members of the Royal Commission 
to investigate not only the labor rebellion of 1938 but also the factors behind legislative 
mismanagement. As local leaders, both Alexander Bustamante and Norman Manley testified 
before the commission and demanded the establishment of a minimum wage (one dollar per 
day), pensions, workmen’s compensation, legalized unionization, and agricultural training in 
order that laborers could improve their economic condition.140 Manley further stressed that 
unless some legislative changes were implemented that benefited the masses, discontent 
would continue to reproduce itself in the form of violence since laborers did not have the 
means to seek redress through the courts as was done in the U.S.141 
The formation of the PNP as a political organ to exert progressive change in the 
Jamaican legislature was followed by the consolidation of the Bustamante Unions into the 
Bustamante Industrial and Trade Union (BITU) on January 23, 1939. 142 The BITU aimed to 
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defend the workers’ interests. Unfortunately, Bustamante also used the union as a political 
weapon directed at destroying his enemies such as Allan Coombs. Bustamante’s abuse of his 
authority would garner criticisms from Coombs and others that he was establishing a 
dictatorship over the unions when he installed himself as president for life of the BITU.143 G. 
Scotter, a reporter for The Daily Gleaner, contended that Bustamante’s actions could possibly 
threaten the future development of unionism in Jamaica by retarding the process, an argument 
that was taken up by historians, George Eaton and Richard Hart. Bustamante’s idea of unionism 
was antidemocratic; Scotter contended that the union itself had no voice, no power, and no 
constitution unless Bustamante allowed it.144 If Bustamante represented the voice of the union, 
where was democracy? This constituted a legitimate question because Bustamante’s egotism 
demanded that only he be acknowledged as the leader of the union as well as be allowed to 
possess the authority to exercise power over the masses, which forms the base of partisan 
politics.145 Although Bustamante won the battle with Coombs, his irresponsible decision to 
consolidate the union was disastrous for the BITU because the union’s membership declined 
after the conflict, and Bustamante proved to laborers that not only was he arrogant but also 
that the workers’ interests were secondary to his ability to control of the union movement. 
Bustamante’s egocentric tendencies resurfaced in early February 1939 when he 
attempted once again to eradicate his rival, Allen Coombs, who managed to maintain a 
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foothold in the parish of St. James and in some areas along the wharfs in Montego Bay. 
Bustamante exploited a minor confrontation on the wharf with Mr. Reid, a member of the 
JWTU, by demanding his dismissal and threatened to launch an island-wide general strike that 
would paralyze the country’s economy.146 Despite the lack of preparation, loyal laborers took to 
the picket line protesting against scabs that were employed to replace the strikers. This 
situation was made more chaotic when employers, such as the United Fruit Company, 
retaliated through the mass dismissal of employees who participated in the strike.147 
Bustamante’s decisions brought the union movement to the verge of collapse. At this juncture, 
Norman Manley intervened and took command of the negotiations between Bustamante, 
Governor Sir Arthur Richards, and Allen Coombs, and a compromise was arranged. In return for 
calling off the strikes, the governor would lift the state of emergency, and employers would 
discontinue retaliations against laborers. Additionally, the Trade Union Advisory Council (TUAC) 
was created to “act as advisory committee to the trade unions.”148 The TUAC comprised 
Norman Manley, Alexander Bustamante, N.N. Nethersole, and nine other union and non-union 
leaders. During the year, Bustamante slowly withdrew the BITU from the TUAC and PNP in an 
effort to dominate the unionization process. 
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However, the advent of World War II adversely affected the labor movement when 
rolling blockades enforced by both Britain and Germany disrupted trade in Jamaica.149 The 
enforcement of the Defense and Emergency Regulations from September 1938 to September 
1939 affected local labor agitation through the curtailment of civil liberties, which restricted 
wharf workers’ attempts to protest. War forced Jamaica into an era of semi-repose with the 
war effort diverting national attention, even as the island’s economy was in a state of decline, 
and increased unemployment, disrupted trade, and reduced wages produced local 
dissatisfaction.150 Consequently, Bustamante responded to laborers’ concern with direct action 
to revitalize the impotent union movement.151 Presenting a speech to wharf workers on 
September 8, 1940, Bustamante said, “I have stood for peace from the first day I have been in 
public life, but my patience is exhausted. This time if need be, there will be blood from the 
streets to the grave.”152 The speech reflected Bustamante’s efforts to intimidate the oppressive 
state apparatus. This statement was recognized as a threat by Governor Richards, who ordered 
Bustamante’s arrest, and he was charged with making an inflammatory speech. The internment 
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of Bustamante served to benefit his leadership by making him a martyr for the labor movement 
and rallied the country to his cause.153  
With Bustamante incarcerated, Norman Manley returned as a mediator for the 
struggling BITU. Both leaders agreed that Manley would act to revive the union. Manley 
responded by recruiting radical socialist leaders working for the PNP, such as Richard Hart, Ken 
Hill, Frank Hill, Arthur Henry, and others to assume leadership within the BITU.154 One of the 
first issues that Manley confronted was discontent among sugar workers over low wages. 
Workers were told by their employers that no wage increase could be made until the 
government-appointed Minimum Wage Advisory Board made a decision about the amount of 
the new minimum wage.155 In an effort to assist the workers and alleviate the problem, Manley 
organized the sugar-producing parishes of Clarendon, St. Catherine, and Trelawney into 
participating in a strike. The strike proved to be effective in destabilizing the sugar industry; 
Manley was called upon by Governor Richards to sign a landmark agreement. The terms of the 
contract provided for “immediate wage increase and cost of living escalator clause to govern 
future adjustments. The larger sugar manufacturers would underwrite smaller producers and 
the government would bear half of any cash support needed.”156 Manley’s contribution to the 
BITU was obvious. When Bustamante was released from jail on February 8, 1942, the union had 
                                                          
153
 Eaton, Alexander Bustamante and Modern Jamaica, 78; also referenced in Post, Strike the Iron, 430–431. 
154
 Rex Nettleford, Manley and the New Jamaica: Selected Speeches and Writings 1938–68 (Jamaica: Longman 
Caribbean, 1971), 54. 
155
 Eaton, Alexander Bustamante and Modern Jamaica, 78–79; also referenced in Post, Strike the Iron, 421–428. 
156
 PRO: CO 137/854/14. Letter, Inspector P. Long to Secretary of the Colonies, May 26, 1942, 1; also referenced in 
PRO: CO 137/852 File 69130 N. N. Nethersole to Citrine, telegram February 28, 1941; PRO: CO 137/852 File 
69130 Officer Administering Government to Secretary of State, telegram March 2, 1941; Eaton, Alexander 
Bustamante and Modern Jamaica, 79; Post, Strike the Iron, 431–449. 
69 
 
a membership totaling 20,612 of which 13,741 paid dues. The BITU leadership was dominated 
by PNP socialist radicals such as Frank Hill, Ken Hill, Richard Hart, and Arthur Henry, who were 
brought in to revitalize the union.157 
Bustamante and violence  
The colonial government, using the services of the local Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID), monitored and exploited the distrust between Alexander Bustamante and 
Norman Manley to maintain control over the emerging progressive movement. In May 1942, 
the CID (through their investigation) placed the blame for local unrest at the door of the PNP, 
arguing that it was easier to lead the people if they were afraid and confused.158 The CID’s 
investigation further accused the PNP of using the legislation enforced as a result of the war 
effort to indict and condemn the British government of exploitation and neglect. “Now, seizing 
upon every incident and turning same to suit their policy and propaganda, the PNP are 
spreading anti-government propaganda, and at the same time, psychologically working the 
public up to a state of excitement and scared apprehension by exaggerating conditions, 
knowing that this will add to the issue.”159 The PNP was dangerous because Manley was 
influenced by radical leftists such as Arthur Henry, Ken Hill, Frank Hill, and Richard Hart, who 
                                                          
157
 PRO: CO 137/840 File 68511/229—Governor Richards to Secretary of State (Telegram), November 4, 1940; 
also referenced in PRO: CO 968/68/7 File 14463—Statement of Alexander Bustamante to Detention Advisory 
Committee, January 10, 1942; PRO: CO 968/68/7 File 14463—W. H. Flinn, Officer Administering the Government, 
to Stanley, January 23, 1943; PRO: CO 968/68/7 File 14463—Direction: Suspension of Detention against Alexander 
Bustamante, February 8, 1942, 1; also found in Post, Strike the Iron, 452–460. 
158
 PRO: CO 137/854/14. Letter, 2. 
159
 PRO: CO 137/854/14. Letter, 1. 
70 
 
supported self-government in an effort to undermine British control of Jamaica.160 The CID 
recommended that the fear of internment be used to disrupt the base leadership of the 
unions.161 This strategy had been tried before when Bustamante was interned both in 1938 and 
1940; however, his internment proved problematic for the colonial government because under 
Manley, the union movement solidified around the BITU. Manley’s charismatic leadership and 
successful negotiation of his release represented a threat to Bustamante’s autocratic control 
over the union, and this alienated both leaders politically.162  
Upon his release from jail, Bustamante accused other labor leaders of “acting to destroy 
his union through socialism, unholy combination of certain persons with political ambition 
whose objective is that of destroying me and then to assume control of the union as a political 
machine to serve their own big friends.”163 Manley responded to Bustamante’s accusations by 
arguing that Bustamante had made a secret agreement with Governor Richards and his actions 
since his release was evidence of that arrangement. Manley’s accusation was justified because 
the Public Record Office in London released documents in 1993, which proved that Bustamante 
had an agreement with the British government to break his affiliation with the PNP in return for 
his release.164 Manley also charged Bustamante with ingratitude for all that was done on his 
behalf. Manley formulated a plan that would sever PNP association with the BITU “because I 
knew that people were saying that Bustamante was detained because he was associated with 
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the PNP, and the government did not like the PNP. I asked him if it was true and this is what he 
said: the government had taken him out of detention camp before a high officer and asked him 
to sign a document promising to denounce the PNP as a condition of his getting out.”165 The 
tension and conflict between Bustamante and Manley became the catalyst for the polarization 
of party politics and the rapid deterioration of the political process that would later be reflected 
in the institutionalization of political violence, which was evident in the inter-party conflict. That 
was further supported by Manley’s assertion that once again, the colonial government was 
seeking to divide the union movement and the PNP in an effort to gain control over the 
progressive forces behind political, economic, and social reconstruction.166  
Bustamante denied these claims and began purging the union leadership of anyone who 
opposed his authority. The acting president of the BITU, H. M. Shirley, was one such victim, who 
launched the Jamaica Workers Union, in opposition to the BITU.167 Bustamante justified 
Manley’s suspicion when he ordered BITU officers to break all ties with the PNP, and he further 
accused the PNP leadership of being socialist with their radical ideas aimed at self-government, 
public ownership, political education, and universal adult suffrage, all of which undermined the 
power of the state.168 The rift between Bustamante and Manley became the catalyst for the 
polarization of party politics and the rapid deterioration of the political process, which would 
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later be reflected in the institutionalization of political violence. In order to challenge the PNP 
within the political arena, Bustamante founded the Jamaica Labor Party in August 1942 to 
contest the PNP in the upcoming 1944 general elections.169  
The effective creation of the JLP resulted in the establishment of the two-party system. 
Representing a by-product of the BITU, the JLP and its political platform reflected the unions’ 
ideals through the promotion of minimum wage, pensions, workmen’s compensation, support 
of big business, and land settlement schemes. The revision of the constitution, which granted 
universal adult suffrage, intensified the 1944 general elections by allowing Bustamante to 
appeal to new voters and win political power. Bustamante’s ability to manipulate the gap 
between the classes benefited the JLP when he exploited the distrust between the black 
working-class poor, and brown middle class by arguing that the PNP was dominated by light-
skinned blacks who would oppress poor blacks if they won the election. This kind of class 
manipulation contributed to the polarization of Jamaican society by not only distorting class 
and color prejudice, but also by complicating the divergent groups’ understanding of reality.170 
Bustamante’s agreement with the British government prompted him to oppose the PNP’s 
demand for self-government: “I oppose immediate self-government; I oppose more so those 
who are clamoring for self-government now” because the JLP administration needed a period 
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of tutelage to understand the fundamentals necessary to operate local government.171 
Bustamante’s belief that the island needed the colonial apparatus represents his attempt to 
utilize British support to maintain control and power of the state, thereby, undermining the 
PNP’s growing popularity.  
Bustamante’s autocratic leadership of the JLP effectively polarized the Jamaican 
populace into two distinctly loyal groups of constituents. Since the JLP became the dominant 
political party after 1943, the PNP emerged as a counterpoise to the JLP in an effort to 
undermine and dismantle the BITU’s control over supporters at the grassroots level. With the 
future of Jamaica and unlimited power recognized as the remuneration, the competition 
between the JLP and PNP degenerated into inter-party conflict, promoting slander and 
violence. In 1944, the competition for the first general elections intensified as Bustamante 
attacked the PNP’s ideology, using political slander (by equating socialism with slavery) to 
confuse and agitate the voting public. The Daily Gleaner reported in various articles that Manley 
pledged to destroy ‘Bustamanteism.’ “He said he would live to get that damnable thing called 
Bustamanteism destroyed in this country, and in that effort he would ask the people of Eastern 
St. Andrew to hold up his hand, not for his own sake, but for the sake of the great and 
imperishable national movement.”172  
Manley further defended the PNP by trying to show how the party contributed to the 
union’s cause of 1938; however, he warned that one of the greatest threats to Jamaica’s 
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democracy was the current conspiracy between the JLP and the Jamaican Democratic Party 
(JDP) in an effort to undermine the new constitution, which not only granted self–government 
to the local legislature but also destroyed the ancient privileges of the Crown Colony system.173 
The JDP was formed in 1943 by citrus farmer T.H. Sharp and represented capitalist interests by 
openly advocating for free enterprise, a direct counter to the PNP’s socialist ideals. The JDP 
acted in conjunction with the JLP to undermine the PNP’s political programs aimed at 
nationalization.174 The Daily Gleaner reported that Manley attacked Bustamante’s domineering 
and ‘Messiah’-like complex. He also charged that Bustamante’s control of the BITU was corrupt. 
Manley believed that unions were an effective tool in training workers for the responsibilities of 
a democratic government. Bustamante’s dictatorship was a danger to the system.175 
Bustamante defended the JLP and criticized the PNP propaganda machine by equating 
‘Bustamanteism’ with labor and then accusing Manley and the PNP of attempting to destroy 
labor, by which he meant poor laborers.176 Bustamante further condemned the PNP for party 
aggression and for exploiting color and class prejudice to alienate the JLP from its working-class 
and peasant support base. Bustamante himself exploited the suspicion that existed against the 
radical middle-class that challenged British authority by asserting that brown middle-class 
domination would mean further oppression by the state for the black working-class.177 
Bustamante argued:  “How could I seek friendship with a party, some of whose officers sow the 
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seed of dissension in the ranks of labor and preach race hatred, and support the use of birth 
control as a means to liquidate the poor colored people of this country?”178 Bustamante also 
attacked the socialist platform of the PNP and contended that through socialism, the PNP 
planned to destroy the poor farmer by taking away his land as part of their public ownership 
ideology.  
Furthermore, the JLP equated socialism with slavery. This claim was possible because in 
September 1940, the PNP declared itself a ‘radical left wing party.’179 Manley asserted that 
“socialism was not just a matter of higher wages and better living conditions for workers but 
that it involves the concept that all the means of production should in one form or the other 
come to be publicly owned and publicly controlled.”180 Since the ordinary farmer was unfamiliar 
with the subtle differences between the Marxian definition of socialism and communism, in 
general, the JLP’s propaganda tactics had negative consequences for the PNP in the rural 
areas.181 In another effort to destabilize the PNP’s political machine, Bustamante claimed that 
the leaders of the Opposition Party had done nothing to help poor workers before the advent 
of the BITU; therefore, they were political parasites who aimed to manipulate the efforts of the 
BITU to their own advantage.182 
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Bustamante also launched a personal attack against Manley’s reputation when he 
denied that Manley had anything to do with the success of the BITU or Bustamante’s release 
from jail. Finally, Bustamante exploited the psychology of dependence on Britain by insinuating 
that the PNP’s support of self-government questioned Jamaica’s loyalty to the British Crown. 
Ironically, George Eaton has argued that “the reality of the Jamaican experience, however, was 
that the masses ever since 1865 had come to view the British crown as the protector against 
the plantocracy and the black and colored middle class.”183 As a result of these tactics and the 
charismatic leadership of Bustamante, the JLP emerged victorious in the 1944 general elections 
with Alexander Bustamante elected as chief minister and the JLP winning twenty three of the 
thirty two seats while the PNP claimed only four and the independent party won five seats in 
the new government.184 
Although the 1944 general election process was marked by political exploitation and 
manipulation, the period after 1945 ushered in an era of political violence as Jamaican society 
was turned against the PNP-TUC and affiliated unions. The conflict between the JLP and PNP 
destroyed labor solidarity by polarizing the working-class populace. This situation deteriorated 
further when Bustamante declared war against the Trade Union Council (TUC) and pledged to 
destroy all affiliated members of the union in an effort to undermine the PNP’s union support 
base.185  
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Bustamante’s opportunity arose on February 15, 1946, when he politicized the Mental 
Hospital Workers Union strike. The 280 nurses and other hospital workers affiliated with the 
TUC went on strike to protest poor working conditions and removal of the senior medical 
officer, a BITU sympathizer.186 Bustamante intervened by visiting the hospital and was 
subsequently slightly injured. Bustamante responded by rallying 5,000 JLP supporters to 
capture and return the mentally ill to the hospital; he also encouraged the police to use an ‘iron 
hand’ to enforce the peace.187 In return, Manley rallied other union members, from the prison 
guards to rail road workers, to support the hospital workers’ right to have the TUC represent 
them.  
The ensuing riot at the hospital was a significant milestone for Jamaica because the 
labor rebellion of 1938 witnessed the use of force by the British Crown Colony system to 
oppress poor Jamaicans. Now, it was Bustamante, the self-proclaimed man of the people and 
elected leader, who encouraged the mob to riot in order to accomplish the BITU’s agenda.188 
George Eaton asserted that “faced with disruption of meetings and molestation of supporters, 
actual or supposed, the PNP retaliated by forming their own protective groups or strong-arm 
squads.”189 Further violence occurred during which three people were killed and many more 
wounded. As the strike progressed, Kingston was overrun by mental patients who escaped 
during the riots, and chaos ruled the streets as workers continued to protest and fight with the 
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police. The governor had to declare a state of emergency to restore order, and negotiations 
resulted in the indictment of Bustamante and fellow BITU organizer, Frank Pixley, for 
manslaughter in the death of J. Nicholas, an innocent bystander who was beaten to death by an 
angry BITU mob. They were acquitted by trial in June 1946.190 However, Bustamante’s 
willingness to participate in violent protests signaled in 1946 the corruption of modern politics 
in Jamaica. 
Despite Bustamante’s acquittal, he was frequently caught violating local laws in the 
1940s. As the leader of the union movement, Bustamante attended political rallies, armed with 
a revolver, just in case he had enemies present. This fact was recorded by Governor Higgins in a 
telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in January 1948, which reported that 
Bustamante was fined five pounds and convicted on four charges of obstruction and assault of 
police constables in the execution of their duty on October 2, 1947.191 The violence that is 
typically affiliated with the development of unionism became the violence that emerged in the 
aftermath of the 1938 labor rebellion and created the framework for violence in modern 
Jamaican politics. This fragmented political system was further corrupted by Alexander 
Bustamante’s defiance and disdain for the PNP when he condoned acts of violence or 
encouraged JLP supporters to attack their PNP opponents. 
Bustamante’s support for political violence was also evident in an address made before 
the House of Representatives in 1947 in which he promised to incite the populace to violence 
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and revolution if changes were not made to the 1944 revised constitution and certain members 
appointed by the British government (such as the governor, Sir John Higgins) replaced. 
Bustamante’s demand was universally supported by the Jamaican people, who condemned 
governmental appointees for localized problems rather than the British government. Critics 
responded by admonishing Bustamante for his speech and reminded all politicians that as 
leaders of Jamaica, it was their responsibility to uphold the dignity and integrity of their 
offices.192 Manley further asserted that “the time has come when the work for labor must be 
more closely coordinated with the work in the political field. It is not two progressive 
movements, but one progressive movement, consisting of different classes of people and the 
foundation of its strength must be in the class at the bottom.”193 However, these concerns were 
ignored as politicians pursued their own ambition for political domination through the creation 
of local agitation. 
Political irresponsibility was evident on January 15, 1948, when Bustamante launched 
the ‘red smear’ campaign where he attacked the PNP on the grounds that they had been 
infiltrated by Red Communists; and Bustamante promised that he was going to take steps to 
‘stamp it out.’ Bustamante contended that “he had thousands of soldiers to do this,” the 
Liverpool Post reported,  “addressing thousands of his followers at union headquarters” to 
accomplish this task.194 This was, however, partially an anti-JLP crowd; and they disrupted the 
rally by booing during Bustamante’s speech. In trying to leave the meeting, Bustamante was 
surrounded and verbally abused; he responded to this threat by drawing his gun and firing into 
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the air. After Bustamante had departed, an angry mob—armed with pick axes, cutlasses, 
shovels, and iron bars—rioted, destroying property.195 Bustamante’s actions in this case were 
not only irresponsible because he was the chief minister of Jamaica, but his willingness to 
publicly draw a gun to confront an angry mob symbolized Bustamante’s acceptance of political 
violence and legitimized this tactic for the wider populace. 
The increasing confrontations between political rivals resulted in the continued 
escalation of political violence. Other telegrams between the Governor and the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies and newspaper articles reported confrontations at political rallies in 
Kingston on October 30, 1950, where in response to a disorderly and rioting crowd, police used 
teargas to disperse the mob after shots had been fired at a Labor Party meeting. One man was 
wounded in the knee and three police constables and two other men were hurt during the 
violence.196 Consequently, the Governor responded by issuing a proclamation that prohibited 
any political meeting in the urban and suburban areas for a month.197 Political maneuvers 
continued when violence erupted at the Worth Park Estate on March 13, 1950. The conflict 
emerged when dissatisfied cane cutters called a strike to protest low wages. Over the course of 
the next several days, workers turned to the TUC affiliated with the PNP for representation. The 
TUC, in order to publicize the laborers’ plight, imported members from Kingston to picket the 
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factory and intimidate non-unionized workers.198 The violence that erupted between the police 
and laborers was a consequence of the PNP’s efforts to help workers. Ultimately, the strike 
failed to win the wage increases that the TUC demanded, but it did help to create a volatile 
political atmosphere for the upcoming elections.  
With the advent of the 1955 general elections, violence intensified as Bustamante’s and 
Manley’s electioneering campaign strategies encouraged the active participation of loyal party 
supporters, which resulted in clashes between rival opponents in order to protect not only 
political patronage but also the privileges extended to the party that won. Pre-election tension 
erupted in the PNP-affiliated Gordon Town area, and The Daily Gleaner reported that a farmer, 
Benjamin Taylor, was stabbed to death while many others were injured. The conflict began 
when Alexander Bustamante pushed councilor Wills Isaacs, a member of the opposition, and 
was in turn struck in the face by a stone.199 According to witnesses, the problem began at 3 
o’clock in the afternoon when a truckload of PNP laborers singing anti-JLP songs were attacked 
by JLP supporters armed with stones; the men in the truck disembarked and retaliated against 
those throwing stones. The JLP workers fled the scene down a local gully. Benjamin Taylor, a JLP 
supporter, was caught, beaten, and eventually stabbed.200 It was further reported that once the 
rioting began, Manley arrived to address the crowd in an attempt to prevent further 
violence.201  
                                                          
198
 “Open Conflict in Kingston,” The Daily Gleaner, January 4, 1950, 6; Telegram Secretary of State, March 13, 
1950. 
199







Upon his return, Bustamante was heckled and chastised by the crowd; and when he 
attempted to leave the area, stones were thrown at his car. In his haste to leave the scene, the 
back door of Bustamante’s car was left open and three police constables were injured as the 
car sped away. Bustamante retreated to the courthouse where Norman Manley was holding a 
rally, and he verbally confronted Manley.202 The Daily Gleaner reported the exchange between 
the two men: “Mr. Bustamante had gone up to the courthouse steps where Mr. Manley stood. 
Harsh words passed between them. Mr. Bustamante turned to Superintendent Donald G. 
Neish, who was nearby and said, gas them and gas Manley too.”203 In his haste to depart, 
Bustamante engaged in a scuffle with Wills Isaacs, who was restrained by local police 
constables to prevent further violence. Upon fleeing to his car, Bustamante was struck in the 
face with a rock by someone in the crowd. Due to the police’s use of tear gas to disperse the 
crowd, Bustamante was protected from further harm as the crowd scattered. 
In the days following the riot, the local government investigated the contributing factors 
behind the violence. The inquest raised more questions than it provided answers to.204 Local 
police asserted that members of the PNP were responsible because they had a larger number 
of supporters at the rally. Moreover, PNP supporters were more aggressive and disrespectful to 
the opposition leader.205 However, Police Superintendent Donald G. Neish contradicted that 
argument when he testified that when news of Bustamante’s assault in Gordon Town was 












reported, busloads of JLP supporters descended on the area, although they were denied access 
due to police blockades; and controlling physical confrontation proved difficult.206 On the other 
hand, Wills Isaacs accused JLP officer Hugh Shearer of firing a gun at police officers and 
demanded his arrest. Isaacs displayed his arrogance when he said that “a broken skull did not 
matter in the growth of a nation,” in an effort to explain away the use of political violence.207 
Other witnesses testified that Bustamante was partially to blame because weapons such as 
sticks, lead pipes, and stones were concealed in the trunk of his car; and JLP supporters took 
weapons from Bustamante’s car during the conflict with PNP supporters. At the conclusion of 
the inquest, the courts ruled that the various acts of violence were the fault of the PNP, 
specifically Wills Isaacs, because he provided access for non-voting members of the PNP into 
the area with the purpose of disrupting the election process.208  
This verdict served to increase local agitation because Norman Manley refused to accept 
full responsibility for the violence. Manley insisted that the JLP was equally to blame because 
the JLP sought to intimidate PNP voters in the Gordon Town area.209 As a result of the Hearn 
Report findings, Wills Isaacs resigned as a PNP official for dishonoring and tarnishing the 
reputation of the party. “Isaacs admitted that he had been most indiscreet in his testimony 
before the commission,” The Daily Gleaner reported and added that “he regretted most of all, 
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any inflammatory statements made, especially as they do not represent PNP policy.”210 In a 
final attack, Isaacs cited incidents of violence perpetrated by the JLP prior to the Gordon Town 
incident, which received little public attention or warranted no official inquest that was 
designed to destroy the party at the grassroots level.211 In spite of the Hearn Report’s verdict, 
the 1955 Gordon Town incident reflected not only a willingness by the leaders of political 
parties to use violence but it also witnessed the use of grassroots supporters to instigate acts of 
political violence. 
Despite the scandal attached to the Gordon Town incident, the JLP continued to attack 
and undermine the PNP’s socialist’s political platform. In his campaign for re-election, 
Bustamante vilified the tenets of socialism by effectively making socialism the equivalent of 
slavery, whereby members of the elite dominated the system and the poor were 
subordinated.212 By insinuating that the PNP represented a party which served the interests of 
the middle-class and that under their regime, the ordinary working man would never reap the 
rewards of his own labor and would rather be a slave to the system, Bustamante destroyed the 
PNP politically.213 Bustamante exploited the existing Cold War paranoia that local communists 
were attempting to undermine Jamaica’s democracy by corrupting politics and oppressing the 
people. Other critics of the PNP’s “communist” platform attacked socialism in defense of 
capitalism and argued about the benefits of private ownership. Public control of power, 
communications, and transportation were good ideas and would benefit the Jamaican 
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government, they argued; but the problem remained with socialism and its oppressive nature 
through the rights it appropriates.  
In response to Bustamante’s attack, the PNP was forced to define and defend its version 
of socialism for the wider populace. Manley contended that “Our enemies constantly say that 
we are communist, or dominated, or influenced by communists. They no doubt will go on 
saying so. I am not concerned with those who deliberately misrepresent these matters. The 
PNP is socialist and socialist alone, but it will take no part in red-bating.”214 Unfortunately, the 
PNP’s definition of socialism was frightening to a country struggling to survive in a post-World 
War II era where the Soviet Union’s system of government was viewed as disruptive of 
capitalism and democracy. These conditions were made more problematic by the vagueness of 
the PNP’s definition of socialism and Bustamante’s successful ‘red smear’ campaign. 
Ironically, the emergence of the two-party system destroyed labor solidarity and 
fostered political patronage, which resulted in the eruption of the political violence that 
polarized Jamaican society.215 The Daily Gleaner reporter Kenneth D. Carey argued that political 
patronage negatively affected society because it forced laborers to choose a political party or to 
remain unemployed. A result of this system was that political patronage rose to dominance as 
political and trade union affiliations became a key factor in government employment.216 This 
argument was supported by historian George Eaton, who contends that “Jamaica developed a 
kind of perverse electoral accountability and responsibility system in which the political parties 
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were judged and supported by working-class, not on the basis of the politics they had instituted 
or failed to institute in an attempt to solve the basic problems of the country, but on the basis 
of necessity to maintain control of the distribution of work on government controlled projects. 
Paradoxically, therefore, the fiercest political competition and violent partnership came from 
those who suffered most from the inability of the two political parties to deal with chronic and 
structural unemployment.”217 
The JLP control of government jobs created continued political agitation, which allowed 
the JLP to emerge victorious in the December 21, 1949, general elections. The JLP won 17 seats 
and the PNP made significant gains with 13 seats while independents walked away with 2 seats 
in the local legislature.218 
Conclusion  
A victory for the JLP was destructive for the Jamaican society because Bustamante 
unilaterally refused to support Jamaica’s attempt at modernization and self-government, 
believing such policies would undermine his own authority and political power. In his effort to 
maintain power, Bustamante caused political underdevelopment.219 The political environment 
deteriorated further as Bustamante exploited his authority via control over government 
employment and abused his power as labor mediator for the government, by attacking and 
destroying rival unions, such as the TUC.220 Due to the benefits of political patronage, 
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Bustamante’s rise to power meant that his enemies were subjected and dependent on his 
leadership as Prime Minister to advance Jamaica’s political development and transformation. 
This situation created tension between both parties, which intensified as rival leaders had 
verbal and physical confrontations. If loyal party supporters used local politicians as examples 
of true leadership, then, the eruption of political violence was inevitable since Bustamante 
willingly used crowd actions and exploited not only his popularity but also the fear generated 
about the PNP’s socialist platform by asserting that Manley was a communist intent on 
destroying democracy for the common man.221 Political propaganda was a major component of 
the political process and Bustamante and other popular politicians exploited their control of 
party supporters to incite partisan conflicts. Bustamante’s aggressive political strategy 
promoted violence, especially the type of violence that surfaced in the 1940s and 1950s general 
elections, whereby JLP and PNP supporters protested with party symbols such as the broom to 
sweep out the old or the bell to ring in the new party. When violence was involved, party 
supporters clashed in the streets, using sticks, stones, and machetes as weapons. Preceding 
unionization, dissatisfaction among workers was prevalent; however, local disunity among 
workers prevented organized group action to protest unfair working conditions and to incite 
violence. By the 1960s and 1970s, organized gang violence led to men being armed with semi-
automatic weapons to disrupt the general elections.  
Through the story of Alexander Bustamante’s political development, what I have 
attempted to capture is the unions’ willingness to use violence to achieve their goals, which 
increasingly became political ones. Since unions are directly linked to the creation of modern 
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political parties in Jamaica, the endemic nature of union violence was reproduced in the 
antagonistic relationship that developed between the political parties. This relationship was 
further manipulated by Bustamante, who used his quest for power to radically polarize the 
populace by exploiting issues involving not only color and class but also the vilification of 
Norman Manley by portraying the PNP’s leader as a communist puppet who was going to 
destroy Jamaica’s working-class. Within this framework, what emerged was a political process 
marred by systemic violence as party leaders exhibited a willingness to utilize violence to 














Norman Manley: The Man and the Myth? 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the emergence of violence in modern Jamaican politics. 
Whereas in Chapter One Alexander Bustamante is charged with instigating violence within 
the union movement, what Chapter Two does is to establish the role of Norman Manley in 
the evolution of violence in the political processes in Jamaica. In the context of labor 
unrests in the late 1930s and 1940s, violence became a feature of original Jamaican politics. 
Alexander Bustamante understood how the threat of violence could reinforce his hold on 
both the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) and the political structure; thus, he 
utilized this method to maintain power. I will examine the responses of the People’s 
National Party to Bustamante’s aggressive campaign tactics.  Unlike the current scholarship 
that alludes to partisan violence being relegated to the periphery of politics, this chapter 
will show that Norman Manley, just like Bustamante,  was far from being removed entirely 
from the institutionalization of political violence. 
In 1955, Jamaica’s new Premier, Norman Washington Manley, faced a confrontational, 
manipulative, Jamaica Labor Party, headed by Alexander Bustamante whose use of 
conservative nationalism created the framework for political violence.222 This political structure 
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was further corrupted and exploited by both political parties, thus encouraging loyal grassroots 
supporters to engage in violence in order to maintain power and win elections. Although 
Bustamante encouraged laborers to confront the state apparatus, he could not effectively 
control the violence that emerged, such as the sugar workers’ strike at the Worthy Park Estate 
in January 1951, where an agitated crowd threw stones at Bustamante and other Jamaica Labor 
Party leaders as they attempted to address the audience. This conflict and others exacerbated 
the already-uneasy political climate. In an effort to neutralize and challenge the JLP’s 
aggression, Manley and the People’s National Party became defensive, forming their own gangs 
such as ‘Group 69’ in Kingston, which utilized political gangsterism in order to protect PNP 
members. Manley suggested that such a PNP armed defense was necessary because “I have 
been abused. I have been kicked on Bustamante’s orders at meetings. I have seen my own 
workers in the Party beaten at street corners.”223 
This chapter examines the connection between political leadership and the evolution of 
gang violence, focusing on the Worthy Park Estates and Myrtle Bank strike, the Claudius Henry 
Rebellion, and the failure of the West Indies Federation. It emphasizes how Norman Manley 
and the PNP leadership participated in the use of violence as a political tactic. In 1949, a 
commentary in The Daily Gleaner commentary stated that “men who should be considered in 
the highest regard too often appear in the company of persons known to be of evil reputation. 
The election is being conducted in some quarters as if it cannot be won without the support of 
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criminals.”224 This editorial provides evidence that as early as 1949, Jamaica’s main political 
leadership had already corrupted local politics through their affiliations with petty criminals. 
The fact that the local newspapers could openly discuss PNP ‘Group 69’ or quote JLP boasts that 
“no PNP member dared to hold any meetings below the Cross Roads line,” demonstrates the 
political leaders of Jamaica’s utilization and acknowledgment of the gang problem.225 Local 
gangs were created by politicians who used poverty and desperation to build up armies in the 
slums of west Kingston. This was evident with the PNP’s creation of ‘Group 69’ in west Kingston 
to challenge the JLP’s authority in that constituency. This problem persisted because violence 
was an effective tool with which to destabilize the incumbent government in power. How could 
Jamaican politicians refuse to acknowledge responsibility for a political system that they helped 
to corrupt and develop? Using current scholarship, local newspapers, and government 
documents, this chapter explains how political violence developed in 1944. In addition, the 
chapter explains how the political rivalry between Norman Manley’s socialist vision for 
Jamaican society and Bustamante’s conservative nationalism polarized politics and corrupted it 
locally. 
Biography 
Manley’s political interests developed in the early 1920s when he witnessed a Jamaica 
that lacked political and economic autonomy. Consequently, the working poor were denied civil 
and human rights as well as economic and social justice. This compelled a sympathetic Manley 
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to aggressively defend the civil rights of the common man; he established his political career on 
the principle that the power to govern resided fundamentally with the people. Manley’s 
ideology never wavered. Throughout his career, he fought to protect the rights of the people, 
even to his own detriment, such as his decision to call a referendum on the West Indies 
Federation in 1960 when he could have guided Jamaica through independence. 
 Norman Manley was born in 1893 to Thomas Manley, a dark skinned farmer who loved 
to gamble and invested in the exportation of his own crops. Thomas married a member of the 
prominent Shearer Family, Margaret Shearer, who later became a postmistress in Porus 
Manchester. She was the half-white daughter of Alexander Shearer, and she defied class status 
by marrying a black man.226 
The couple had five children: Douglas, Muriel, Vera, Roy, and Norman. Unfortunately, 
Thomas Manley’s penchant for risk proved disastrous, and he died in 1899 leaving his family 
financially devastated. Upon Thomas Manley’s death, Margaret Manley relocated the family to 
her sister (Mrs. Shrimpton) in Kingston, and left for the United States, unsuccessfully seeking 
employment.227 Inadequate salary forced Mrs. Manley to return home, at which point she 
moved her family to Belmont (a small farm in St. Catherine in which her husband had some 
interest along with her grandfather, Mr. Shearer). Due to her grandfather’s poor health and 
near blindness, Margaret Manley took over his responsibilities and operated the farm on a daily 
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basis. Mrs. Manley not only managed the farm but also performed domestic duties such as 
mending clothing and childrearing. In addition, she petitioned the local authorities to allow her 
to establish a local post office to further provide for her children.228  
With such a determined mother, Norman and his siblings were raised in an environment 
dedicated to hard work and promotion of a higher education. Family was just as important as 
school work, however, and the Manley household hosted various members of the Clarke family, 
including Alexander Bustamante, then known as Alexander Clarke.229 Between the ages of 21 
and 22, Bustamante resided at the Belmont estate as a junior overseer. While there, 
Bustamante acquired the reputation as a good horseman, and peasants traveled from all over 
the parish to have him ‘break’ their animals.230 Norman fondly remembered Bustamante as a 
fun and talented cousin with a zest for life that resulted in his travels around the world. In his 
unpublished autobiography, Norman Manley described himself as a ‘bushman’: “I grew up as a 
bushman. I earned my pocket money cleaning pastures and chipping logwood at the standard 
rates. I would get out in the morning and share lunch with the workers or if we were out 
looking for stray cattle, walk the day and get home late at night after twelve or fourteen hours 
on the constant move.”231 Although Manley believed that his childhood experiences were 
compatible with the average Jamaican, the reality for working-class Jamaicans was that they 
worked because of financial necessity, not for pocket money. That Manley failed to grasp that 
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simple fact when he described himself as a ‘bushman’ suggests that there was a disconnect 
between him and poor laborers.   
Despite Margaret Manley’s determination that all her children receive a good 
education, Manley was undisciplined and erratic in school. He attended various schools: Lloyds 
Elementary School, Spanish Town Secondary School, and in 1906, at 13 years of age, Manley 
attended Jamaica College (JC).232 At this point, Manley was not dedicated to his education and 
his grades reflected this fact; moreover, he became the leader of the school bullies and spent 
the next three years harassing the weaker students. In 1909, when Norman was 16, Mrs. 
Manley died; and he decided to honor her memory by furthering his education through an 
application for the Rhodes Scholarship, although he was unqualified due to both poor academic 
record and disruptive behavior.233 According to Manley, his headmaster was stunned that 
someone of Manley’s character applied for such a prestigious award: “To say that he was 
shocked is to put it mildly; I had done little work and showed no special promise at anything. I 
was reminded by the Head that not only was I far behind in study but also had a thoroughly 
disreputable reputation which would make it almost impossible for his teachers to write 
character recommendations on his behalf.”234 
In spite of Manley’s poor academic record, Mrs. Manley had, before her death, 
appealed to teachers at JC (Mr. Reginald and Mr. Murray) to tutor her son in order to improve 
his grades. In attempting to reform himself, Manley not only dedicated himself to his education 
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but also participated in various sports such as track, cricket, football, and rifle shooting. He also 
taught English and Math classes at Titchfield School and successfully controlled his quick 
temper. According to Manley, “constant inhibition by violent efforts at control gradually wore it 
down till it seemed to disappear with its place being taken by a sort of arrogant indifference 
which was constantly mistaken for the real me.”235 In 1914, Manley was rewarded for his 
efforts with the Rhodes Scholarship; unfortunately, his education was delayed by an attack of 
typhoid fever which almost killed him. Manley claimed that “this illness which nearly killed me 
had a great effect on my life and character.”236 
Ironically, it was Manley’s journey to Europe that helped to shape his political 
development and resulted in his dissatisfaction with the British government. After recovering 
from his illness, Manley traveled to England where he was expected to attend Jesus College, 
Oxford, in the fall of 1914, the same year in which World War I began. With the outbreak of the 
war, Manley reunited with his family in London. While visiting his aunt (Ellie Swithenbank) in 
Penzance, Manley was introduced to his cousin (Edna Swithenbank), who later became his 
wife.237 Manley described Edna, “then a little girl of fourteen, a strange, shy, and highly 
individualistic person quite unlike the rest of her family and unlike anybody I had ever 
known.”238 Manley’s education was interrupted from 1915–1919, when he and his brother 
(Roy) enlisted in the Royal Field Artillery. Manley’s experience in the war was tragic because his 
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brother (Roy) was killed after serving on the Western Front for three years. He also 
encountered racism while serving in the British army, where members of his unit referred to 
him as ‘darkie.’239 This situation became even more problematic when Manley, due to his 
childhood experiences with horses and guns, was promoted to lance corporal and then corporal 
by the time his unit left for France.240 Manley explained that “corporals and sergeants resented 
my sharing status with them. They were rude, spiteful, and later conspired to get me into 
trouble.”241 After being charged with insubordination, Manley negotiated with his commanding 
officer for a transfer for both himself and Roy to the ‘battery of guns.’ In 1917, at the battle of 
Ypres, Manley “lost his brother and was devastated by Roy’s death.” Despite being awarded a 
“military medal for bravery in action,” Manley felt isolated from the wider society.242 Manley’s 
experience in the military created a sense of ambivalence about British governmental authority, 
a sentiment that was later reflected in Manley’s decision as leader of the PNP to support an end 
to the Crown Colony system and the promotion of self-government.   
The conclusion of World War I was a significant transition for Norman because he lost 
his scholarship while serving in the military, struggled to finish Jesus College successfully and 
also felt alienated from his white peers. “Norman felt alone, a brown alien in a white city,” his 
biographer Philip Sherlock writes. What “he said about a sense of superiority being a good 
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protection against the obsessions that color feelings can create was only partly true.”243 In the 
summer of 1921, Manley completed law school and married Edna on June 25. He spent the 
next year as an intern, learning the techniques necessary for being a proficient lawyer. On May 
30, 1922, Edna gave birth to their first child, Douglas; and the family migrated to Jamaica. “I 
dedicated the next several years establishing my practice that kept me at it seven days a week 
and anything up to twenty hours a day, law and court work did not absorb all my mental 
energy.”244  
Since Manley’s law practice dominated his family life, in 1923, Edna returned to London 
for a year to decide whether she wanted to pursue a career in art. Edna felt stifled by racism 
and social status in Jamaica that did not allow women equal access to opportunities. During 
their separation, Manley bought a house later named ‘Drumblair’ and waited for Edna to 
return, which she did in 1924.245 With his family reunited, Manley explored the possibility of a 
political career. Despite his popularity and success as a lawyer Manley was alienated from the 
wider Jamaican society. His position was complicated by his role as barrister for the crown 
charged with subjugating challenges to British colonial authority, which often led to the further 
oppression of poor blacks.246 
The 1930s was a turbulent time for Jamaica and the wider Caribbean. The Great 
Depression resulted in the reduction and withdrawal of financial aid to the West Indies from 
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Great Britain, causing higher rates of unemployment, increased poverty, reduced migration, 
homelessness, starvation wages, and worker oppression. 247 Workers responded to the 
economic crisis through the labor rebellion that erupted all over the Caribbean. In Jamaica, 
violence began in St. Thomas at the Serge Island Estate on January 7, 1938. Workers went on 
strike to demand a higher wage increase from one to two shillings per day. Although initiated 
for fair wages, the strike degenerated into violence as workers responded to employers’ efforts 
to replace the striking workers with scabs.248 In an effort to protect the picket line, the level of 
violence generated by the strike resulted in a committee being formed to investigate the crisis. 
This was headed by Sir Henry Brown, who discovered that not only were wages inadequate but 
that other factors such as poverty, desperation, lack of opportunities, and racism had to be 
considered as part of the dilemma.249 This economic crisis was dramatized when Bustamante 
testified before the commission and stated the “Poor House, the Mad House and the Prisons 
are overcrowded through dire need and poverty, while the streets and villages are over-run 
with beggars who were once respectable people. Thousands upon thousands of able-bodied 
men and women willing to work, over-ran the towns and district, hungry and ragged from the 
want of employment.”250 This argument was supported by the Labor Department which 
reported in 1938–1939 the high rate of unemployment. 
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Unemployment Survey 5 Parishes, 1938–39 
Parishes Laborers Artisans Domestics Clerks Dress 
Makers 
 Male Female     
Kingston & 
St. Andrew 
4,946 814 2,170 3,575 593 963 
Portland 3,305 887 342 534 35 40 
St. Thomas 2,843 562 307 359 22 38 
St. Catherine 3,586 692 354 578 38 42 
St. Elizabeth 2,188 543 335 244 21 46 
 16,868 3,498 3,508 5,290 709 1,129 
251 
Manley’s biographer argues that “as a lawyer he recognized that he had obligations to 
the society in which he lived, and to which he belonged. No man, however poor, should be 
deprived of his help through lack of money.”252 Therefore, as Manley became politicized he 
openly articulated policies of political modernization, universal adult suffrage, self-government, 
and constitutional reforms that would provide opportunities and protect the laboring masses. A 
consequence of Norman’s ideological beliefs was that he became involved in the labor struggles 
among Jamaica’s working class via unionization. 
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Manley attempted to align himself with labor when he organized the Jamaica Banana 
Association, the country’s first large co-operative formed to protect the interests of the small 
farmer. In early 1935, Manley’s efforts on behalf of the workers laid the foundation for the 
future of the labor rebellion in 1938.253 The dilemma that banana producers in Jamaica 
confronted was two-fold. The first issue was the subordination of Jamaica’s banana exports to 
United Fruit Company exploitation. According to Manley, “the United Fruit Company and Elders 
& Fyffes controlled the position in Jamaica. And the small grower paid for it. His price varied 
with United Fruit Company interest and there was no guarantee that he could sell at all when 
his fruit was ready.”254 The second dilemma was local disunity among farmers. Consolidation 
efforts were complicated by Governor Edward Denham who refused to recognize the co-
operative as a legitimate organization. Despite these obstacles, in 1935, Manley met and 
negotiated with Samuel ZeMurray, leading to the creation of the United Fruit Corporation 
(UFCO), which ZeMurray merged with Cuyamel Fruit. Samuel ZeMurray was a powerful 
business mogul whose private company Cuyamel Fruit controlled the banana market in Central 
America in the 1920s. Manley and ZeMurray reached an agreement that protected local banana 
producers: “The proposal was that the United Fruit Corporation would set aside one cent per 
stem exported from Jamaica to form a fund to be administered by an organization to be 
created by me for the good and welfare of the people of Jamaica with emphasis on the rural 
people. This would mean as things then stood some 25,000 dollars nearly 90,000 pounds 
annually.”255 From this offer evolved the Jamaica Welfare Limited, which represented local 
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banana producers and others. Through the organization, Manley acted to protect the interests 
of small proprietors through fixed rates, fair contracts with United Fruit, and legal 
representation. The crisis initiated by the United Fruit Corporation allowed Manley not only to 
explore political leadership but also to create his own power base among small farmers. He, 
then, raised the question: Could Jamaica operate successfully within the colonial framework? 
For Manley, the answer was “No” because the Crown Colony system was designed to oppress 
the local economy and people. Manley advocated for self-government because it was the only 
way to empower the people.256  
Due to his official position as barrister for the crown, Manley was considered the enemy 
of the Jamaican working-class; his decision to participate in the politics of labor disputes, 
however, reflected his support for Alexander Bustamante. Despite Manley’s earlier experience 
as a negotiator for Jamaica Banana Producers, he was not recognized as a labor leader until he 
participated in the labor rebellion of 1938. On January 6, 1938, when sugar workers went on 
strike, labor conflicts erupted at the Serge Island Estate; Alexander Bustamante rallied to the 
cause of labor and, in the process, alienated local leaders within the Crown Colony system by 
attacking the British government for failing to protect the working-class poor. Consequently, on 
May 4, 1938, The Daily Gleaner reported that Bustamante’s actions as labor leader resulted in 
his being arrested and charged for inciting people to unlawfully assemble in 1938.257 
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With the arrest of Bustamante, Norman Manley became the unofficial leader of the 
union movement by negotiating on behalf of dock laborers on strike for higher wages in May 
1938, for one shilling per day and two shillings for overtime work.258 His efforts to settle the 
strike proved problematic since dock workers refused to return to work until Bustamante and 
Grant were released from jail, and other laborers complicated the negotiations by participating 
in an extemporaneous island-wide strike that paralyzed the country.259 Unfortunately, Manley’s 
skill as a negotiator was not the same as Bustamante’s as an organizer. Consequently, there 
was distrust between Manley and the populace when he supported workers’ returning to work 
and terminating the strike. In addressing the workers, Norman encouraged them to participate 
in the negotiation process and asserted that “the object of the Labor Committee that I am 
trying to form is first of all to represent the different groups of workers before the Conciliation 
Board and to negotiate on their behalf; secondly to deal with the organization of Trade Unions; 
and finally to prepare and advocate a program for the general improvement of labor 
conditions. One of the most important tasks of the committee is to devise a viable program for 
labor reform and a foundation for the creation of a genuine Labor Party in Jamaica.”260 Since 
Manley believed that the Crown Colony system was oppressive toward the poor and working-
class blacks in Jamaica, he utilized the unrest generated by the labor rebellion to promote 
change. 
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Manley continued to negotiate with wharf owners and won major concessions for 
workers. Consequently, when Bustamante and Grant were released, Bustamante announced 
that he had won for them an increase of ten to eleven pence per day and new overtime rates of 
pay.261 Although Bustamante took credit for Manley’s work, general national recognition for 
Manley’s efforts on behalf of working-class blacks emerged as a counterpoint to Bustamante’s 
leadership. Manley used his popularity to gain additional power within the labor movement by 
uniting with Bustamante and the BITU to resolve labor conflicts in Jamaica. Since Manley and 
Bustamante had different base constituencies, Manley advocated for legal reforms in rural 
areas. He remained critical of the British government’s control of Jamaica and argued that this 
colonial control rendered the Jamaican laws weak and left Jamaican local leaders without real 
power. Manley realized that it was important for Jamaica’s political development to embrace 
the process of self-government because the current construction and structure of government 
was restrictive. For example, the legislative council contained fourteen elected and fourteen 
nominated members, the latter predominantly white. A governor who was appointed by Britain 
had veto power over local laws and protected British interests. Voters were restricted by 
property qualifications and lacked political knowledge, which resulted in a poor voter turn-
out.262  
Manley further asserted that local leaders refused to cooperate with each other. 
Instead, they fostered a political structure based on disunity among the people.263  
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The council is now a body of bickering and abuse of government even when government is trying to do its 
best in the interest of the country. If the fourteen men, representatives of the people come together with 
the financial power, which they have in their hands, they could control the destinies of this country. What 
is wanted is co-operation. There are many parties in this country everyman is a party unto himself, 
everyman is a voice unto himself. The control of the financial powers of the country would give our 
representatives a considerable amount of power.
264  
Manley looked beyond the labor movement to the future of Jamaica and the destructive role of 
the British government on the island. Consequently, he advocated radical changes such as self-
government that would lead Jamaica towards independence. 
Political Evolution  
Manley argued that if economic and social conditions improved in Jamaica, real changes 
such as self-government and universal adult suffrage needed to be promoted locally.265 In 1938, 
as a union leader, Manley believed that the politician’s responsibility focused on mobilizing the 
masses and the nation towards self-government. Sherlock writes that Manley contended “that 
a government should create the conditions for liberating the potential of the individual, 
coupled with his insistence that the solutions for Jamaica’s problems should be thorough in 
terms of the needs and history of the people, led him to reject any form of dogma, or any 
political theory that put the state first.”266 Consequently, Manley espoused Fabian socialistic 
policies because these promised equal opportunities for all, but socialism was also flexible 
enough to be applied in any country. Manley’s socialist politics meant that he had to invest in 
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educating the Jamaican public about the benefits of self-government and socialism as they 
were applicable to Jamaica.267 
By August 1938, Manley asserted his political independence when he encouraged the 
audiences of the National Reform Association and citizen councils to form political parties to 
support the local economy and sever Jamaica’s dependence on British colonialism. An internal 
dispute within the BITU between Alexander Bustamante and William Grant for complete 
control of the union resulted in the expulsion of Grant from the union for being a traitor. 
Manley continued to travel, to petition the people to participate in local politics, and to 
campaign for self-government because without a united people, Jamaica would remain 
dependent on Great Britain and be forced to subjugate its national interests.268 
Using a platform based on political modernization, constitutional reform, and self-
government, Manley organized the grassroots support base for the People’s National Party 
(PNP) on September 18, 1938. The PNP’s political platform advocated for “political, economic, 
and social progress of Jamaica; exercise effectively the country’s rights and power; promote 
predominantly the public’s interest; achieve self-government; nominate and support 
candidates for election to the legislative council; secure representation of the party in all 
municipal bodies; by guiding, informing, and expressing public opinion through meetings and 
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party literature to develop the political life of the island.”269 Manley warned that the process 
towards self-government remained precarious because the colonial government was 
attempting to disrupt the unity forged by the labor rebellion. For example, rumors circulating 
within the Bustamante Union charged that Manley conspired to usurp Bustamante’s authority 
and become the principal leader of the union. Manley contended that Jamaica could not be 
truly independent until the people had a government that was representative of the people 
through direct election of government officials.270 
Although Bustamante and Manley continued their unionization efforts of Jamaican 
workers and grassroots mobilization, the personal charisma of both men produced rumors that 
disrupted the union’s unity. At the launching of the PNP, Manley observed that The Daily 
Gleaner editorials “suggest that there was a conspiracy to dethrone Mr. Bustamante and to rule 
myself. I myself was supposed to be one of the conspirators. I was supposed to be conspiring to 
take charge of the labor movement. I wish I had the power to do so and the time, because it is 
worthy of help.”271 Manley’s efforts to diminish the controversy did not eliminate the problem; 
rather, it concealed the issue, which resurfaced in 1940 when Bustamante was again 
incarcerated. The eruption of violence caused by World War II interrupted the unionization 
process. In a campaign by the British government to maintain production and promote colonial 
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unity, Jamaican workers lost rights. The West Indian colonies were expected to illustrate their 
loyalty and rally in support of Great Britain during crises. Unfortunately, workers’ dissatisfaction 
over high unemployment, a weak economy, and disrupted import and export trade remained, 
and wharf workers demanded that Bustamante protect their interests. 
Bustamante’s union activities resulted in his internment from September 1940 through 
February 21, 1942, while he secretly negotiated with Governor Richards for his release. Due to 
Manley’s socialist affiliation, the British viewed him as the most dangerous of the Jamaican 
national leaders and, as a result, the terms of Bustamante’s release stated that he sever BITU 
affiliations with the PNP. Bustamante honored the agreement upon his release and denounced 
Manley and his colleagues for being traitors to the union movement, asserting that “we would 
not consort with traitors and conspirators.”272 As Bustamante reported, “with a note of injured 
innocence he denounced the PNP caretakers as self-seekers, who could well take care of 
themselves, because they possess intelligence, influence and wealth.”273 Manley was 
disappointed and criticized Bustamante for being a pawn in the British government’s venture to 
maintain colonial authority in Jamaica. Manley also publicly stated his suspicions that 
Bustamante would betray him when he said that “shortly before his release Bustamante 
withdrew from our close association and I discovered that he was hoping and planning to break 
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within and attack our self-government, which was then at a climax and crisis.”274 Manley’s 
suspicion about an arrangement between Bustamante and the British government proved to be 
correct and had negative consequences for the development of modern politics in Jamaica. The 
rift between Bustamante and Manley produced not only an ideological separation between the 
PNP and BITU but also perpetuated a struggle between both leaders for control of Jamaican 
politics, which polarized the local populace.275 
The alienation of the PNP and BITU precipitated the division of the union movement and 
fostered the advancement of independent political parties. According to Philip Sherlock, 
“Manley’s success with the union was bound to make Bustamante suspicious and hostile. 
Manley had worked to keep the labor movement and the national movement together but 
Bustamante was not the man to play second fiddle to anybody except, by courtesy, the 
sovereign; certainly not to his highly educated introvert cousin Norman, of whom he always 
spoke with affection and esteem as a lawyer but whose politics he distrusted.”276 As a result of 
this process, Manley developed a political orientation for Jamaica that advocated a nationalist 
ideology rather than Bustamante’s narrowly focused labor ideals, because Manley believed that 
the modernization of Jamaica depended on its total independence from Britain.277 Manley 
openly supported universal adult suffrage in an attempt to reduce the oligarchic dominance of 
white British expatriates and their control over the Crown Colony system. In trying to establish 
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grassroots support, Manley contended with local confusion over socialism, Bustamante’s 
appeal to the masses, and the idea that the PNP was protecting the interests of the middle- 
class.278  
The struggle between Bustamante and Manley not only polarized the Jamaican 
populace but also prompted Bustamante to form the Jamaican Labor Party (JLP) to contest the 
upcoming general elections in 1944. The party’s platform reflected union ideals such as 
workmen’s compensation laws, minimum wage laws, eight-hour workdays, old age pensions, 
and legalized unionization, rather than focusing on political issues such as independence.279 
Bustamante claimed legitimacy for the JLP, based on these platform issues. To many critics, the 
JLP seemed to be an extension of Bustamante’s union without any substantial political policies. 
However, based on the economic rebellion of 1938 that fostered the union spirit, Bustamante 
was extremely popular among the populace. This was because whether right or wrong, he was 
idolized as the man responsible for change. George Eaton contends that “the JLP was a political 
label for the Bustamante Trade Union. The JLP like the BITU was Bustamante.”280  
The contest between the JLP and PNP engulfed the country as both parties nationalized 
political issues that revived open debates among Jamaicans regarding their political future. 
“You are a JLP. And you is a PNP, became terms of abuse thrown from one crowd to another. A 
Bustamante or ‘laborite,’ and a ‘comrade’ were words of recognition and acceptance,” writes 
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Philip Sherlock.281 Since Bustamante was elevated to the status of Messiah for the black man, 
Manley was constantly on the defensive about the PNP’s political programs. In advocating self-
government, Manley found it difficult to rally support because the working-class remained 
dependent on Britain, which he viewed as a threat to Jamaica’s independence.282 Manley was 
attracted to socialism as an alternative to capitalism because of the positives that it 
represented for the ordinary working man and woman. Manley’s affiliation with local 
communists, Frank and Ken Hill, Richard Hart, and Arthur Henry, who helped to develop the 
political platform of the PNP, influenced his opinions on socialism. Although Manley was 
attracted to socialism as a system of government, he failed to define socialism in Jamaica and 
how his version of socialism would affect the people. Manley declared that “socialism does 
involve a demand for the complete change of the basic organization of the social and economic 
conditions under which we live. If it involves anything less than that then it is something less 
than socialism. Socialism is more than higher wages or better living conditions. It involves the 
concept that all the means of production should in one form or the other come to be publicly 
owned and publicly controlled.”283 Manley’s vague definition of socialism and how it was 
applicable to Jamaica allowed Bustamante to use misinformation to confuse the populace by 
equating socialism with communism and loss of freedom, security, and individual land 
ownership. “To the land conscious peasant whose plot of land symbolized his status of 
independence and removal from slavery… it was frightening to be told that a socialist 
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government might require him to divide and share the little he had.”284 The successful smear 
campaign waged by Bustamante created a sense of distrust of the PNP and, in particular, 
Norman Manley, who was not viewed as a friend of the poor black man. 
The PNP’s failure to effectively counter JLP propaganda affected the party’s ability to 
recruit grassroots support. This situation was further complicated by rising partisan violence, 
which was being used by the JLP to deter the PNP’s Trade Union Congress (TUC) from gaining a 
support base among the working class. Ironically, it was the violence generated by the 1944 
elections that led to the PNP’s Wills O. Isaac’s founding of ‘Group 69’ as his own defensive 
garrison in the Matthews Lane district. Isaac believed that violence was necessary for the 
political process and he stated in 1944 that “what are a few broken skulls in the growth of a 
nation!”285  
In the 1944 general elections, Manley was forced to address racism since the JLP 
insinuated that the PNP was the party of the brown middle-class. Although Manley did not 
exploit color prejudice, he tried to form a national movement that would unite all Jamaicans 
despite color; but years of colonialism by the British government had created distrust between 
black, brown, and white Jamaicans. “Bustamante also denounced self-government as ‘brown 
man’ (middle class) government, and a return to slavery.”286 This was a successful tactic 
because the overseers of the old plantation system were represented locally by the brown 
middle-class. Despite defeat in the 1944 elections, Manley asserted that “he had no thought of 
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giving up the struggle, and he remained convinced that he had been right in pressing for adult 
suffrage as a first requirement. He considered that adult suffrage had wrought a political 
revolution. A new and—for Jamaica—unprecedented political awakening had occurred. It 
permeated all classes.”287 His socialist vision reinforced his hope that Jamaica’s political 
development would be achieved through an educated people while motivating PNP leaders to 
continue fighting for a progressive change. In spite of Manley’s beliefs, he had to combat 
Bustamante’s popularity and influence over legislative polices which ran counter to PNP 
political platform issues. 
Despite Manley’s aspirations, the JLP successfully defeated the PNP in the 1950 general 
elections due partly to Bustamante’s manipulation of “deep-seated fears and suspicions when 
he alleged that a victory for the independent party would mean the brown man, i.e., middle 
class government and continued exploitation of the masses.”288 Although repetitious, the JLP’s 
political tactic proved that color prejudice was deeply entrenched in the Jamaican psyche, 
which reflected that politically the local populace was polarized according to class and race. 
However, the PNP gained momentum in the 1949 elections because the PNP won thirteen seats 
in the House of Representative to the JLP’s seventeen seats, and two for the Independent 
party. This achievement for the PNP meant that Manley’s efforts to challenge the JLP’s 
authority were successful, as he effectively illustrated the benefits of the PNP’s political 
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programs such as constitutional reforms, self-government, and government-owned public 
utilities.289 
Norman Manley and Violence  
Despite the PNP’s ability to successfully gain a foothold within the Jamaican populace by 
1950 via representation within the government, political violence was evident. The point is not 
that Manley was participating in violence himself but that he colluded in violence through 
grassroots supporters. Any Jamaican involved in politics under the Bustamante or Manley 
regime would claim that political debates were entertaining and party loyalty was displayed 
through party symbols, such as the PNP’s broom or the JLP’s bell. However innocent that 
assessment might be, the political violence generated by the general elections hints that 
politics was becoming corrupt in that period. The violence that tainted local politics was 
introduced into the process via the unionization movement when unions used thugs to counter 
employers’ use of scabs and thugs.290 The struggle to unionize workers polarized the populace, 
forcing laborers to choose between either the BITU (which controlled the docks and 
government jobs) or the TUC (which was entrenched in the bauxite and sugar industries). Out 
of this conflict, the beginnings of political gangsterism emerged in the form of ‘Group 69’ from 
the Matthews Lane district.291 As modern politics developed, the conflicts within the union 
movement shifted to the political sphere.  
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Gangs such as the PNP’s ‘Group 69’ were initially used as a defensive tool to protect PNP 
supporters attending rallies or going to vote against violence by JLP supporters. The intensity of 
violence generated by the pre-election process increased in 1949, forcing the PNP to go on the 
defensive. Group 69 served as a political tool that was used to mobilize party supporters during 
the general elections, such as in 1949 when PNP supporters were bussed into Gordon Town 
based on allegations of JLP aggression and violence.292 Norman Manley’s collusion in violence 
via party supporters was evident in his testimony before the Hearne Commission in 1949 when 
he stated that “actually what happened was when you got your representatives at trouble 
spots, the trouble stopped. Of course, at times things developed into a fight.”293 Based on 
Manley’s statement, it is obvious that he was aware of violence via the defensive actions of 
loyal party supporters in the 1949 election. By 1960, gang violence became synonymous with 
the high death rate, rise in gun violence, and hypocritical politicians who refused to 
acknowledge their role in perpetuating localized violence.294 
The political atmosphere deteriorated as political leaders tarnished the electoral process 
through the use of gangs (desperate, poor, and unemployed young men found in every 
constituency), resulting in an escalation of violence. Consequently, political gangsterism 
became synonymous with electioneering. This change was reflected in local politics when The 
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Daily Gleaner chastised Bustamante for promising to incite the populace to violence and 
revolution if changes were not made to the constitution and certain British government 
appointees removed from office.295 Verbal agitation evolved into physical confrontations 
between the rural parties. On February 15, 1950, employees of the Myrtle Bank Hotel went on 
strike. The problem that TUC representatives encountered was a preexisting contract between 
the Crown Colony government and the BITU in 1941 which stipulated that the BITU was granted 
“sole bargaining rights of industry” until the end of 1950.296 Consequently, when the TUC 
demanded recognition by management for representing hotel employees, the negotiation 
reached an impasse. The management announced that they reached an agreement with the 
BITU regarding wage increase. A group of 1,500 angry employees went on strike and invaded 
bedrooms and bathrooms at the hotel, scaring the hotel’s 145 foreign guests. The Daily Gleaner 
reported that the strikers were also accused of stealing private property and assaulting police 
officers and hotel personnel who tried to remove them from the premises. Such drastic actions 
taken at the Myrtle Bank Hotel were necessary to gain national attention for the problems that 
confronted workers. With the eruption of violence, TUC representatives retreated to picket 
lines outside the hotel, where chain-linked workers defied police and intimidated visiting hotel 
guests. This conflict highlights a willingness of mobilized grassroots supporters to utilize 
confrontational tactics to resolve labor disputes. 
The partisan The Daily Gleaner once again chastised the PNP for fostering environment 
of violence: 
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 And with all of this having taken place, we were treated at the end of the affair to the shameful and 
amazing spectacle of Mr. Norman Manley one of his Majesty’s Council (sworn to uphold the law) rejoicing 
with the crowd in the illegalities committed and publicly thanking the mob for the wonderful work that 
they had done. If King’s Council, a leader of an important political party, a member of the House of 
Representatives, a man universally respected for his character, integrity, and knowledge of the law, a man 
regarded as one of Jamaica’s outstanding sons, can thus display his hearty support of vandalism, 
intimidation and law breaking, then to what is this country becoming?
297
 
It is my contention that political irresponsibility was repeated in January 1951 when 
violence ensued in a strike in St. Catherine at the Worthy Park Sugar Estate and gained national 
attention. Striking factory workers armed with sticks, stones, and machetes, fought with police 
armed with billy clubs and guns on the streets when one of the owners, Owen Clarke, was 
assaulted and prevented from entering the factory.298 According to the Governor, “since that 
time the situation has deteriorated and a number of criminal elements who are PNP-TUC 
leaders have used intimidation in other industrial disputes have entered the area. Several 
persons including two police officers suffered injuries. Tear gas was used and some arrests were 
made.”299 The intensity of the union conflict was reflective of Jamaica’s descent into partisan 
conflict.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, this situation became more problematic when 
Bustamante attempted to speak, while visiting the Worthy Park Estate in Lluidas Vale. 
Unfortunately, the agitated crowd rejected Bustamante, heckled BITU speakers, and then threw 
stones at Bustamante, who responded by firing two shots into the air in order to escape from 
the crowd.300 The fact that Bustamante was carrying a concealed weapon and was willing to 
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discharge his gun in a crowd is one of the paradoxes of modern politics in Jamaica—political 
leaders were somehow exempt from charges of political violence despite their actions, which 
promoted partisan conflict. Tensions between the parties escalated further when a Member of 
Parliament, Wing Commander Cooper, while visiting Jamaica, blamed the labor disturbance at 
the sugar estate on the communist influence within the PNP which, he argued, were inciting the 
people to riot.301 Visiting Member of Parliament, Sir Tomas Lloyd, contended that:  
Nevertheless, the fact remains that Mr. Bustamante’s speech at Lluidas Vale contained the same sort of 
references to communist infiltration. He ought to have been conscious of the risks involved in making this 
sort of statement. There is, of course, some truth in the allegation that certain prominent members of the 
People’s National Party are extreme left-wing in their political sympathies and are known to be in touch 
with the Communist Party in this country. But these facts are well-known both to the Colonial Office and 
the Jamaican government, and they do not amount to serious communist infiltration in the sense implied 
by Wing Commander Cooper. The real point is that there are a number of thugs among the supporters of 
both Mr. Bustamante and Mr. Manley, and these include some persons who have contacts with British 
Communism. They are not the cause of the trouble in Jamaica; this lies in the struggle for political power 
between Mr. Bustamante and Mr. Manley, waged in the Trade Union field. Responsibility for these 
troubles lies squarely with Mr. Bustamante and Mr. Manley who have failed to agree on some solution of 
the problem of representational disputes.
302 
Although Members of Parliament were concerned by the possible communist infiltration on the 
island, a greater importance was placed on the failure of both Manley and Bustamante to 
effectively resolve the crisis within the union movement, which resulted in local disruption of 
business and acts of violence. Consequently, the ability of Manley and Bustamante to mobilize 
poor laborers represented a greater threat to the power of the colonial authority.   
The Worthy Park Estate strike was resolved when Bustamante agreed to share ‘joint 
bargaining rights’ with the TUC, which allowed the union to negotiate on behalf of sugar 
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workers.303 George Eaton argued that “Bustamante realized that continuing political violence 
would be too costly. The irony, of course, was that violence should have been a factor in 
sustaining the leadership of a man of such overwhelming popularity as Alexander 
Bustamante.”304 
The dramatic resolution to both the Worthy Park and the Myrtle Bank strikes 
represented an attempt by Governor Sir J. Huggins to change Trade Union laws, not only to 
prevent future political violence but to protect striking workers from thugs brought by 
employers to disrupt the strikes.305 Escalating violence resulted when Governor Huggins 
imposed a ban on public meetings and processions throughout the island. Despite current 
political violence, Norman Manley’s claim that “I will be no party to inciting people to physical 
violence as a means of progress in this country” was a meaningless comment because pre-
election violence continued to rise and adapt.306  
The Governor’s efforts to preserve the peace by negotiating with both the JLP- and PNP-
affiliated unions lasted until the 1955 general elections when violence that accompanied that 
election forced Bustamante and Manley to agree to a peace treaty to prevent future violence. 
The Daily Gleaner reported on May 18 that the political parties agreed “not to use force in 
political campaigning and to remember that regardless of their political views, it is in their 
interest to comply with this appeal so as to secure the preservation of law and order, the rights 
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of free speech and the right of everyone to exercise his privileges as a voter.”307 Unfortunately, 
the peace did not last because two months later political violence erupted in the St. Andrew 
district over by-election politics.308 
The tension in the district was evident in a series of clashes between JLP and PNP 
supporters. One of the most violent episodes involved an attack against local resident, 
Benjamine Taylor, who was beaten, stabbed, and died in his own home. Due to the close 
margin of votes that separated the candidates (Lee McDonald (JLP) and Allan Isaacs (PNP)), 
Governor Huggins acted by forming a commission in 1949, chaired by Hector Hearne, to inquire 
into the election-related violence. Political scientist Amanda Sives writes that “the evidence 
highlights the existence of loyal supporters ready to engage in violence against their rivals 
during the early phase of party politics in Kingston. While the violence of the 1940’s was not as 
endemic in its consequences as that of the later period—partly because sticks and stones were 
used rather than semi-automatic weapons—a strong sense of party loyalty and affiliation was 
evident.”309 The political violence generated by the general elections proved that the politicians 
were exploiting the existing tensions between JLP and PNP supporters to win power. Despite 
the subtle evolution of political violence from 1938 through the 1950s, local politicians colluded 
in corrupting the political structure, a process described by the Hearne Commission report. 
Whether Norman Manley wanted to accept responsibility for the PNP’s collusion in violence 
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through the mobilization of party supporters, the reality of the general elections of the 1940s 
and 1950s was that partisan violence escalated due to the PNP’s defensive program in 1944, 
which resulted in the creation of the party’s garrison (‘Group 69’).  
With the British Crown Colony system being attacked, it was important that the 
Governor reassert control by investigating the outbreak of political violence. Consequently, the 
Hearne Commission was charged with investigating “first, all political incidents subsequent to 
July 2, 1949, and relevant to the by-election campaign. Second, the commission was to explore 
all the events and circumstances leading up to the violence; and finally, the commission was to 
identify the persons or political bodies who were responsible.”310 Through this investigation, 
the commission discovered that both political parties were involved in instigating local 
agitation. On July 3, 1949, JLP supporters disturbed a PNP rally of 300 persons by marching 
through the area. Violence erupted when stones were thrown and six people were injured.311 
PNP supporters retaliated on July 4, in Gordon Town when they disrupted a JLP event. The 
evidence reported by the commission revealed that political candidates were complicating the 
process by breaking the peace agreement, encouraging violence by possessing fire-arms, and 
denouncing their opponent’s character, which resulted in further conflict between 
supporters.312 The intensity of political corruption was evident when JLP political candidate, 
Mrs. Rose Leon, hired a professional boxer and petty criminal Eustace Cox, also known as 
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‘Gungoo,’ to act as protectors for her entourage.313 Her PNP opponents were just as guilty of 
promoting violence by hiring Aston Nelson, also known as ‘Jar Man,’ to act as a bodyguard.314 
Politician Frank Gordon asserted that “people would attack you because you were a member of 
the PNP. You could not hold a meeting on the streets without confrontation. We had a 
councilor, Wills O. Isaacs, who said we must keep a meeting and get all the rough necks to 
come out and have a meeting on the streets, so you have to fight back. You had to build a 
counter force. Group 69 was part of it, and others.”315 The use of petty thugs by acknowledged 
respectable politicians represented a toxic political system. That was further complicated by 
local denial by leaders such as Frank Gordon, who believed the PNP was innocent because their 
actions were defensive in protecting local constituents rather than offensive. 
Group 69 was formed as a defense force for the Matthews Lane community to counter 
aggression from their JLP neighbors in the Tivoli Gardens district. Like previous gangs, members 
of Group 69 were desperate unemployed young men used by the PNP in the unionization 
efforts of the labor rebellion of 1938. However, by the 1950s, Group 69 was reconstituted as a 
gang. The formation of Group 69 in west Kingston allowed the PNP to aggressively defend their 
communities and defy the JLP’s efforts to oppress the party. The PNP’s efforts to openly 
challenge the JLP’s authority were reflected in a statement made by Minister of Parliament, 
N.N. Nethersole, to The Daily Gleaner: 
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We will resolutely oppose all demagogic thugs who attempt to reduce us to servility, and to suppress our 
rights to hold and express any individual opinions and to join and participate in the institutions and 
organizations that we support. We will defend those vital and fundamental rights to the death and we will 
defend our supporters and property when they are attacked and threatened, and for those purposes we 




The fact that the PNP leadership acknowledged the escalating violence and promised to 
retaliate in kind establishes a connection between politicians and local gangs. Based on the 
level of violence and the role of the political parties, the Hearne Commission concluded that the 
PNP was responsible for the eruption of violence. Manley responded to this conclusion by 
arguing that “the report was intemperate and unbalanced. I have been abused. I have been 
kicked when it suited them I have seen my own workers in the Party beaten at street 
corners.”317 If the by-election violence involved both political parties, then, how did the Hearne 
Commission conclude that the PNP was solely to blame? The simple answer to this question is 
that members of the Hearne Commission examined the evidence, questioned the participants, 
and concluded that the PNP was the aggressor. Therefore, they were held responsible for the 
violence that erupted. This conclusion was somewhat questionable since the commission 
seemed inclined to ignore the JLP’s response to aggression, which made the party just as 
culpable for partisan conflict. Additionally, the report also meant that the PNP’s claim that their 
use of thugs was solely for defense purposes was false because the party was found guilty of 
instigating violence. 
The PNP’s ability to participate in political subterfuge was temporarily suspended due to 
intra-party conflicts. The JLP’s propaganda about a PNP dominated by communists crystallized 
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on November 26, 1951, when an internal conflict between the right and left wings of the PNP 
erupted. Although Manley acted as a mediator between the factions to maintain peace within 
the PNP, he could not anticipate the scandal that divided the party. The problem was initiated 
when one of the leaders of the TUC and the right wing, Florizel Glasspole, broke his affiliation 
with the TUC and announced the formation of a new union—the National Labor Congress—
which represented bauxite workers.318 Sectarian polarization within the PNP occurred when the 
leaders of the left (Frank and Ken Hill, Richard Hart, and Arthur Henry) responded to this threat 
by demanding the expulsion of members of the right for their betrayal of the PNP. Glasspole, 
then, alleged that the left was actually attempting to seize control of the party through 
subversive actions.319 Members of the right (Thossie Kelly and Walter McPherson) provided 
documentary evidence which showed the efforts of the left to undermine PNP authority via the 
formation of a communist party. 
At this juncture, Manley intervened to prevent further conflict by forming a committee 
to investigate all aspects of this discord. The investigation revealed, George Eaton writes, that 
“documents prepared with the knowledge of the four H’s taught that only a communist party 
could protect workers and that workers would have to leave the PNP and form a communist 
party at some stage of the movement for freedom prior to which the working class may be part 
of a general national party like the PNP. Moreover, the four H’s and others formed a secret 
organization within the PNP to which they were bound by discipline and which was working to 
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disrupt the PNP.”320 Manley tried to negotiate with both sides to prevent the split; however, 
Ken Hill aggressively attacked PNP politics and leadership. This resulted in the expulsion of the 
four H’s, and with them the loss of the TUC, the union base of the PNP. This necessitated the 
formation of the National Workers Union (NWU) to fill the gap.321 Noel Nethersole, Florizel 
Glasspole, and Michael Manley were recruited by the PNP as leaders for the NWU, and the 
union quickly became popular and attracted many members. By 1952, NWU membership 
totaled 25,000 at the expense of the BITU. The crisis precipitated by the four H’s demanded the 
organization of the PNP. Consequently, Manley eliminated his socialist rhetoric to articulate 
PNP platform issues in order to protect the party from the JLP propaganda machine and post-
World War II anti-communist paranoia. This allowed the PNP to emerge from this conflict 
victorious as a popular alternative to the JLP’s dominance. The intellectual radicalization of the 
PNP was especially attractive to the younger generation of Jamaicans that supported the idea 
of an independent Jamaica. However, the purging of the left from the PNP negatively affected 
the party because the four H’s represented the progressive and radical intellectual arm of the 
party. Thus, from 1952 onward, the PNP had been marginalized politically. 
Continued JLP attacks against the PNP’s acceptance of communism—which many poor 
Jamaicans did not fully understand—and reports of JLP discord (such as the arrest of JLP 
candidate, Wilton Hill for possessing a weapon and breaking traffic laws) helped make the PNP 
a viable option in the 1955 general elections. Consequently, Manley was elected as prime 
minister while the PNP claimed victory in the elections, capturing eighteen seats while the JLP 
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claimed fourteen.322 Due to the fact that political violence centered around the various general 
elections, the first five years of the PNP’s administration were relatively quiet, which allowed 
the PNP to focus on the development of the economy, education, agriculture, industry, and civil 
service reforms. Manley contended that steps had to be taken to develop Jamaica’s 
infrastructure, “planning and rational administration were to be the mainspring of action in 
mobilizing, harnessing, and exploiting the human and financial resources of the country.”323 
With the election of Norman Manley as chief minister, it was time for a change; however, the 
partisan conflict remained since party leaders refused to acknowledge that their mobilization of 
foot-soldiers within the various constituencies generated political violence. 
Manley’s most important decisions centered on the administration of finances via the 
colonial Development and Welfare Organization, which provided financial assistance from 
Britain to the West Indies. Manley’s budget for 1955–1957 encouraged the growth of the 
economy through the expansion of governmental programs. He also created the Central 
Planning Organization that annually published statistics charting the progress of the economy, 
and reviewed the progress of the various departments. Despite the PNP’s efforts to develop the 
government, Manley acknowledged that “there were limits to what could be done. The 
government was without some of the institutions vital for regulating the economy.”324 Manley 
carried out constitutional reforms aimed at recognizing the internal structure of the 
government by allowing the ministers of the House of Representatives to become independent 
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of the governor when passing laws. Manley reformed the civil service to make it more efficient, 
honest, advancement opportunity-oriented. However, the civil service reforms did not 
eliminate exploitation through political patronage such as the location and development of 
housing projects.325 In the field of education, Manley sought to create equal opportunities for 
all classes through the establishment of national scholarships to be available to all. Finally, he 
invested in agricultural reforms by offering incentives and facilitating soft loans to farmers. 
Manley argued that “like so many third world countries, Jamaica did not have the resources to 
finance its development. It was without capital,” Philip Sherlock writes.326 Consequently, the 
government needed to focus on providing incentives to private investors. Although the PNP 
continued to promote Jamaica’s development, Manley’s attention remained divided over the 
controversial West Indies Federation. The question of federation was a polarizing factor for the 
development of modern politics in Jamaica because federation would determine whether 
Jamaica sought independence or remained part of the British Commonwealth. In the ensuing 
debate that engulfed Jamaica, the question remained: Was federation a savior or hindrance for 
Jamaica and the wider West Indies? 
The process of federation began as early as 1919 when the British government 
promoted a closer union among the islands, and members of the Royal Commission advocated 
federation because they believed that certain islands were unprepared for independence. 
According to members of the Royal Commission, the islands needed both the economic 
protection that federation could provide and secure and the guidance of strong political 
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leadership. Political scientist Douglas Anglin observes that “in 1919, a West Indies Court of 
Appeal was created; in 1924, the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture was founded in 
Trinidad; and in 1934, a West Indian Trade Commissioner was appointed to Canada in order to 
further overcome local prejudice against federation and pave the way towards eventual 
political union.”327 Additionally, the Royal Commission supported the formation of the 
Development and Welfare Organization, which was responsible for the amalgamation of the 
various territories. The people of the West Indies were apprehensive about the federation and 
pressured the colonial administration for political independence.328 Despite the English-
speaking Caribbean’s’ demand for independence, in March 1945, the British government 
pressed for federation instead. What followed was a series of conferences from April 1953 
through February 1956 to convince and rally West Indian support for federation.329  
As early as September 3, 1947, Manley reiterated his support for federation when he 
presented a speech at the Caribbean Labor Congress. He argued that the federation would be 
beneficial in protecting Caribbean interests in the international sphere. Manley said, “The 
history of civilization is a history of amalgamation from small things to large. I say it is evident 
that we must create out of ourselves large enough units. I say we must create a large enough 
area, small although it will be in the face of the colossi who bestride the world today, but a 
large enough area to give us a voice, and pull, and power over their international affairs which 
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in the long run determine the peace and prosperity and the opportunity for happiness of the 
three million people of these lands.”330  
Once elected as prime minister in 1955 and again in 1959, Manley collaborated with the 
British government and tried to rally local support for the federation, which proved to be a 
difficult enterprise. This was especially so since Bustamante exploited the confusion about 
federation to propel him back into the spotlight.331 Despite ten years of preparation for 
federation, Jamaican opinion had gradually changed as an economic boom from bauxite and 
tourism stabilized and improved the economy. Jamaicans became apprehensive about the 
effects of federation on the local economy such as the power of taxation, internal migration, 
and the role of customs unions.332 However, the issues that Bustamante used to generate fear 
in Jamaica revolved around the power of federation to tax the various territories without their 
consent and whether internal migration might be allowed. 
On February 23, 1956, the British Caribbean Federation Act was passed by the British 
parliament, and tentative steps towards the formation began. According to Douglas G. Anglin: 
In 1955, Sir Stephen Luke comptroller for Development and Welfare in the West Indies was designated 
commissioner for the preparation of the federal organization, and experts were appointed to prepare 
reports on the fiscal, civil services, and judicial implications of federation. This pre-federal executive 
quickly plunged into the task of organizing departments of government, appointing key officials and 
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legislation and regulations, and attending all other problems, large and small associated with the 
establishment of a modern state.
333
 
Between 1956 and 1958, Trinidad became the capital of the federation, and Sir Grantley Adams 
of Barbados was chosen as prime minister after Norman Manley declined the position. Manley 
said that “the job of first prime minister of the West Indies is a great job and it would assure to 
any man a place in history for all times. It is a far easier job than the job of continuing in the 
hard, bitter, tough fight for Jamaica, but I am not asking for an easy job. I am probably facing 
the last job of my life and I am taking a job where I believe I can make the largest contribution 
to my country.”334 Manley’s decision to remain in Jamaica undermined Bustamante’s attempt 
to create local agitation thereby making federation an election issue.335 
The formation of the West Indies Federation resulted in two opposing parties. One was 
the Federal Labor Party which consisted of Norman Manley and Grantley Adams, and the other 
was the Democratic Labor Party, “a loose collection of territorial parties and individuals formed 
in 1957 by Alexander Bustamante.”336 Internal conflicts within both parties made these unions 
susceptible to any disruptions, such as the issue of representation based on population. The 
populations of the smaller islands, for example, were supposed to be the beneficiaries of 
federation; but in reality, they expressed doubts about replacing British leadership with a West 
Indian-based one and were suspicious of the intentions of the larger islands. The West Indian 
Federation’s legislature consisted of the Governor-General, a Prime Minister, Senate, and 
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House of Representatives.337 The Governor-General was appointed by the British government 
to serve on the West Indies Federation and protect British interests in the Caribbean. “The 
governor general personally appointed all the federal senators, justices of the Federal Supreme 
Court, and members of the Public Service Commission. He had the discretionary power to make 
appointments to offices in the public service of the federation and to dismiss and to exercise 
disciplinary control over officers, and he was not required to accept the advice of even his own 
Public Service Commission.”338 The role of the Governor-General within the federation 
ironically raises the question of whether the federation really represented freedom for the 
Caribbean. Regardless of the structural organization of federation, these various problems 
allowed Bustamante to challenge Manley’s support of federation, and nationalized the issue of 
federation, thereby, gaining control over a divisive election issue. 
Since Bustamante was not as politically invested in federation as Manley, he argued that 
the JLP was against federation for Jamaica because the former’s ability to tax the colonies 
would retard Jamaica’s economic development. He pointed to Trinidad as an example, which 
was experiencing problems with federation immigration policies. With the formation of the 
federation, Trinidad had 10,000 migrants immigrating to the island. Consequently, Eric Williams 
demanded that the federation make “economic development of the Leeward and Windward 
islands a priority, in order to protect the wider Caribbean.”339 The JLP supported Bustamante, 
and contributed to the nationalization of the federation issue in Jamaica by exploiting local 
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fears about the impact of federation on the economy.340 This issue was further politicized and 
exploited by Bustamante to confuse the Jamaican populace about federation and served to also 
mobilize grassroots supporters against the PNP.  
The question of whether Jamaica should join the West Indies Federation or vote for 
independence further polarized Jamaicans into opposing JLP and PNP constituencies. Ordinary 
Jamaicans soon became concerned that the Jamaican people would be overwhelmed with the 
financial burden of federation, and fearful that free trade within the federation would make 
Jamaica a dumping ground for manufactured goods from Trinidad and the other islands, 
resulting in high unemployment.341 Bustamante argued that he was against federation unless 
certain changes were instituted: representation based on population, a revised federal 
constitution, and removal of federal powers of taxation without prior territorial consent.342 
Bustamante further stirred up local suspicion when he contended that: 
I am more suspicious of the motive behind this federation. Most of the British West Indian colonies have 
been asking for greater self-determination. As far as Jamaica is concerned we have left the stage of 
infancy and we have grown up into manhood where we can manage our own affairs, and I believe there 
are other West Indian islands almost in the same position. The reason why I have become suspicious 
about the motive relative to the formation of this federation is that whilst most of us West Indians have 
been asking for self-government, we are told that self-government for the time being is really not good 
for us and the thing we deserve is federation.
343 
 What ensued as a result of JLP anti-Federation campaign was a national debate. The 
pro-JLP The Daily Gleaner, for example, was filled with dramatic headlines such as; ‘Bigger 
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Burden for Jamaica,’ ‘Quit Federation says Bustamante,’ and ‘Federation: Is Jamaica to Suffer 
Alone.’ Headlines such as these helped to agitate the local populace, and forced Manley to 
defend the process of federation. Manley argued, “I believe I speak for the real sentiment of 
Jamaica, and I hope that I speak for the wider West Indies if we federate we must federate as 
self-governing units who voluntarily surrender some of the power which each has over his own 
to the common whole. I reject totally any sort of mis-marriage between colonial rule and 
federation, and I would predict for such a marriage an abortion as politics has never seen and I 
say that a federated West Indies cannot aim at any smaller immediate objective than dominion 
status.”344  
Based on the documents available, I believe that Manley was correct in his stipulation 
about Federation; this organizational body would have unified the Caribbean islands and 
empowered the federation government to negotiate and represent the various islands 
internationally. The Federation would have also offered protection to these struggling Third 
World countries as they entered the international business arena for the first time. My one 
concern, which was never fully explained by Norman Manley, was just how much control would 
the British government exert over the newly formed federation? 
Bustamante’s attempt to undermine the progress and success of the PNP government 
by vilifying the federation process ultimately failed. The problems with federation were 
insignificant since the Jamaican people were ready for a political change and were willing to 
give Norman Manley a chance to address real problems like high unemployment, government 
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corruption and intimidation, and the general stagnation of the Jamaican economy. Despite 
Bustamante’s concerns about the Federation, the PNP won re-election in 1959, claiming the 
majority twenty eight seats in the house, while the JLP won only sixteen seats.345 However, the 
crisis precipitated by the JLP’s electioneering campaign persisted; and during Manley’s second 
term as prime minister, he confronted a polarized, confused, and angry Jamaican populace that 
demanded answers to questions surrounding the federation. In an effort to promote the 
federation, the Secretary of State, Ian Macleod, met with Bustamante and other leaders of the 
minority party on June 14, 1960, to discuss their concerns. Bustamante said that “it looks as 
though England expected 3 million hungry people to make a success of federation without 
financial help, and nothing substantial has been done to make federation a practical possibility. 
He was loyal to the U.K. but his first loyalty must be to Jamaica.”346 
The Secretary of State acknowledged that although a great divide existed over 
federation, the decision whether to join or not must be made by the people. Manley informed 
the Secretary of State that “if it was impossible to reach agreement on the character and 
structure of an independent federation, Jamaica would insist on withdrawing and would seek 
independence as a dominion on her own, leaving Trinidad and the other islands free to form a 
smaller but perfectly logical and viable federation by themselves.”347 Bustamante’s 
nationalization of the federation debate allowed the JLP to once again gain the political 
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spotlight, forcing Manley and the PNP to go on the defensive via the mobilization of grassroots 
supporters.  
By May 31, 1960, Bustamante further exploited Manley’s vulnerability by announcing 
his decision to resign from the Federation’s Democratic Labor Party in order to support his 
theory that federation would destroy the Jamaican economy. With public pressure growing, 
Manley announced his intention to call a referendum which would allow the Jamaican populace 
to decide if Jamaica should remain a part of federation and ultimately resolve the question 
about independence. The reality of a vote against federation was that it was unclear who would 
lead Jamaica into independence. The battle cry of the parties was “power for the PNP and 
Freedom for the JLP.”348 Manley asserted that “I have decided to put the matter to the final test 
in the only way such matters can be put to the final test. I have decided to go to the people and 
ask them to vote on one single question all by itself, the question is, do we stay in the 
federation or do we get out? Yes, we stay. No, we go.”349 The question about federation was 
pivotal to the PNP’s political future because the wrong decision could have resulted in Manley’s 
losing of the next general elections. 
Although partisan violence was comparatively subdued due to doubts about Jamaica’s 
political future, mobilized foot-soldiers for both political parties acted to protect their 
constituencies. The Daily Gleaner reported that most political violence was concentrated in the 
west Kingston Tivoli Gardens district where several shanty homes were destroyed by politically 
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motivated arson. Since the local police were expecting political protests generated by the 
elections, riot police were sent with the local fire brigade to subdue any post-election 
violence.350 However, the violence surrounding the fire elicited minor local protest; election 
violence erupted when the JLP candidate, Edward Seaga, visited the district. According to 
reports, the problem erupted when Seaga arrived at the polling station in Denham Town and 
was assaulted by someone in the crowd. In the confusion that followed, Clarence Harris was 
stabbed in the side and the police intervened and used tear gas to disperse the crowd.351 But 
the violence continued when Wilburne Johnson was also repeatedly stabbed by JLP supporters. 
The rioting escalated as the local police reported further acts of partisan violence that included 
mob violence, assault, destruction of property, and drive-by shootings. Although the police 
visited several hot spots throughout the day, violence continued sporadically. Preventative 
police raids in Union Gardens also resulted in the confiscation of a cache of Molotov cocktails in 
the shop of Herman Graham. Nine of the homemade bombs had been used in prior political 
actions and, acting on tips, the local police seized the remaining bombs. Although the PNP 
successfully defeated the JLP in 1959, the questions about Jamaica’s independence or 
federation created a sense of political desperation and intensified the competition for political 
office which resulted in an escalation in violence against political candidates and foot-soldiers 
alike.352 
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The debate over whether to stay in the federation was complicated and overshadowed 
in the national media by an attempt by Rastafarians to overthrow the colonial Jamaican 
government. The Rastafarian religion elicited a volatile reaction from the wider society because 
Rastafarian beliefs departed from conventional religious beliefs by promoting radical Black 
Nationalism and revolutionary violence.353 For example, Rastafarians considered whites evil 
because they controlled the colonial system which they saw as oppressive to and exploitative of 
Jamaicans. The Rastafarian Movement evolved as a result of various religious and political 
leaders’ influences. Ernest Cashmore contends that Marcus Garvey’s back-to-Africa movement, 
as well as the visibility of blacks in power, influenced Rastafarian ideology. It is difficult to define 
Rastafarianism as a religion or a cult because there is no clear locus of final authority beyond 
the individual member. Additionally, there are different sects within Rastafarianism just like 
there are different Protestant denominations. Rasta ideology is loosely defined, and doctrine 
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was a matter of individual interpretation since there was no leader to impose his authority and 
unite the movement.354 
The Rastafarian attempt to overthrow the government was inspired by Alexander 
Bedward, a leader of the Baptist Free Church, who supported millennial prophesies, and 
proclaimed himself to be the re-incarnation of Jesus Christ and that he would ascend to heaven 
on December 13, 1920, at 10 am. After three days, he would return and carry his followers to 
heaven, where he would create the perfect world.355 Bedward appealed to Jamaican Black 
Nationalism when, “he told his followers of an impending holocaust in which all whites would 
be destroyed and the blacks redeemed,” historian Ernest Cashmore writes.356 Bedward’s 
followers lost faith and withdrew from the movement when his ascension to heaven failed to 
materialize. Due to his erratic assertions, Bedward was committed to Bellevue Mental Asylum 
in Kingston, where he later died in 1930.357  
Marcus Garvey influenced the Rastafarian Movement when he participated in 
sponsoring fundamental societal changes that were engineered by local blacks. Garvey did not 
believe that real changes could effectively reconstruct European colonialism, which oppressed 
and fragmented blacks culturally and intellectually. Since Garvey was part of a historical 
continuation of the Back-to-Africa movement, he advocated that program because only in 
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Africa could blacks attain true equality.358 Garvey created the Universal Negro Improvement 
Association (UNIA) in 1914 in Jamaica and the U.S. in an effort to promote reform on behalf of 
blacks. Garvey failed due to colonial interference as the French, British, and U.S. governments 
acted to contain and isolate a colony of emigrants of African descent. The duplicity of a corrupt 
Liberian government, which did not want Garvey’s back-to-Africa dream fulfilled, and internal 
corruption within the UNIA, contributed to his failure. When Garvey did finally return to 
Jamaica, he was ignored by his own people and he died in 1940 in London. Ernest Cashmore 
argues that Garvey’s ideologies did change black self–conceptions through ‘an emancipation of 
the mind.’359 These ideologies were the foundations for the Rastafarian Movement. 
Garvey’s prophesy said, “Look to Africa where a black king shall be crowned, for the day 
of deliverance is near.”360 Around this phrase, an entire religious system was created. Garvey’s 
prophesy was fulfilled in November 1930 when the Ras Tafari, the prince regent of Ethiopia was 
crowned emperor and transformed into Haile Salassie I, “King of Kings, Lord of Lords, the all-
conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, and the self-proclaimed redeemer of all blacks by 
promising the return of blacks to Africa.”361 Garvey’s supporters usurped the prophesy and 
transformed the ideology of black power into the Rastafarian movement, whereby poor blacks 
were empowered to foster change. 
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The Rastafarian movement lacked centralized unity and organization. The only area that 
Rastafarians agreed on was the recognition of Haile Selassie as the redeemer of black people.362 
Those who supported the radical ideologies that the world would be ‘miraculously transformed’ 
by Haile Selassie began recruiting and preaching to the masses of Kingston in the early 1930s.363 
Rastafarian ideology depicted whites as the enemy sent to oppress and enslave blacks, who 
could only be saved when they returned to Ethiopia. The evolution of the Rastafarian 
movement was shaped by a notorious leadership. For example, local Rastafarian leaders, 
Leopold Howell and Robert Hinds, in 1933, experienced many confrontations with the law and 
their subsequent arrests for sedition and disorderly conduct attracted negative attention.364 
According to Ernest Cashmore, “Howell organized the Ethiopian Salvation Society in 1940, took 
his 1,600 followers to an abandoned estate at Pinnacle, St. Catherine, where they set up their 
own self-sufficient commune. Howell’s commune was subjected to frequent police raids due to 
drug use.”365 What becomes evident by the 1930s after Howell’s failure is that Rastafarians 
operated on the periphery of Jamaican society, and by the 1960s, leaders such as Claudius 
Henry were willing to use violence to accomplish their goals.  
The development of modern politics in Jamaica is rooted in union-related violence. An 
examination of the formation of labor unions revealed that in 1938, unionization produced 
national rebellions and state-oppression generated violence. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
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Rastafarians involved in the Henry Rebellion in 1960 were inclined to mobilize, using violence. 
Claudius Henry returned to Jamaica in 1959 from the United States and founded the African 
Reform Church. Henry proclaimed himself God’s prophet and sold tickets to Rastafarians who 
wanted to return to Africa.366 Thousands sold their personal possessions and waited for the ship 
that would take them home. However, when this failed to materialize, the local Rastafarians 
were disappointed, disillusioned, and stranded with nowhere to go. The government charged 
Henry with fraud. He was found guilty and sentenced to twelve months in jail.367  
The threat that the Rastafarian movement represented to the wider Jamaican society 
revealed itself in a raid on Claudius Henry’s residence by police on April 12, 1960. Confiscated at 
the scene were “detonators, dynamite, home-made bombs, guns, machetes, and swords.”368 
After the discovery, Henry and several of his followers were arrested for “conspiring to 
overthrow the government and treason.”369 The government’s security forces discovered 
through their investigation that some of Henry’s followers were plotting a rebellion. Rumors of 
Rasta military exercises aimed at overthrowing the government resulted in a raid by the local 
security forces that discovered a cache of firearms at the Rastafarian commune located in Red 
Hills.370 During the raid, there ensued a shootout between police and Rastas. As a result, two 
members of the British Royal Hampshire Regiment were killed as the suspects fled in a hijacked 
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vehicle. This incident was followed by a massive manhunt to find the assailants, with 1,000 
members of the joint security forces who searched the island, causing panic until Monday June 
27, when the four suspects, all Americans, were caught in a shop located in Sligoville. Later, 
another six suspects were apprehended. One of the six, Ronald Henry, was the son of Claudius 
Henry.371 The uprising led by Ronald and Claudius Henry was disruptive for Jamaica because 
seven of the men arrested were American Rastas affiliated with the radical First African Corps, a 
New York-based organization that sympathized with the Jamaican Rastaman cause, and also 
because those arrested possessed automatic weapons. This raised the question, how did these 
local Rastas acquire such weapons? The uprising threatened political order on the island. A total 
of eight men were arrested, including Ronald Henry. The men were charged with plotting to 
overthrow the government; and murderer, Ronald Henry, was executed in March 1961 for the 
crimes he committed. Henry’s execution served as an example that the Jamaican government 
would not tolerate rebellion.372 However, the Henry Rebellion confirmed the problem with 
political violence in Jamaica. 
Despite the debate, the political backlash from this incident resulted in increased 
hostility towards local enclaves of Rastafarians and open assaults and raids against their 
communities.373 Manley responded to the crisis aggressively when he said, “recently there has 
developed a section of the Rastafari movement which introduced two new elements. The first 
was the positive preachment of violence against the country as a whole, and the second was its 
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association with foreign elements in the United States of America. It will be the policy of 
government to pursue relentlessly and to stamp out completely every trace of this new 
movement of violence in this country.”374 Although Manley promised swift action against all 
forces aimed at disrupting the Jamaican government, he acted with compassion and restraint 
by ordering members of the UWI to conduct an investigation into the practices and beliefs of 
Rastafarians in an effort to find a peaceful resolution to Rastafarians’ complaints.  
This decision was criticized by Alexander Bustamante who believed that Rastas violated 
local laws through their use of “ganja” (marijuana) in their religious ceremonies. Bustamante’s 
antagonism towards the Rastafarian culture was rooted in the Rastas’ opposition to 
Bustamante’s conservative nationalistic approach. They also created a spiritual, cultural, and 
political discourse that was much more inclusive than Bustamante’s use of nationalism for his 
own political ambitions. The Rasta rebellion was detrimental to local government because 
Rastafarian complaints and concern about a white political structure resulted in the threat of 
violence as seen in a reported plot to overthrow the government. Continued Rasta 
dissatisfaction and abuse by police led to local rebels independently attempting to overthrow 
the established government, proving that local politicians’ control over grassroots supporters 
was tenuous at best and, more importantly, that the fragmented political system was flawed. 
Although the Henry Rebellion of 1960 remained controversial, Manley had to re-focus 
his efforts to address the federation problems. Bustamante continued to pressure Manley 
about seceding from the Federation. He accused Manley of “planning to sell out Jamaica to the 
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smaller islands.”375 Due to the confusion about federation, Manley acted as a mediator for 
Federation and he tried to negotiate changes to the federal constitution that would protect 
Jamaica’s interests. Manley threatened to withdraw Jamaica from the Federation if the power 
to take over the economy of countries within the Federation was not eliminated. Continued 
public pressure resulted in Manley’s extemporaneously announcing the referendum. The 
question of federation resolved itself on September 19, 1961, when Jamaica’s referendum was 
completed and 35,535 Jamaicans (fifty-four percent of the population) voted against 
federation. Manley responded to the results when he said, “tens of thousands will grieve at this 
defeat of their hopes for the future and I share their sorrow.”376 This was the first of two 
disappointments that Manley suffered when he called an early election in 1962 and lost to the 
JLP, which gained twenty six seats while the PNP won nineteen.377 After the election, the newly 
formed Jamaican government headed by Alexander Bustamante petitioned the British 
government for independence; a request that was granted. 
Conclusion 
On August 6, 1962, when Jamaica gained independence, Norman Manley claimed 
victory for advancing Jamaica from a colony to independence while reminiscing on his tenure in 
office, and claimed that the country’s infrastructure was stronger due to his economic 
programs. Yet, despite these achievements, political violence persisted. In the 1940s, both 
Alexander Bustamante and Norman Manley—the forefathers of modern Jamaican politics—
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engaged in political subterfuge to win elections, and developed the framework for political 
violence. Although the violence of the 1940s through the 1950s might be described as less 
intense than the bloodshed of the 1960s, the willingness of loyal party supporters to engage in 
partisan violence cannot be overlooked, and was reflected in the Gordon Town incident. 
According to Amanda Sives, “these experiences of political participation formed through 
violence on the streets, whether political party or trade-union inspired, helped to define the 
way in which the relationships developed between individuals, their parties and their 
government on the streets of Kingston.”378 
This chapter contends that while Norman Manley did not directly advocate violence as 
Alexander Bustamante, he was involved in the creation and institutionalization of a framework 
of political violence which was sanctioned. Under Norman Manley’s regime, the evolution 
continued with the eruption of PNP-affiliated violence that was reported in the 1949 Hearne 
Report. The Hearne Report documented that the increase in casualties was due to the use of 
automatic weapons by gangs. The Hearne Commission further concluded that although both 
parties were guilty for the sectarian violence, the PNP was blamed for the eruption of violence 
in Gordon Town, which sparked the ensuing riot. Coupled with the Hearne Report findings were 
The Daily Gleaner editorials that condemned the various parties’ use of violence: “it is obvious 
that violence is being spawned in this political contest.”379 This was followed by increased 
political violence in both the 1955 and 1959 general elections when the police department 
reported on further JLP and PNP clashes, shootings, and riots.  
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Violence continued to escalate in the Henry Rebellion of 1960 when local Rastafarians, 
using Jamaica’s union and political legacy of violence, organized a rebellion against the 
established government. Despite the brutal suppression of the Rastas, Henry’s willingness to 
use violence highlights the problem with political polarization in modern Jamaican politics. The 
evolution of political violence represented a process that continued to develop despite 
















The Changing Faces of Jamaican Politics 
Introduction 
The late 1960s was a period of transformation for Jamaican political leadership and the 
use of political violence. By 1967, an old and infirm Bustamante at age 83 was preparing to 
retire and relinquish the reins of power to younger and popular Jamaica Labor Party leaders 
such as Donald Sangster and Hugh Shearer. In the 1960 elections, deaths and injuries through 
firearms totaled nineteen cases. By 1969, the number had increased to two hundred and six. 
Political violence was a consequence of the two-party system, which was manipulated by party 
leaders to protect their interests.380 
The social divisions that polarized the Jamaican society were reflected in the growth of 
political violence, which was evident during the “Henry Rebellion,” when Henry’s followers—
dissatisfied with the legacy of colonialism represented by the local government—used 
automatic weapons against the local security forces. The Henry Rebellion was followed by the 
Coral Gardens conflict in 1963, where three Rastafarians attacked a gas station; an anti-Chinese 
riots in 1965, when Chinese-owned businesses were looted and destroyed by angry mobs, 
allegedly jealous of their success; and rioting in 1966 over labor disputes that resulted in the 
JLP’s imposition of a state of emergency. Finally, in 1968, a state of emergency was once again 
declared when followers of the Black Power Movement protested in the streets about the 
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Shearer government’s decision to prevent University of the West Indies (UWI) instructor, Dr. 
Walter Rodney, from entering Jamaica.381 Unlike the 1930s, , events such as these and many 
more during the 1960s signified a transitional phase, whereby confrontations between the 
state apparatus and partisan supporters escalated into frequent violence. Jamaica was 
becoming increasingly a volatile society, characterized by civil unrests, gang violence, and police 
aggression. 
This chapter examines the relationship between the political process and gun violence in 
the 1960s. Of equal importance to the patterns of political violence was the rise of gun violence 
through “garrison politics,” as the JLP and PNP developed paramilitary units which responded 
to the increasing political fragmentation and economic pressures. Although Bustamante 
continued to lead the country and the JLP in the early 1960s, his failing health forced him to 
turn the party over to his younger protégés. Consequently, after Alexander Bustamante retired, 
leaders such as Donald Sangster, Hugh Shearer, and Edward Seaga, took Jamaican politics in a 
new direction via governmental reform. Donald Sangster and Hugh Shearer attempted to lead 
the JLP independently of Bustamante’s influence and to combat a PNP political machine that 
was in the process of reforming and seeking to attract a popular and youthful base. The 
violence of the 1960s was significant because it signaled an increase in political conflict and a 
transition to open political warfare between the parties as well as the nationalization of 
                                                          
381
 Terry Lacey, Violence and Politics in Jamaica 1960–1970 (Britain: Manchester University Press, 1977), 86–90. 
148 
 
violence that engulfed and further polarized the country. Problems within the political arena 
were exacerbated by a failing economy with an unemployment rate of thirty two percent.382 
As part of an era of transition for the JLP, Donald Sangster became the second Prime 
Minister of Jamaica on February 23, 1967. He was born on October 26, 1911; his father was 
W.B. Sangster, a land surveyor in St. Elizabeth. Donald Sangster attended Munro College from 
1921–1929, and practiced law as a solicitor in 1937. He began his political career at the age of 
21 when he was elected to the St. Elizabeth Parochial Board on June 22, 1933, a position he 
retained until 1949.383 Sangster entered national politics in 1949 when he won a seat in the 
general elections for southern St. Elizabeth. This victory was followed with an appointment as 
the Minister of Social Welfare. In 1950, Sangster became the Deputy Leader of the JLP and was 
also appointed as Finance Minister; he also later served in both the House and the Senate.384 
Sangster and the JLP were displaced in the 1955 general elections by an aggressive PNP 
opposition. However, the PNP’s failure to make the West Indies Federation a reality for Jamaica 
allowed the JLP to return to power in 1962. As The Daily Gleaner reported in a 1997 history of 
the party, 
Shortly after independence in 1962, Bustamante affirmed Sangster’s political credentials by naming him 
Deputy Prime Minister even though such a post did not exist, and still does not, in the constitution. Then 
in 1964 when Bustamante’s failing eyesight forced him to pull out of the day-to-day leadership, and so he 
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chose February 21, 1967, three days before Bustamante’s 83
rd
 birthday as the date of the first general 
election in which for the first time since 1944 Bustamante would not be at the helm of the campaign.
385 
Despite Bustamante’s retirement, the JLP emerged victorious in the February 1967 general 
elections with thirty three seats to the PNP’s twenty. 
In a series of articles reviewing Sangster’s life and career, a reporter for The Daily 
Gleaner in 1997 wrote, “Though a private man whose real personal friends were a minimum, 
Donald Sangster was a likeable politician. With no fanfare or formalities; no wife; no mother; no 
father; no sister; no brother to hug with joy and share this time of glory and congratulate him 
even the staff at Vale Royal knew that Donald Sangster had been sworn in as Prime Minister of 
Jamaica.”386 Prime Minister Sangster’s personal life remained private, and he was not well 
known by the Jamaican people. Sangster supported Caribbean solidarity and wanted that bond 
of unity translated into reforms for Jamaica’s political affairs. Unfortunately, his death four 
months into his 1967 term prevented not only true reforms but also hindered acceptance by 
the local populace, which allowed Hartely Neita to refer to Sangster as “the forgotten prime 
minister.”387 Despite his short term as Prime Minister, Donald Sangster remained critical of the 
previous PNP government and openly denounced the PNP for being corrupt and violent 
incompetents who exploited the people, which was conventional political rhetoric in both 
parties. 
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Unfortunately, any faith that the people had in the newly elected JLP government to 
lead a united people and independent Jamaica into a true democracy proved disastrous.388 
Instead of promoting national unity, the leaders of both political parties polarized Jamaica by 
creating a political environment dominated by partisan politics and political gangsterism. When 
the JLP returned to power in 1962, they cleaned house by terminating the appointments of 
those civil servants who had been elected for their credentials and expertise because they 
served the government by invitation of the PNP. These civil servants were removed as an act of 
political patronism that in turn effectively destabilized the JLP government by creating a new 
class of enemies.389 According to The Daily Gleaner journalist Thomas Wright, in 1967, all 
Jamaicans suffered because of the patronage system: “entire constituencies and in some cases 
the larger portions of whole parishes which had not voted for the JLP at the last general 
election were victimized. Government housing units went exclusively to carefully selected and 
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known supporters of the JLP. This was particularly so in western Kingston, where supporters of 
the PNP and even those who were completely neutral in their politics, were so rigidly excluded 
from housing and jobs in government projects, there resulted a sense of hopelessness and 
frustration.”390 The desperation created by unemployment fueled the political violence of the 
1960s. 
In spite of the political struggle between the JLP and PNP, Sangster was critical of 
political violence and encouraged party supporters to avoid participating in violent conflicts 
against PNP supporters. Denouncing political gangsterism, Sangster said, “However, political 
violence does not exist in a vacuum. It takes people to be violent, and other people to 
encourage them. Both parties solemnly declare that they are against violence. Yet violence 
continues. How can that be? Each side considers it necessary to ‘defend’ themselves against the 
violence of their opponent. Nobody of course, has the courage to be the first to put a stop to 
this system of defense and counter-defense. So declarations of non-violence continue side-by-
side with actions of violence.”391 With increasing tension between JLP and PNP supporters and 
a financial crisis in the economy, the Sangster government’s popularity declined. Unfortunately, 
a health crisis prevented Sangster from creating a lasting legacy of leadership for Jamaica. 
On Sunday March 18, 1967, while working on the government’s yearly budget, Donald 
Sangster “complained of nausea, vomiting, and an intense headache.”392 A physical 
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examination and tests by Dr. A.L. McFarlane revealed that Sangster suffered from a brain 
hemorrhage; he was ordered to remain in bed and avoid the strenuous responsibilities 
associated with political office. Sangster’s high blood pressure resulted in a decision by his 
doctor to transport the prime minister to the Neurological Institute of the Royal Victorian 
Hospital in Montreal, Canada, where he could be properly diagnosed and treated.393 The 
Deputy Leader of the JLP (D.C. Tavares) was appointed as the acting prime minister. While in 
Canada, Sangster’s condition further deteriorated and he died on April 11, 1967. The same day, 
Hugh Lawson Shearer, the Minister of External Affairs, was appointed as Jamaica’s third prime 
minister.394 
Biography 
Hugh L. Shearer was born in Martha Brae, Trelawney, on May 18, 1920, to James 
Shearer, reportedly a veteran of the First World War, and Esther Lindo, a dress maker and 
member of the prominent Lindo family. However, the family resided with Esther’s grandfather, 
Fredrick Lindo, who was not only the Deacon of the local Baptist church but also a small 
farmer.395 Hugh Shearer was raised in a strict family and was compelled to attend mandatory 
church services. He performed light chores around the farm such as carrying water from the 
local river to the house; but he had no interest in becoming a professional farmer. He attended 
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the Barracks government school in Falmouth, and won a scholarship to attend St. Simons 
College in 1935 to pursue a secondary education.396 According to his biographer, Hartley Neita, 
Shearer was a “tall, lanky, exuberant school boy, laughing, zestful, quick witted, and high 
spirited with an eye for the girls.”397 Shearer completed his secondary education in 1940, and 
was then employed by his uncle, Lynden Newland, who worked for the BITU’s weekly 
newspaper, the Jamaica Worker. Shearer claimed that his job “was to edit the letters sent to 
the union by its members and supporters principally for publication in the Jamaica Worker. You 
must remember that, at this time, illiteracy in Jamaica was very high and many of these men 
and women could barely read and write. Their letters needed translation.”398 
Shearer learned the practical applications of journalism on the job via his uncle, Lynden 
Newland, who was a professional journalist. Shearer was a good student and quickly became 
proficient at organizing and writing insightful and scintillating editorials, some of which are 
cited in this chapter. Shearer began his career when the Second World War was declared, and 
the British colonial government used censorship as a method of preventing rebellion. 
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Consequently, the Jamaica Worker, a public forum for the BITU, was subjected to intense 
government censorship and all articles had to be approved by the locally appointed 
government censor, Inspector Long.399 As a reporter for the Jamaica Worker, Shearer had 
constant contact with Alexander Bustamante, who was influential in not only politicizing 
Shearer but also in educating him about the level of poverty that Jamaican workers endured.400 
Shearer witnessed political conflict within the BITU while Bustamante was detained in 1940. 
Bustamante argued that Manley’s management of the union was problematic because he was 
not consulted or included in the decision-making process.401 
In the subsequent days, Bustamante expelled those BITU leaders such as acting 
president, H.M Shirley, for betraying him. Hugh Shearer claimed that Bustamante stipulated 
that he was “going to keep on sweeping until the office is purified of Norman Manley’s 
godsons, who should have been thrown out of the union long ago. When you discover traitors 
around you, son, get rid of them fast. If you don’t, they will get rid of you.”402 It is my 
contention that Shearer forged a bond with Bustamante when he was promoted to assistant 
                                                          
399
 Neita, Hugh Shearer, 43; “BITU Censored,” The Daily Gleaner, Vol. CXIII. No. 215, September 24, 1947, 10; 
“Labor Organization Intensified,” Daily Gleaner, Vol. CVIII. No. 280, December 17, 1942, 10. 
400
 Neita, Hugh Shearer, 44–45; also referenced in Gladys Bustamante, The Memoirs of Lady Bustamante (Jamaica: 
Kingston Publishing, 1997) 20–80; Eaton, Alexander Bustamante and Modern Jamaica, 79. 
401
 “Conflict Between Manley and Busta Over the BITU,” The Daily Gleaner, Vol. CV. No. 89, April 20, 1939, 10; also 
referenced in Neita, Hugh Shearer, 48–53; “Bustamante and Manley Disagree,” The Daily Gleaner, Vol. CIV. No. 53, 
March 5, 1938, 10; “Sugar Agreement Handicaps Industry,” The Daily Gleaner, Vol. CIV. No. 51, March 3, 1938, 1. 
402
 Neita, Hugh Shearer, 55; also referenced in The Daily Gleaner, “Bustamante Betrayed by Manley he Claims,” The 
Daily Gleaner, Vol. CVIII. No. 50, February 27, 1942, 1, 2; “BITU Purged of Traitors,” The Daily Gleaner, Vol. CVIII. 
No. 46, March 2, 1942, 10. 
155 
 
editor for the Jamaica Worker and assigned the responsibility of meeting with Inspector Long to 
submit Bustamante’s schedule for review, which was one of the requirements of his release. 
Shearer had the responsibility for organizing for the BITU, leading strikes, performing clerical 
duties, and helping to develop strategies for negotiations.403 Shearer was also encouraged to 
participate in union rallies after Bustamante found him to be a charismatic and articulate 
speaker. According to Hartley Neita, “his style of speaking was rooted in Baptist pulpitry. He 
used phrases which evoked an imagery which resonated with his listeners. His voice was strong 
and in rural areas where there was no electricity for public address systems, he could be heard 
clearly and distinctly at the far distant edges of the crowd.”404  
Due to his new position as Assistant Editor and public speaker for the BITU, Shearer had 
frequent contacts with Bustamante and participated in efforts to revitalize the union, which 
was under attack from rival unions such as the Jamaica United Workers Union, headed by H.M. 
Shirley, a former BITU vice president.405 I have found that Bustamante’s attempt to restore the 
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BITU’s dominance allowed Shearer to travel to the various parishes on behalf of the union, 
where he could perfect his skills as a public speaker. Since Bustamante was grooming Shearer 
as a protégé, he was given additional responsibilities such as job placement and union 
recruitment, which allowed Shearer to interact and become popular with members at the 
grassroots level.406 Shearer’s practical experience with unionization expanded when he assisted 
Bustamante in trying to negotiate a Minimum Wage Law that would protect all workers. It was 
“Shearer’s responsibility to find out the rates being paid to workers by industry in order to 
present claims to employers if these pay rates were below the minimum wage.”407 The process 
was complicated by the governor and local legislators, which delayed the implementation of 
the law. Bustamante, however, threatened serious labor action if the government did not act to 
protect workers. Consequently, the Minimum Wage Law was implemented on December 22, 
1942. Shearer’s participation in unionization allowed him to interact with JLP grassroots 
supporters and establish a support base for himself.  
Shearer’s own inquisitive nature and compassion for the working man slowly weaved 
him into the tapestry of unionism. Shearer’s contributions were practical and relevant, because 
his indoctrination in the union movement helped not only to politicize him but also shaped his 
political decisions as Prime Minister.408 As Shearer engaged with members at the grassroots 
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level, his responsibilities with the union increased as he became involved in negotiations on 
behalf of the workers. This can be seen from his effort to gain an increase to seven shillings for 
sugar workers who protected the sugar cane against vermin by catching and disposing of rats. 
Shearer also became very vocal about protecting non-unionized workers, whom he argued 
should not be ignored by union leaders.409 
Despite Shearer’s increased political participation, Bustamante effectively controlled the 
BITU and was committed to transforming national politics when he announced in 1942 the 
formation of the JLP, a political party acting as a counterpoise to the PNP’s political power.410 
According to Bustamante, “Shearer neither hated nor intended to preach hatred for the PNP or 
the capitalist class, but he was only setting out to curtail the length of the rich man’s 
pockets.”411 It is my contention that a consequence of the formation of the JLP, as an extension 
of the union, was that Shearer was slowly becoming politicized as “he accompanied 
Bustamante, Lynden Newland, and Gladys Longbridge on their travels throughout the island, 
personally contacting the local branch chairmen and secretaries of the union to gain their 
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support for recruitment purposes and arrange for union members to attend local rallies.”412 
This kind of interaction between Shearer and Bustamante allowed him to become more 
intimately tied to both the union and the JLP representing the common man. 
The creation of the 1944 constitution eliminated voting requirements such as literacy 
tests as a requirement for voting. Consequently, the general elections of 1944 signaled the 
beginning of a new era, where all Jamaicans of twenty one years could vote.413 Shearer, 
however, could not vote or run for office because he was not yet twenty one years old. 
However, that disappointment did not deter him from campaigning with Bustamante for the 
JLP. “Shearer with all the pristine vigor, enthusiasm, and fervor of youth became the dashing 
ace organizer for the BITU in the most remote part of Jamaica,” one biographer writes. “His 
monumental pioneering work was only outdone by the reputation he made for himself for his 
fast driving and his amorous attraction to women.”414 
It is my contention that the exploitative and polarizing style of politics utilized by 
Bustamante in the development of partisan politics in Jamaica made Shearer reluctant to 
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participate in national politics.415 These political strategies were evident in the campaign for the 
1944 general elections, which proved to be problematic for Shearer, who was raised to be 
morally conscious about his personal decisions. Therefore, when the PNP propaganda machine 
accused Bustamante of stealing from the union, Shearer responded by holding a public 
meeting, where Bustamante issued an invitation to members of the BITU to examine the union 
accounts.416 According to Hartley Neita and The Daily Gleaner in 1944, “Shearer was annoyed at 
these accusations against Bustamante and deeply concerned at the levels to which the chief 
had to go to remove these rumors from the political agenda of conflict. Up to then he had 
enjoyed the political hopscotch of debates, but the personal venom which he now discovered 
was a feature of party politics that was against all the values of good manners he learned as a 
child.”417 Consequently, Shearer became very acquainted early in his political career with the 
political maneuvers and drama that dominated the political structure. Therefore, life on the 
campaign trail with Bustamante was a learning experience for Shearer, who became acquainted 
with the problems confronting working-class Jamaicans, which re-reinforced Shearer’s 
ideological beliefs that the people needed someone to protect their interests. 
Shearer’s first independent project occurred in 1946, when Bustamante was distracted 
by the campaign to find a replacement for Maurice Thelwell, the JLP representative from south 
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Trelawney who died in October of that year. This campaign coincided with a strike by sugar 
workers at the Frome Estate, located in Savanna-la-mar, when the union secretary from 
Westmoreland, Clarence Spencer, asked Bustamante for his assistance after union members 
had been arrested for violating the Defense Regulations Act. Since Bustamante was dedicated 
to the campaign on behalf of J. Henry Sparkes, he sent Hugh Shearer to resolve the problem. 
Shearer successfully negotiated the bail of various workers in the area and provided them with 
legal representation.418 With the union movement dominating national attention, Shearer 
utilized Bustamante’s support and claimed a political victory in October 1947 when he ran for 
office in the number two division of central St. Andrew. “Shearer defeated the PNP candidate 
John A. Gregory, obtaining 3,645 votes while Gregory obtained only 2,478.”419 Throughout 
1947, Shearer continued to successfully negotiate on behalf of various industries for improved 
working conditions for laundresses at Jamaica College, and for fairer pay for workers at J. Wray 
& Nephew, Fred L. Myers & Son, and the Kingston Public Hospital (KPH).420 
Although Shearer preferred union organization, he realized that significant reforms 
were only possible via the state apparatus. Consequently, he used his political popularity to 
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become a voice for the people in the House of Representatives and fought to defend the 
people’s rights because he believed that it was only through politics that lasting changes could 
be made for the poor. The question of the West Indies Federation divided the Jamaican 
populace and played a dominant role in the 1959 general elections as a result of Bustamante’s 
manipulation of the issue. A consequence of Shearer’s position in the BITU was that he worked 
with Bustamante via the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) and campaigned for federation among 
the smaller islands.421 Bustamante’s tactics to undermine Manley’s support for federation failed 
and the JLP lost the 1959 elections to the PNP, which won twenty nine seats to the JLP’s 
sixteen.422 When Shearer lost his political seat in the elections, he contested the result, claiming 
voting fraud, which forced the PNP-led government to investigate the matter. By 1960, the 
committee reported that “electoral malpractice occurred in the west Kingston constituency 
where Shearer was defeated by Hubert Wallace. Five other constituencies were also affected. 
According to the reports, there was a possible maximum of 8,000 false votes in these areas, 
including 142 votes for persons who had died, 862 persons who were abroad, and 950 cases of 
double voting, all of which had been evident during the magisterial recount in west 
Kingston.”423 
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Although the verdict of the committee vindicated Shearer’s credibility, he was displaced 
politically; but he campaigned with Bustamante against federation. In 1962, Shearer led the 
attack against the PNP: “firstly he had been forced out of active politicking by his defeat in west 
Kingston in 1959 and was therefore left freehanded to challenge Michael Manley for trade 
union supremacy during the intervening years. He not only challenged but he succeeded. It is 
very significant that the JLP won almost all the seats in the trade union parishes of Cornwall and 
Middlesex,” Hartely Neita writes.424 Ironically, despite Shearer’s disdain for Bustamante’s 
political tactics, he was willing to use similar methods to undermine the PNP’s popular support 
as Shearer willingly polarized the Jamaican populace against the incumbent government via an 
anti-federation campaigns based on fear. 
The discontent and misinformation about federation generated by the JLP in the 1960 
elections had negative consequences for Manley’s second term. The JLP fostered a hostile 
political environment with nation-wide debates that promoted agitation about Jamaica’s status 
within the federation and anger about possible taxation issues, which resulted in an early 
election and a referendum on the value of the West Indies Federation. Consequently, the 
political campaign of the 1960s was followed by increased political violence in the 1962 general 
elections. The Daily Gleaner reported that violence erupted in the Spanish Town area outside 
west Kingston, where Edward Seaga was assaulted, while another man was stabbed, and the 
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local police used tear gas to disperse the crowd. The newspaper also publicized pre-election 
conflicts when a police raid in Union Garden uncovered a cache of bombs, Molotov cocktails 
stockpiled by Herman Graham, who was later arrested. The JLP political machine’s attacks 
against the PNP enabled the JLP to win the elections with 569,781 persons voting.425 
Shearer’s political activities intensified when he became the voice of Jamaica 
internationally due to the 1962 general elections, which allowed the JLP to dominate local 
government and resulted in Bustamante’s assigning control of the External Affairs Office to 
Shearer.426 Shearer accepted this role as he branched out into the Caribbean in an effort to 
increase unionization and promote “training in trade union representation in Jamaica. Shearer 
benefited from the colonial Development and Welfare, an agency created by Britain to provide 
financial aid for health, education, agriculture training, and other social and economic 
development programs in the British West Indies.”427 Bustamante displayed his favoritism for 
Shearer once again when Jamaica won independence on August 6, 1962, and he appointed 
Shearer as Jamaica’s spokesman. Shearer was assigned the responsibility of presenting a speech 
before the United Nations announcing Jamaica’s independence. “It was not only the address 
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that he was to deliver, but as Jamaica’s spokesman, he was also expected to hold meetings with 
other world leaders. And he would be expected to initiate future diplomatic, economic and, 
other relationships with their governments.”428  
Some critics believed that Shearer was a poor choice, that there were other more 
qualified candidates; yet, Bustamante remained loyal in his support of Shearer. In his speech 
before the UN, Shearer was very blunt in expressing his opinions. He addressed race in the 
wider world, the impact of corruption and colonialism on Third World nations, effects of 
underdevelopment, nuclear testing and its destruction of the environment, and exploitation of 
workers. Hartley Neita writes that as Jamaica’s foreign policy representative, Shearer spent the 
next three years creating and articulating Jamaica’s policies. He further asserted that although 
Jamaica was aligned with the west, its government would not always agree with western 
policies. Shearer stipulated that “Jamaica as an independent nation definitely should be pro-
west, and her attitude will be one of friendship towards the US of America but this friendship 
will not carry a price tag.”429 By 1963, it was evident that Shearer’s role as Bustamante’s 
personal advisor made him the heir apparent to the JLP, a position envied by members of the 
cabinet. In 1964, Bustamante’s failing health resulted in his passing the torch to Hugh Shearer, 
to whom he gave “full authority to enter into all discussions on behalf of the government of 
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Jamaica.”430 It is my contention that once again, Bustamante displayed his loyalty to Shearer as 
his protégé and replacement who, by 1963, embodied all the attributes necessary to lead but, 
more importantly, exhibited unwavering loyalty to Bustamante and the party—all of which was 
necessary because Bustamante wanted a representative who would not only implement the 
JLP’s partisan ideologies but was popular and dynamic enough to fire the imagination of party 
supporters. 
On January 24, 1967, the JLP leadership announced the retirement of Alexander 
Bustamante and his replacement by Hugh Shearer in the south Clarendon district in the 
upcoming general elections.431 “The elections were held on February 21st. The JLP won thirty 
three seats and the PNP, twenty.”432 Hugh Shearer won the seat vacated by Bustamante in 
south Clarendon. Hugh Shearer’s political career reached its apex when the then current Prime 
Minister, Donald Sangster died on April 11, 1967, and Shearer was appointed Prime Minister by 
the Governor-General, Sir Clifford Campbell. 
As Prime Minister, Shearer had to address the problems of crime and violence, which 
continued to escalate in the late 1960s. The evolving gang violence was evident in Jamaican 
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culture, where “popular singers had been glorifying the men involved in these crimes, who had 
earned the name of ‘Rude Boys’ or ‘Rudies.’ These popular songs that glorified violence 
included ‘007’ and ‘A-Shanty Town’ by Desmond Dekker and ‘Tougher than Tough’ by Derrick 
Morgan.”433 According to Robert MacFarlane and Eric Williams, popular culture’s glorification of 
violence contributed to the belief that being a gangster was the key to wealth. Consequently, 
some Jamaicans in the 1960s not only idolized Clint Eastwood in films such as The Good, The 
Bad, and The Ugly, A Fist Full of Dollars, and For A Few Dollars More, but they also wanted to 
emulate the life-style depicted in such films. This was reflected in growing discontent with high 
unemployment, poverty, and the government, which erupted into violence by 1963 with the 
Coral Gardens incident, Anti-Chinese Riots in 1965, or political warfare related to the 
declaration of a State of Emergency in 1966–67. The increased political violence of the mid-
1960s gained national media attention forcing politicians to criticize popular culture gangster 
lifestyle.434 Shearer responded to the problem by publicly denouncing the rise in violence and 
announced that he supported the police force’s using any means necessary to stem its tide. 
Political scientist Carl Stone contends that political renunciation was hypocritical because the 
corruption of the political process and rising gang violence represented an effective tool for 
destabilizing the system and polarizing grassroots supporters into either the JLP or PNP camp. 
“The political parties provided the main channels for the articulation of individual and collective 
interests in search of responses by the state. As the political parties matured they increasingly 
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frowned on non-partisan activism and sought to co-opt and incorporate all such pockets of 
activism and harass some that resisted. They attempted to establish territorial hegemony over 
defined combination to preserve that territorial hegemony.”435 Unfortunately, localized 
violence was the means by which politicians maintained control over their particular 
constituencies. 
By June 1968, the JLP government headed by Hugh Shearer confronted various 
governmental failures in the form of island-wide electrical black-outs caused by increased 
demand that exceeded Jamaica Public Service Company’s supply, which created problems for 
local businesses. The country and its businesses were also plagued by strikes. Marine pilots, bus 
operators, street cleaners, and hospital workers participated in a work slow-down, 
accompanying a sick-out by policemen island-wide, and a water shortage.436 Complex societal 
issues, coupled with rising violence, effectively destabilized the local government, while 
damaging Shearer’s reputation, as he seemed incapable of resolving the country’s current 
conflicts. “The reaction of the JLP government was to try to tighten the reins of control by 
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repressive measures which created for the opposition PNP the issue of civil rights, police 
brutality, freedom of speech and movement, and abuse of power by the JLP government.”437 
Beginning in 1967, violence erupted which resulted in physical confrontations between 
supporters. In an effort to protect Jamaica’s economy and relieve high unemployment, Hugh 
Shearer traveled to Europe. His European trip was important for the economic stability of the 
country since Britain was going to become a part of the European Common Market; thus any 
preference given to her Caribbean possessions would be lost, forcing the countries into 
economic turmoil. The aim of Shearer’s visit was to seek a way for Jamaica to gain access to the 
European Common Market via Britain’s acceptance.438 The Daily Gleaner criticized Shearer and 
argued that the economic problems confronting Jamaica would not be solved by Britain or the 
United States because they acted to protect their own interests. The Daily Gleaner critics also 
said that Jamaica’s agriculture needed to be further developed if Jamaica was to benefit from it; 
otherwise, Jamaica would continue to import foreign food staples, displacing local farmers and 
markets.439 The PNP leader Norman Manley was also critical of the government when he 
argued that unemployment could not be resolved by orthodox means. He further asserted that 
the role of government was to create an effective program that would provide employment; 
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and if that objective was impossible, then, the government must provide financial assistance for 
the unemployed. Manley charged that the JLP failed to protect the workers’ interests with an 
unemployment rate of twenty percent. He contended “that the economic problems bound up 
in unemployment, required long term and short term solutions and investment in 
education.”440 With unemployment, poverty, and desperation on the rise, the political structure 
of the 1960s fostered an environment that made escalating partisan violence possible, which 
was made worse by the development of gang culture. 
Shearer and Political Violence 
The political scene was further complicated by the restructuring of the PNP under 
Michael Manley as Norman Manley prepared to retire. In an effort to lead the PNP in a new 
direction, Michael Manley assigned each department within the party a specific task, and 
compelled the party to register as many members as possible for the upcoming elections. The 
younger Manley criticized the JLP government for its incompetence, corruption, and 
victimization of PNP leaders. He also claimed that the JLP was responsible for the increase in 
political violence surrounding the general elections.441 Manley further charged that “the 
country was being flooded with words everlasting, about everything under the sun. But 
underneath those words it is the same policy. The government works for the big money 
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interests. The government works on basically conservative lines. The government is not 
concerned to change the fundamental structure in which we derive from our colonial days, a 
structure of inequality, and a structure in which the masses of the country have no hope.”442  
Political machinations by both the JLP and PNP failed to address the problem of 
politically instigated violence, an issue that threatened the upcoming general elections. The 
Daily Gleaner reported that the violence associated with political gangsterism made the 
political parties responsible. Despite local confusion about which party was responsible for 
political violence, I have found that for many working class Jamaicans, the late 1960s 
symbolized political evolution in not only the level of violence involved, but also the types of 
weapons used to disrupt the political process.443 In 1966–67, a series of conflicts served to 
highlight the problem with gun violence, which served as a precursor for political life in the 
future. Political gangsterism was evident on February 13, 1967, when gunmen opened fire on 
Michael Manley’s procession as he and others campaigned for peace in the west Kingston 
constituency. This incident represented a significant change in how the political process was 
conducted because politicians were now the objects of violence and that use of violence 
included the use of guns. 
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It is my contention that with a political process that allowed a significant level of 
dependence on political patronage, Jamaican political structure evolved into a system that 
bestowed increased power on political leaders to control and exploit party supporters. Carl 
Stones argues that this process was further complicated by the use of ‘political gunmen’ and 
gangs that utilized violence and terrorization to enforce ‘party discipline.’444 With another 
election on the horizon, the violence escalated in 1966–67, which allowed irresponsible 
leadership to corrupt the political process. This development was evident in affected 
communities such as Tivoli Gardens and media coverage of the elections. With sensationalized 
headlines which announced that the “JLP has divided the nation,” “Police seize firearms and 
explosives,” “Gunmen shoot at Manley’s party,” and “JLP man shot dead,” these titles very 
clearly summarized the problem. My research revealed that rising gang violence dominated the 
headlines of local newspapers.445 Loyal politicians seemed almost impotent to stop the problem 
and eager to maintain the status quo that promoted partisan conflict. 
The pre-election period represented a chaotic time in Jamaican politics as both the JLP 
and PNP, in an effort to consolidate their power bases, abused their control over the patronage 
system. This problem was already evident in 1966 when Edward Seaga, the JLP representative 
of the western Kingston district of Tivoli Gardens, planned to extend the housing estate in an 
effort to strengthen his control in the area and displace his opponent, Dudley Thompson, in 
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western Kingston. In essence, Edward Seaga precipitated the escalation of violence on the part 
of the state via the use of police officers to bulldoze the Back-O-Wall district, forcing out 
tenants and squatters alike. This project produced an elevation in anti-JLP sentiments as 
violence and terrorism were used to intimidate PNP supporters in bordering communities 
through night-time guerrilla warfare. Additionally, JLP bulldozers displaced squatters and 
Rastafarians when their shanties in Foreshore Road were destroyed for a housing development 
project scheduled for that area that was part of the patronage system used to reward loyal JLP 
supporters. Ironically, the Back-O-Wall conflict was caused by the JLP’s desire to establish a 
base constituency in the west Kingston district. Consequently, according to Terry Lacey, due to 
increased violence, Shearer “in October of 1966 declared a state of emergency in west 
Kingston, the army and the Jamaica National Reserve (JNR) was mobilized and the army 
working in conjunction with the police force conducted raids on the headquarters of the JLP 
and PNP in the area. Minister of Affairs McNeill asked Seaga and Thompson not to visit their 
constituency in order to prevent further conflict.”446 The failure of the Jamaican police force 
and party leaders to effectively prevent the chaotic eruption of violence allowed the process to 
deteriorate further. Terry Lacey writes, “it was argued that the influx of guns into western 
Kingston could not be explained by the stealing of locally owned firearms, the apparent 
reluctance of the JCF to arrest known gunmen alleging that some top JCF officers wanted to 
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raid political headquarters of Seaga and Thompson, but could not get a green light from the 
Director of Public Prosecution.”447  
This struggle over the Back-O-Wall constituency established a clear connection between 
politicians and gang violence, as both Minister of Parliament, Edward Seaga, and Dudley 
Thompson recruited local gunmen to defend their respected districts, which was evident by the 
second week of June after rival gangs of one hundred and fifty men armed with semi-automatic 
guns and dynamite bombs fought continuously for six days. The police were slow to respond to 
the conflict, which allowed local gangs to terrorize communities located along Foreshore Road 
and Denham Town areas via the destruction of property, robbery, intimidation, and assault.448 
The Daily Gleaner reported that Norman Manley said, “he was aware that Seaga’s private army 
was well armed and the new element was introduced when he made his threat last year ‘of 
blood for blood and fire for fire,’ when he promised to use that private army.”449 It was evident 
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from the failure of Shearer’s government to effectively control JLP minister (Edward Seaga) that 
the political system was deteriorating and violence was becoming a recognized part of politics. 
Furthermore, Shearer’s reluctance to support the prosecution of Thompson and Seaga shows 
his collusion in maintaining the status quo, especially since the bulldozing of Back-O-Wall 
resulted in the destruction of 1,500 shacks and the displacement of over 4,000 families. This 
conflict was the result of the JLP’s efforts to gain substantial foothold in the PNP-dominated 
west Kingston constituency.450 It seems that political leaders were not concerned with the well-
being of the people but rather their ability to maintain power and political office.  
Arguably, the 1960s was a turbulent time because of the political conflict between the 
JLP and PNP factions. Young Michael Manley realized very early in his political career that his 
greatest opponent would be the rising star of the JLP, Edward Seaga. According to Rachel 
Manley, her father’s relationship with Seaga went beyond partisan politics. Her father’s 
antipathy towards Edward Seaga stemmed from an incident in 1965, at the National Hero’s 
Park, honoring the nineteenth-century insurgent leader, Paul Bogle, whose statue was designed 
by Edna Manley.451 The crisis occurred when Edward Seaga was booed by the crowd because 
Edna Manley left the stage to join her husband Norman who, as leader of the opposition, 
should have been invited onto the platform. Seaga responded to the insult by issuing a threat of 
war, “If they think they are bad, I can bring the crowd of west Kingston. We can deal with you in 
                                                          
450
 Lacey, Violence and Politics in Jamaica 1960–1970, 90–91; “Seaga Announces 3 Projects for west Kingston,” 
The Daily Gleaner, Vol. CXXXII. No. 136, July 16, 1966, 1–2. 
451
 Manley, Drumblair, 333; Gunst, Born Fi` Dead, 84–85. 
175 
 
any way and at any time. It will be fire for fire, and blood for blood.”452 Rachel Manley wrote 
that, “the incident had a profound effect on my father, who stated bluntly that he would never 
forget this insult to his father by Edward Seaga.”453 Consequently, I have found that the political 
relationship that emerged was marred by personal sentiments, depreciation, and political 
verbal antagonism, and manipulation of party loyalty. All of this helped to create a political 
environment that was volatile and chaotic, and the blame for the violence that later emerged 
was the fault of Jamaica’s more prominent leaders. 
Unlike his father whose collusion in political violence was more passive because 
grassroots supporters engaged in less armed conflict, Michael Manley might arguably be 
thought of as being a more aggressive participant in the politics of spoils that generated 
violence. I believe that with the 1967 elections approaching, politicians on both sides of the 
aisle condemned the other for perpetuating political violence while exploiting the west 
Kingston war to advance their respective parties’ politics in these communities. The PNP 
candidate for the west Kingston constituency, Dudley Thompson, manipulated the anti-JLP 
sentiments created after the forced removal of a large PNP-affiliated Rastafarian community 
from the area to win local support for his candidacy.454 Darrell Levi states that “Gangs 
connected with the JLP and the PNP began to attack each other with guns and Molotov 
cocktails. In 1966, Norman Manley accused the government of fomenting violence in west 
Kingston to confuse the public mind and divert attention from the moral shame and wickedness 
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of the conduct of the government towards the poor squatter.”455 As violence continued to 
escalate and politicians from the JLP and PNP blamed each other for the crisis, Dudley 
Thompson and other PNP leaders tried to negotiate an end to violence in the area. However, 
Seaga’s refusal to meet with the opposition and discuss peace negotiations led to the 
government declaring a state of emergency in October 1966 to end the violence. The state of 
emergency was terminated after three weeks when the violence subsided despite flare-ups of 
sporadic violence as the 1967 general elections approached. Michael Manley later commented 
that the “principal beneficiary of the west Kingston wars was Edward Seaga,” who was idolized 
by the constituency for defending their homes.456 My analysis of the 1966 state of emergency 
has revealed that the escalation of political violence was generated by a series of strikes 
initiated by both the BITU and NWU, which were engaged in a battle for power. 
The most relevant aspect of the strike was the Post Office dispute which began on April 
4, 1966, when 500 postal workers walked off the job. In the ensuing days, violence erupted as 
the government terminated the appointments of all the striking postal workers and employed 
scabs to replace them.457 Violence escalated as local gangs attempted to intimidate postal 
employees who themselves resorted to violence to block scabs. The government responded by 
using the Police Riot Squad to end the conflict. The postal workers’ strike represented a 
significant change in political violence since the dispute involved a clash between the police and 
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armed gangs. According to Terry Lacey, “the strike paved the way for more violent rebellions 
against the government.”458 Lacey’s assessment is correct because from May through 
September 1966, the country was overwhelmed by violence as local gangs protesting poverty, 
unemployment, and homelessness used terrorism to gain access to political patronage. When 
the government failed to respond to their demands, JLP government offices were vandalized 
and government construction projects were disrupted.459 Random acts of violence were 
documented by The Daily Gleaner and Terry Lacey, who reported that after a week of escalating 
violence and political rhetoric, the entire area of Spanish Town road was closed after public 
health inspectors and the CID escorts were attacked with Molotov cocktails: “Assistant 
Commissioner Basil Robinson led one hundred police armed with rifles and tear gas into the 
area. Armed men opened fire on the police and fired at them from behind ‘barricades’ of 
children. When the police fired the children and squatters retreated while firing at the 
oncoming police as they went.”460 In spite of (economic) protests, endemic political violence 
continued as JLP and PNP confrontations erupted over a plan by Edward Seaga to develop the 
Tivoli Gardens area as an extension of political patronage to reward party loyalists. According to 
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Vivian Blake, a PNP member of parliament, “both parties practiced victimization albeit with 
varying degrees of ruthlessness. Jamaicans were tolerant of this system because there are not 
enough jobs to satisfy the demand.”461 As violence escalated with additional conflicts between 
the security forces and local gangs, a state of emergency was declared in October 1966. 
Through these tragic stories, which documented political violence, it is evident that the 
parties’ connection to gun violence added to the problem. On February 3, 1967, The Daily 
Gleaner headline article reported ‘arms, explosives seized at JLP headquarters.’ When the 
police raided the JLP central headquarters in Kingston, policemen armed with riot gear and 
‘Mark seven rifles,’ tear gas and other such paraphernalia, blockaded the JLP offices and 
engaged in a minor gun fight. The wounded were Clement Tucker, who was shot in the neck, 
and Neville Fowler, who was shot in the thigh. Both men were later taken to the Kingston Public 
Hospital (KPH) for treatment. Police seized “at least 200 rounds of ammunition, two home-
made bombs, two Molotov cocktails, and dynamite caps. In another raid on an adjacent 
property the police discovered a small cache of weapons and ammunition.”462 Mass arrests 
followed the raid for illegal possession of firearms and violation of the ‘Gun powder and 
Explosives law,’ but the questions that remained were: Where did the JLP representatives get 
these weapons from? Why were these weapons being stockpiled? This incident firmly 
established a link between local politicians and the rising gun violence because why would 
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politicians need bombs and over two hundred rounds of ammunition? Ironically, no politician 
from either of the political parties could provide a definitive explanation about the ammunition 
stockpile, and the questions were left unanswered about the role of party leaders in political 
violence. 
Throughout 1967, violence continued to escalate in western Kingston, and on February 
6, 1967, violence exploded in Denham Town over JLP exploitation of the patronage system. A 
PNP mob gathered outside the Tivoli Gardens housing project to protest against victimization 
and a refusal to employ members of the opposition for the project. They were confronted by 
police, armed with riot gear, purportedly to restore order.463 However, the police’s presence at 
the site failed to prevent nine persons from being shot. “The shooting began on Oxford Street 
at four o’clock in the evening when the gunmen hurled Molotov cocktails at Mr. Wayne Smellie, 
who posted PNP posters on walls and fences along the street. The explosive missed Smellie but 
hit Mr. Victor Rhoden and other PNP members standing close by. Immediately after gunmen 
opened fire on Smellie but he outran them.”464 The continued rise in violent confrontations 
between police and party supporters resulted in Norman Manley publicly appealing to “all 
persons of both parties to put an end to violence and preserve the right of the citizens to vote 
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and the good name of Jamaica as a peace loving place.”465 Manley further demanded that the 
Prime Minister activate the police and army to protect not only people but also to quickly 
suppress politically motivated violence.466 Shearer’s inability to resolve the economic crisis of 
the late 1960s contributed to increased partisan conflict since the JLP used their control of the 
patronage system to reward party supporters. This element of modern politics contributed to 
the institutionalization of political violence. And it was evident from Shearer’s failure to 
effectively control increased incidents of political conflict in the late 1960s that violence was 
evolving and party leaders did not totally control the gangs. 
In spite of Manley’s warning against politically instigated violence, the problem 
remained and continued not only to polarize the populace but also to foster sentiments of 
animosity against the opposition. By February 11, 1967, the police reportedly seized explosives 
and firearms at a PNP constituency headquarters in west St. Andrew. The problem with this 
seizure was that the firearms were found buried in the yard, thereby creating doubts and 
suspicions as to who were the real owners of the weapons. The PNP candidate of west St. 
Andrew, Hopeton Caven, claimed that no weapons were found in the offices, and the yard was 
public domain, therefore, subject to sabotage. According to the police, this seizure yielded a 
total of “two revolvers one of them licensed, another an antique, one toy gun, eleven rounds of 
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ammunition, thirteen knives, one dynamite bomb, one Molotov cocktail, one long razor, two 
new machetes, a quart bottle filled with gasoline and quantity of ganja.”467 Despite the 
suspicious nature of the police seizure and the small quantity of evidence collected, this 
incident served to tarnish the PNP’s reputation, further enforcing the media’s idea of politically 
instigated violence and the inability of the police to control the problem. It also raised doubts 
about the PNP’s claims that they were defending their communities and were not the 
perpetrators of violence.            
Despite the PNP’s claims of innocence, partisan conflict escalated when The Daily 
Gleaner erroneously reported that on February 13, 1967, Norman Manley and other PNP 
representatives on a peace tour of west Kingston were shot at while in lower St. Andrew and 
the police had to use tear gas to disperse the crowd.468 On February 14, 1967, The Daily Gleaner 
corrected this error and reported that before Manley and his entourage arrived in the Spanish 
Town area, JLP supporters posting posters in a PNP neighborhood were shot at and pursued by 
a crowd of PNP supporters. It was during this confusion that an innocent by-stander, Horace 
Cargill, was shot in the arm.469 Prime Minister Hugh Shearer accused the leader of the 
opposition of trying to instigate violence. “Had Mr. Manley truly meant this tour to be a peace 
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mission he would not have taken the candidates for the area along with him and the fact that 
he did suggests that it was meant to be provocative,” thereby making Manley a relevant factor 
in the rising political violence.470 However, what Shearer did not address was the fact that a JLP 
supporter was willing to use violence to attack the leader of the Opposition in a public forum. 
Furthermore, Shearer’s refusal to acknowledge that both political parties were involved in 
violence reflected a fragmented political system. 
Manley’s denial that he was an instigator of political violence was followed by a two-
hour rampage by a PNP-affiliated gang in the lower Kingston and St. Andrew area. According to 
The Daily Gleaner, a JLP supporter (Rudolph Roach) was shot dead after a PNP gang randomly 
shot up homes and stores in Kingston on February 18, 1967, in vengeance. “The police said it 
seemed that the fire-arm assault was a wild affray to anyone who happened across the path of 
the bullets.”471 Another victim (Edwin King, a Chinese grocer) reported that members of a gang 
became violent after they had refused to pay for merchandise taken from his store.  
The transformation of the Jamaican political system since the transitional leadership of 
the 1967 general elections reflected a “bitter power struggle between politicians who perceived 
a power vacuum in their respective party leaderships was created because control of the party 
by Norman Manley and Alexander Bustamante in dictating had weakened with age. The 
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weaponry of political warfare thus changed from rhetoric to the Molotov cocktail and the gun. 
Political violence in western Kingston continued fairly consistently from March 1966 until the 
general election in February 1967.”472 The unfortunate reality of electioneering was that it was 
wedded to political violence and the scope of this violence increased overtime. The failure of 
the patronage system to fully provide for loyal party supporters, coupled with a change in the 
political leadership of the parties and poverty, resulted in political gangsterism and the use of 
semi-automatic guns and bombs. In spite of the escalating political violence and the people’s 
discontent with the government, on February 22, 1967, the people voted to re-elect the JLP, 
which won thirty three seats to the PNP’s twenty. Despite the loss, this election reflected the 
PNP’s success at attacking JLP grassroots supporters and dismantling the party’s platform 
issues.473 
The discontent that remained after the general elections served as a precursor for 
future elections and destabilized those governments that failed to rectify these problems. 
“Rising discontent over unemployment and job victimization, increasing bitter individual 
disputes exacerbated by inter-union rivalries, the breakdown or disruption of public services 
and the continued growth of industrial political and criminal violence” all destabilized Jamaica, 
a planning report observed in 1967.474 Despite the bread-and-butter issues that dominated 
political debates, gang violence in October 1968 also erupted independently of the political 
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parties with an explosion of violence that was not initiated by the two dominant political 
parties. This change was evident in the post-election violence that had little to do with politics 
and was a consequence of poverty and high unemployment. 
The 1960s Black Power Movement in the United States had overarching implications in 
Jamaica as young college students became radicalized. Students studying at the University of 
the West Indies (UWI) challenged the authority and the corruption of the government and 
rallied on behalf of Walter Rodney, professor of African history at the University. The conflict 
began on October 15, 1968, when Dr. Rodney was denied entrance into Jamaica after traveling 
to Canada for a Black writer’s conference.475 According to the Shearer government, “an 
Exclusion Order was initiated because of his reported secret, personal activities in several areas 
of the island which convinced security personnel that he was a grave security risk.”476 Walter 
Rodney was not only popular among members of the student body and the poor. Hartely Neita 
writes that,  
Rodney’s classroom was never confined to the University. On the contrary, he spent a large portion of his 
time on playing fields, hanging out on street corners, meeting with the ordinary black people of Trench 
Town and other parishes. He especially identified with the Rastafarians who constantly reflected on the 
black situation in Jamaica. This group had begun to have a profound impact on the young people of 
Jamaica, even as the Black Power Movement gained impetus in the U.S. So, with the growing popularity of 
Black Nationalism in Jamaica and Rodney’s hold and influence on the masses coupled with the possible 
spread of Communism, Shearer was forced to make a decision.
477 
                                                          
475
 Department of Statistics (1966) Employment, Earnings, and Hours in Large Establishments, 1965; Lacey, 
Violence and Politics in Jamaica 1960–1970, 94; Neita, Hugh Shearer, 292–93. 
476
 Lacey, Violence and Politics in Jamaica, 94. 
477
 Neita, Hugh Shearer, 295. 
185 
 
The Shearer government’s response to the Walter Rodney case sparked immediate 
demonstrations by the student body, which decided to march to the Ministry of Home Affairs 
and demand redress for the professor. The following day, the students shut down the 
University and took to the streets of Kingston. In the process of marching into the heart of the 
city, “three youth mobs formed around gangs of thirty or so youths, and, chanting ‘Black Power’ 
began smashing and burning buildings, attacking cars and buses, assaulting motorists, and 
clashed with police. As the student demonstration dissipated, so thousands of unemployed 
came onto the streets.”478 At this point, the student demonstration was replaced by mob 
violence which dominated the riots. The JDF used tear gas to disperse the rioters and instituted 
a ban on all forms of public protests. In order to maintain the peace, the military was mobilized 
to patrol the streets. Terry Lacy argues that a consequence of the Rodney Riots was fear of class 
violence “that manifested a reservoir of antagonism against the Jamaican government and the 
national bourgeoisie, and because they pointed to a source of political strength, and in a wider 
than party sense, of political violence, which was largely outside and beyond the control of the 
conventional political system and whose main relationship with the political system in 1966 and 
1967 had been to provide mercenary warriors serving the ends of Jamaican politicians.”479 The 
reality of the Rodney Riots was that local gangs (rise of the Rude Boys) were not fully controlled 
by the patronage system and they were willing to use violence, independent of the general 
elections, to protest against poverty and neglect. Coupled with this dilemma was the influx of 
semi-automatic weapons and explosives, which contributed to the increase in gun violence that 
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erupted in the political arena. This escalation of violence on the part of the police state and 
local gangs as well as the corruption of modern politics in Jamaica all contributed to the 
institutionalization of violence within the political system. 
Conclusion 
The 1960s represented a turning point for Jamaican politics as the transition from 
localized violence to a national process. This transition was reflected in the Rodney Riots, where 
Black Power sentiments resulted in not only a loss of grass roots support for the JLP (which 
allowed the Michael Manley political machine to dominate local politics) but also changed the 
structural dynamic of the type of political violence that occurred. Although it is somewhat 
simplistic to contend that the violence before the 1960s was different from the political 
violence that preceded it—because the former involved physical confrontations, sticks, and 
stones—the use of automatic weapons did change the level of brutality and violence involved in 
conflict, as in the case of the Claudius Henry Rebellion and the various police seizures of bomb-
making materials during raids at both the JLP and PNP offices. This transition remains relevant 
because it signified the evolution of political violence and identified local politicians as the 
central impetus of this dilemma. A consequence of this system was that political patronage 
became substantial as increased poverty and unemployment led to desperation of a winner-
takes-all strategy for each party to protect its vested interests. The next chapter will fully 
explore the further development of gang violence and the implications of political patronage 





Young Joshua Comes to Power 
Introduction 
Popular writings about Michael Manley’s period in power around the 1970s often 
expressed the view that the PNP was largely exempt from perpetration of violence. In my view, 
this is a questionable understanding of violence. This chapter argues that the PNP played an 
integral role in the escalation of violence in the 1970s. The 1970s epitomizes an era marred by 
brutal political violence and the government’s inability to resolve the economic crisis. Both the 
JLP and PNP’s participation in political tribalism and politically motivated violence brought the 
credibility of Jamaican democracy and political practice into question. The cycle of violence 
became more nationally widespread and institutionalized within Jamaican politics as both 
parties manipulated and exploited the population through patronage—the tool by which 
parties sought to exert control over the various youth gangs. Despite Michael Manley’s 
declaration of the PNP’s innocence of charges leveled against it by the JLP, it is not difficult to 
show that they were implicated in the cycle of violence in the 1970s that victimized people on 
both sides. This escalation of political violence reached its apex in the run-up to the 1980 
general elections when over eight hundred people were killed.480 
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In 1969, Michael Manley succeeded his father Norman Manley, as president of the PNP. 
Exploiting religious symbolism (identifying himself with the Biblical figure of Joshua wielding the 
‘Rod of Correction,’ a cane allegedly bestowed on Manley by the emperor of Ethiopia Haile 
Selassie), making use of the popular appeal of Reggae music, and employing his considerable 
personal charisma, Manley gained the confidence and support of a large majority of the people 
and came to power in a landslide victory in the general election in 1972 despite continued 
election violence. Manley became a charismatic figure among the poor. For many, Michael 
Manley was a contemporary ‘Moses,’ promising a better-life-to-come for the poor and 
oppressed. Indeed, ‘better must come’ was the slogan of the 1972 campaign. Michael Manley’s 
ability to mobilize popular culture to establish a connection with the Jamaican masses allowed 
the PNP to discredit the Jamaica Labor Party government for its alienation of the poor, 
corruption, squandering of national treasury funds, high unemployment, and poverty. Using 
language that the people could relate to gave the PNP legitimacy among working-class 
Jamaicans. The competition between the JLP’s Hugh Shearer and later Edward Seaga, and the 
PNP’s Michael Manley for power is of pivotal significance to the evolution of political violence in 
the 1970s. Unlike his father, who had a more passive relationship with political violence, 
Michael Manley might be thought of arguably as being a more aggressive participant in the 
politics of spoils that generated violence. This era gave rise to Jamaica’s most destructive 
partisan politics as local gunmen used terror tactics to disrupt the general elections.481 
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In an effort to combat existing social and economic problems, the newly elected PNP 
government implemented a series of reform programs: to relieve unemployment, address 
illiteracy via the Jamaica Adult Literacy Program (JAMAL), and the nationalization of the utilities 
and bus systems. However, arguably, the Manley regime suffered adversely because it sought 
to establish too many reforms within too short a time frame and without the necessary 
financial support that would make these programs viable. In addition to economic setbacks, 
Manley’s declaration in 1974 of a return to ‘democratic socialism’ and his close relationship 
with Cuba’s Fidel Castro clashed with the United States’ Cold War policies which supported the 
global destabilization of Socialist governments. 
This chapter examines the leadership of Michael Manley as the new president of the 
PNP and his attempt to resolve the crisis of political violence. This political emergency was 
responsible for the death of nearly a thousand people as both parties viciously contested the 
1976 and 1980 general elections. During Manley’s term as prime minister, there were a number 
of incidents that implicated his government in the perpetration of violence. One of the most 
egregious was the so-called Green Bay Massacre in 1978 in which JLP supporters were set up, 
ambushed, and killed by members of the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF), presumed to be 
supporters of the government in power. This incident served to portray the PNP as a force 
behind the violence and created distrust for the government among a growing percentage of 
the populace. This sentiment was further reinforced with the creation of the ‘Brigadista’ 
program which was an agreement between Jamaica and Cuba that allowed Jamaican workers 
to travel to Cuba, where they were to be trained in construction techniques. This program was 
controversial. The leader of the opposition party, Edward Seaga, exploited local and U.S. fears 
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about the spread of socialism in the Caribbean when he argued that the ‘Brigadista’ program 
represented a conspiracy by the government to allow PNP supporters to learn guerrilla tactics 
and other subversive techniques in Cuba.482 
The relationship between Michael Manley and Fidel Castro served to precipitate further 
problems for Jamaica as the United States government would not tolerate any model of 
alternative development in the Caribbean and reacted to this alliance by working to destabilize 
and remove Manley’s government from power. It has been argued that the CIA sent agents to 
infiltrate Jamaican politics and gangs in order to create discord and to encourage the collapse of 
the Jamaican economy. In spite of internal and external attacks on the PNP government, 
Manley continued to fight for working-class people because he strongly believed that only 
through true participatory government could the working-class poor be granted full equality. 
This reality, he believed, could only be accomplished if Jamaica’s sovereignty was protected 
from external interference. My contention is that despite Manley’s attempt to reform the 
Jamaican government and protect the people, violence between the JLP and PNP escalated. 
Arguably, an irate Manley responded to the JLP’s aggression by forming the Brigadistas—a 
program that generated controversy when former Brigadista Colin Dennis claimed that the 
program was designed to train PNP supporters in guerrilla warfare tactics. In my view, through 
his efforts to defend PNP constituencies against the JLP’s aggression by implementing programs 
such as the Brigadistas, Manley contributed toward creating an environment in which political 
violence was sanctioned, if not authorized. 
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Michael Manley was born in Kingston, Jamaica, on December 10, 1924, to Edna and 
Norman Manley. According to Manley’s biographer, Darrell Levi, Manley grew up in a brown 
‘activist’ middle-class family and experienced a normal childhood despite having charismatic 
parents. “Michael Manley’s youth was dominated by his remarkable, enigmatic, strongly 
individualistic parents. Douglas, being the first born, suffered from the inexperience of his 
parents, as do perhaps all first born children. Michael theorized nearly sixty years after the fact 
that, in the twenties, his parents had adopted all kinds of crazy, wrong theories about child-
raising. They would read a book and decide on the basis of their reading how to raise 
children.”483 In spite of having two children, the Manleys were somewhat estranged from each 
other in the sense that Norman, a politician, and Edna, an artist, had professional careers which 
demanded the majority of their time. As King’s Counsel for Jamaica, a politician, and later prime 
minister, Norman Manley worked extremely long hours. Edna, the consummate artist, became 
so involved in her art that she was often totally unaware of anything else.484 This environment 
resulted in the Manley children being raised by a succession of domestic helpers, some of 
whom essentially became surrogate parents. 
The Manley family members expressed a love for art, music, and sports, especially 
boxing and cricket, in which both Douglas and Michael participated.485 However, exposure to 
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art and music played an important part in the boys’ education, and frequent discussions of their 
opinions and interpretations represented an essential part of the Manley tradition. Although 
the labor movement began in the 1930s, the Manleys’ childhood was not disrupted by the 
national political struggle being waged.486 
In 1935, at the age of 11, Manley was enrolled at the exclusive and elitist Jamaica 
College. Unfortunately, his experience at boarding school became one of his greatest 
disappointments since Manley became a victim of school bullies and was a social outcast. 
Manley’s negative experience at school could, arguably, be attributed to his father’s reputation 
as both a scholar and athlete. According to Manley, “it was my first recollection of agony. I still 
get very upset when I remember my years of boarding early, and being very much a part of the 
tradition of boys that just don’t tell. And I had a terrible period when I was losing weight and 
my parents were going out of their minds, because they did not know what to the hell was 
wrong with me. And I would not confide in anyone, a mistake that went on for years. Oh Jesus, 
it was awful.”487 Manley’s experience resulted in his intense attraction to sports and a fierce 
desire to work out in order to protect himself. Manley’s athletic ability resulted in his becoming 
the captain of the swimming team.488 
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Both Douglas and Michael Manley had to contend with being frequently compared to 
their father, Norman, who was legendary. Manley stipulated that “Dad’s thing was so 
legendary, you just could not move anywhere at Jamaica College, he had the best bowling 
average for three years; second most goals scored in soccer for three years; champion athlete 
and was vice captain of the rifle team. Everywhere you turned you saw his picture. It was just 
too much for Douglas and myself.”489 Unfortunately, Manley’s personal charisma did not 
prevent him from experiencing conflict with the new principal of Jamaica College, J.W.S. Hardie, 
with whom tensions developed when Manley declined Hardie’s offer to become the new 
headboy over a more qualified classmate. The relationship between the two spiraled 
downward and resulted in Hardie’s using his position to humiliate and publicly chastise Manley 
in order to remind him that he was powerless as a student, which resulted in Manley’s not only 
leaving JC but also migrating to Canada.490  
In October 1943, Manley emigrated from Jamaica and joined the Royal Canadian Air 
Force (RCAF). The military provided structure, routine, and discipline for a rebellious Manley. 
He quickly became bored with military life and constant exams despite his need to qualify as a 
pilot.491 In spite of Manley’s desire to serve in combat, “he was deactivated shortly after May 8, 
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1945, VE Day.”492 Manley’s experience in Canada was one of frustration; his ideological beliefs 
that communism granted true equality by protecting the poor contributed to his ostracism from 
Canadian society.493  
Manley’s experiences in Canada resulted in his emigration to Britain in late 1945, where 
he was very critical of the people and society due to the subtle enforcement of racist 
ideologies. Darrell Levi contends that, although Manley was “very light skinned, he nonetheless 
witnessed and experienced an immense amount of color prejudice in which all Jamaicans, West 
Indians, and Africans were snubbed in restaurants, refused lodgings, and suffered job 
discrimination.”494 Manley’s disappointment with Britain was intense and troubling because 
civic classes in Jamaica had protected and idolized the history of the British people. Jamaicans 
were taught to respect Queen and country and to be loyal to Great Britain, which empathized 
with blacks through their emancipation in 1838.  
Despite these obvious problems, Manley married his first wife, Jacqueline Kamellard, in 
early 1946 and enrolled at the London School of Economics (LSE) to finish his undergraduate 
degree. Manley quickly became frustrated with the structure of social conditions at LSE, where 
he majored in economics.495 Manley withdrew from the university and relocated with his wife 
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to Cornwall, a decision that lasted six months during which his daughter Rachel was born on 
July 3, 1947.496 By the fall of 1947, Manley returned to LSE to continue his education in political 
journalism. In his second year, Manley was further influenced by Harold Laski, who advocated 
“combining individual freedom with social order, worker freedom in the face of growing 
demands by the state, and the marriage of socialism and democracy.”497 Laski’s ideologies were 
an extension of those of Norman Manley, who had previously influenced Michael on the 
benefits of socialism. Manley continued to remain informed about the state of Jamaican and 
Caribbean politics via personal correspondence with his father and newspapers while attending 
Laski’s lectures which further advanced his support of ‘Democratic Socialism.’498  
From 1948–49 Manley, in his third year, became more politicized and actively 
participated in the LSE’s West Indian Student Union. Through the student union, Manley 
became “a principal organizer of strikes protesting against the British government’s 
enforcement of racism in Africa.”499 Despite Manley’s political activism, the daily frustration of 
providing for a family precipitated a financial crisis, which caused a strain within the marriage 
and resulted in the couple’s divorce in 1951. This in turn resulted in Manley’s daughter Rachel’s 
being sent to Jamaica to live with her grandparents, Edna and Norman Manley.500 
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In an effort to gain practical journalistic experience, Manley worked for the London 
Observer in 1951; however, by December of that same year, he returned to Jamaica. “From 
early 1952 through 1955, he wrote an opinion column entitled The Root of the Matter for an 
independent newspaper that was very critical of the JLP government’s Public Opinion; he wrote 
editorials, covered stories, worked on feature stories, handled lay-outs, and managed the 
sports and feature pages.”501 Manley used the newspaper as a forum to express his ideologies 
and attacked the JLP-supported The Daily Gleaner for its monolithic nature and its unethical 
editorials on the PNP.502 In the continued battle between the JLP and PNP, Manley was very 
vocal in defense of the PNP and openly attacked JLP supporters. “The leaders of the JLP, he 
wrote in 1955, are completely contemptuous of democracy, are basically indifferent to the 
welfare of the country, and dedicated solely to the end of their own lust for power.”503 
Arguably, Manley’s time as a journalist allowed him to re-connect with Jamaican society 
and to become more intuitive and vocal about the problems that the people endured.504 While 
working for the newspaper, Manley became involved in establishing grassroots support bases 
for the PNP in the middle-class constituency of Barbican. Working in this capacity, Manley 
addressed large audiences in order to promote the PNP’s political agenda.505 This allowed him 
to become more involved in the trade union movement and resulted in his being elected to the 
                                                          
501
 Manley, Drumblair, 82–86; also referenced in Levi, Michael Manley, 72; Doggett, “Michael Manley,” 27. 
502
 Levi, Michael Manley, 73. 
503
 Levi, Michael Manley, 79. 
504
 Levi, Michael Manley, 84. 
505
 Levi, Michael Manley, 87. 
197 
 
“National Executive Committee and the Central Executive Committee of the PNP.”506 In late 
1952, Manley became a negotiator for the National Workers Union and participated in 
representing workers at the Ariguanabo Textile Mill. By 1953, he also assisted employees at the 
Aluminum Company of Canada (ALCAN) to gain a fair wage. According to Manley, these 
experiences “convinced him that trade unionism suited his egalitarianism, his commitment to 
social justice and his instinct for activism.”507 Manley’s passionate nature and continued 
activism resulted in his acceptance by the local populace who believed that Manley was 
committed to the ordinary man. In June 1953, Michael Manley officially joined the trade union 
movement when he became a full-time employee of the National Worker’s Union (NWU). 
According to Martha Doggett “Manley’s job was to make inroads into the labor sector, long 
dominated by Bustamante and the BITU; although he consistently maintained that his trade 
unionism was separate from his politics, success in bauxite and sugar organization had the 
political bonus of broadening the support of the predominantly urban PNP.”508 In an effort to 
ingratiate himself with the Jamaican populace, Manley dedicated himself to visiting poor 
neighborhoods and used public rallies to advocate on behalf of the NWU. 
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Amidst his union activities, Manley married Thelma Verity (a dancer) in 1954 despite his 
total involvement in a bitter struggle between NWU, BITU, and TUC to represent workers on 
the unorganized sugar estates.509 In 1956, this crisis resulted in major victories for the NWU in 
the South Clarendon area and in the NWU’s emerging as a counterpoise to the BITU.510 Due to 
the balance of power that the NWU represented in the trade union movement, there was 
cooperation between the BITU and NWU, which jointly led a strike in 1956 against various sugar 
estates.511 The crisis went to arbitration, which resulted in a loss for the NWU when arbitrators 
concluded with a decision on a worker’s salary of one shilling and ten pence per hour. In spite 
of the defeat, Manley continued to advocate on behalf of workers for higher wages. By 1960, 
Manley’s second marriage had failed due to his union activities since he was rarely at home to 
help raise his son, Joseph, who was born in 1958.512 
The failure of the West Indies Federation resulted in a major loss for the PNP in 1962, 
which allowed the JLP to return to power. This erupted in conflict with mass lay-offs, 
termination of civil servants, redistricting to claim more seats for JLP candidates, abuse of 
patronage, and the blatant abuse of PNP supporters who protested against JLP corruption.513 
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This environment facilitated Manley’s attempt to enter the political arena because he realized 
that as a political leader, he could directly impact policies designed to benefit the poor. Despite 
the PNP’s defeat in the 1962 elections, Michael Manley was elected to the senate, “the lesser 
house of Jamaica’s bicameral parliament where his main job was to represent labor,” where his 
political career began.514 
As a consequence of his senatorial position, Manley became an essential factor in 
maintaining the connection between trade unionism and politics, a position that he exploited in 
1964 when he participated in the strike by the Jamaica Broadcasting Corporation (JBC). 
Manley’s organization of the strike gained him national attention and introduced the people of 
Jamaica to his dynamic and charismatic personality. Although the JBC was created by Norman 
Manley, the company was independent of local politics, and in this elusive capacity, the JBC was 
equally critical of the PNP government from 1955 through 1962.515 However, once the JLP 
reclaimed office in 1962, they censored and controlled Jamaica’s only television station and a 
pro-PNP medium by placing the organization’s finances under the control of Edward Seaga, the 
Minister of Culture and Development. Concerned that JBC employees would turn to the BITU to 
protect their interests, the NWU began negotiations with the corporation in 1963 and reached 
a tentative agreement in January 1964 for increased wages, pensions, and reduced working 
hours. A week later, Manley was informed that the proposal was rejected by the corporation’s 
                                                          
514
 Levi, Michael Manley, 110. 
515
 Levi, Michael Manley, 112; Manley, Drumblair, 294. 
200 
 
board of directors and Minister Edward Seaga because the JBC was losing money.516 With 
negotiations stalling, Manley was informed that two JBC reporters, Adrian Rodway and George 
Lee, were terminated for reporting on the JBC labor dispute. Manley argued that the 
corporation should reinstate both men—Lee because he had done nothing wrong in reporting 
the story of the union strike, and Rodway because the most of which he was guilty was 
technical default by not verifying the story with the senior news editor.517 The board rejected 
Manley’s proposal and refused to reinstate the men. At this juncture, the NWU informed the 
corporation of the workers’ decision to strike.518  
Michael Manley organized and led the strike that began on February 1, 1964. 
Negotiations were problematic because station managers were paid ‘double salary’ to keep the 
station operating while workers walked the picket line.519 Manley surmised that due to the 
station’s ability to operate, coupled with other media outlets such as radio and newspapers 
that reported the daily news, the NWU’s probability of success was negligible and that he must 
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find an alternative means of success.520 Manley decided that the strike’s success depended on 
the public’s awareness of the injustice of the workers’ terminations, and resorted to non-
violent protests epitomized by Dr. Martin L. King, Jr. in the American civil rights movement. On 
March 5, the union initiated a strike when JBC workers, including Manley, lay down on the 
streets of Kingston’s main roadway, causing major traffic jams. The government responded to 
this act of defiance by using tear gas and force to remove the strikers. According to Michael 
Manley, “it is not that I do not understand that violence will sometimes be the only medium 
capable of delivering historical change, it is just that I see it as an absolute last resort and not a 
path to be taken, because the moral courage is lacking to try other ways.”521 After ninety-seven 
days of protest, the strike was resolved after the terminations were investigated by a board of 
inquiry, which ruled that George Lee was innocent and Adrian Rodway’s termination was 
justified. Arguably despite this split verdict, the strike helped propel Michael Manley into the 
national political arena as a contender for the leadership of the party. It also endeared him to 
the Jamaican working class who renamed him ‘Joshua,’ savior for the people, a man willing to 
challenge the government to protect the working man.522 
Manley’s popularity did not prevent criticism from those within the PNP who believed 
that he was unqualified to lead the party. He was also criticized by some sections of the 
Jamaican Left for being a moderate liberal and not a radical socialist. Members of the Jamaican 
Left, such as Bobby Hill, created controversy in 1964 when he challenged the party’s more 
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prominent leaders for control over policies.523 The Daily Gleaner was also critical of Manley, 
stating that “he cast his lot in 1964–5 with the center-right of the PNP rather than its left wing 
insurgents.”524 Political challenges from the younger generation within the PNP, coupled with 
internal fighting, created a crisis for the PNP. Consequently, in November, Michael Manley, in 
conjunction with an advisory committee, announced their socialist programs in an effort to 
maintain party unity. Manley declared, “I want to spell out democratic socialist policy for 
Jamaica based on the premise that socialism is about equality. Equality did not mean 
uniformity, dictatorship of any kind, or equality in misery and poverty.”525 Manley’s 
explanation, however, failed to resolve the confusion and JLP propaganda about socialism. The 
problem with the PNP’s socialist program was its inability to work effectively within a 
capitalistic framework. The failure to fully define Democratic Socialism and how it would work 
in Jamaica created a disconnect between the people and the party. The PNP’s neglect allowed 
the JLP to exploit the weaknesses within the PNP’s socialist program to create uncertainty and 
fear about the impact of socialism in Jamaica.526  
Michael Manley, the PNP, and Violence 
Despite the JLP’s attack against the PNP’s political ideologies in 1967, Michael Manley 
campaigned for the House of Representatives in the east-central Kingston constituency, a seat 
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which he later won.527 Manley continued to engage in union struggles via the NWU, although 
he was now a recognized politician. The tactics utilized by Manley in the unionization process 
were antagonistic and perilous in relation to the political violence of the 1960s. This was 
evident in 1967 when Manley became embroiled in political violence himself, when the NWU’s 
dominance of the bauxite industry was challenged by the BITU leadership. The conflict emerged 
in 1967, when an agreement to build an aluminum plant was negotiated between the Jamaican 
government and Kaiser, Reynolds, and Anaconda Corporations came to fruition when 
construction on the project began. At this juncture the BITU used the commencement of the 
project to challenge the NWU’s control over workers in the bauxite industry.528 
Unlike his father, Michael Manley had a more active relationship with political conflict, 
which was evident when violence occurred after Manley had addressed NWU bauxite workers. 
As he was leaving, a fight erupted between the JLP’s Pearnel Charles and NWU members. 
Michael Manley claimed as the fighting escalated, “Pearnel Charles drew his gun and started 
firing, wounding Clenton Cooke and another NWU worker, George Whyrune. Charles then ran 
to a waiting BITU car, which sped away when additional shots were fired by PNP supporters, in 
the midst of tear gas fired in turn by the police on duty at the work-site.”529 In an effort to end 
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the strike, Manley rallied workers and marched to the work site, past JLP gunmen defending 
the picket line, a strategy that ended the strike successfully.530  
Manley married Barbara Lewar in 1966 in spite of the challenges that a political career 
can generate. The marriage ended when Barbara died of cancer after giving birth to Manley’s 
third child, Sarah.531 
During his tenure as a member of the House, Manley continued to fight for the union 
workers; but he also became more entrenched in the political sphere by publicly challenging 
the JLP’s policies and arguing against political corruption. Consequently, Manley criticized the 
JLP government for failing the working class, as the unemployment rate rose to thirty percent 
and poverty persisted, reinforced by enforcement of social and class biases.532 The economy 
remained a weakness for the JLP because in the 1960s, although Jamaica experienced growth in 
the manufacturing industry as a result of foreign investment, that growth was limited to the 
middle class. This situation was further complicated by restrictive British immigration policies 
that prevented migration from Jamaica, thus, exacerbating the high unemployment rate. 
Political scientists, George Beckford and Michael Witter, blamed these problems on the mal-
distribution of wealth due to the JLP’s political support of multinational businesses, which 
oppressed the masses (especially the disenfranchised youth, whom they viewed as a “political 
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nuisance and superfluous.”)533 Political deference to multinational corporations was not unique 
to Jamaica; however, the JLP exacerbated the issue by alienating and neglecting the working-
class poor. 
In February 1969, Manley became the president of the PNP after defeating the 
moderate lawyer, Vivian Blake, and immediately launched his attack against the JLP 
government. As the leader of the opposition, Manley continued his criticism of the JLP for the 
rising violence. “One of Manley’s first acts as PNP president was to call for an independent 
crime commission to investigate violence and law and order in Jamaica. Prime Minister Shearer 
responded by calling on Manley to stop preaching civil disobedience and support the police.”534 
With the 1972 general elections approaching, local politicians waged a war of words, each 
condemning the other for localized violence while claiming that their respective party only 
responded to defend their members. Manley used his charismatic personality to cement a 
connection between the PNP, the working-class poor, and the Rastafarian community. Darrell 
Levi reports that,  
In his campaign Manley used terms from the Old Testament that reflected Rastafarian speech and 
sensitivity towards the ‘sufferers’. Songs like ‘Beat down Babylon,’ ‘Small Axe,’ and ‘Must get a Beating,’ 
expressed the outrage of many people towards the ‘oppressors’ loosely identified as the JLP and 
associated groups such as ‘capitalists.’ A walking stick supposedly given to Manley by Haile Selassie, the 
Ethiopian emperor became known as Joshua’s rod and featured prominently in the campaign.
535 
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The people actually believed that Manley’s rod had mystical powers and wanted to touch this 
source of power at political rallies, a spectacle that further established Manley as a champion of 
the people. By exploiting Manley’s connection to the Emperor’s gift of the rod, and by 
manipulating popular culture via reggae music, he was able to evoke biblical, cultural, and 
political symbolism to strengthen his support base.536 Manley’s motives during his rise to power 
were not totally altruistic; he was just as guilty as others of manipulating and exploiting 
grassroots supporters to gain access to power.537 However, Manley’s appeal was multifaceted 
and, outside of partisan politics, many Jamaicans were ready by 1970 for a change after ten 
years of economic failure by the JLP leadership. Coupled with Manley’s political campaign that 
incorporated the poor and disenfranchised and a stagnating economy, he claimed victory in the 
elections.  
Reporting on the drama surrounding the political campaign for the 1972 general 
elections, The Daily Gleaner concentrated on the propaganda machines of both parties. Both 
parties exploited the fears of the populace. For example, speaking at a rally in Tivoli Gardens in 
1972, Edward Seaga declared that “I did not bring violence to west Kingston they (the PNP) 
brought it to me.”538 Once again, the JLP attempted to discredit the PNP since Seaga never 
failed to condemn Manley for promoting violence and all the problems that plagued Jamaica, 
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although the JLP had been in power for the last ten years.539 If propaganda tactics failed to 
motivate the populace, the JLP exploited the PNP’s socialist platform, not only to vilify the party 
but also to create fear and confusion about a possible communist occupation and to draw 
support from the United States. Paul Ashley argues that “locally the JLP imposed the 
international climate on the electorate by perpetuating the fear of the PNP-linked communist 
invasion to justify its pro-United States foreign policy orientation and the veil of secrecy over its 
foreign policy.”540 However, this tactic was frequently used by whichever party controlled the 
government to malign and condemn the Opposition. This was reflected in previously cited 
speeches, where both Manley and Seaga played partisan politics by blaming the other party for 
instigating political violence, a political tactic that maintained the status quo but failed to 
resolve the crisis caused by gang violence. 
The PNP’s battle call of ‘power to the people’ answered JLP propaganda with a 
campaign promise that they would dedicate themselves to resolving corruption, 
unemployment, crime, violence, and ending victimization by the JLP government.541 Political 
aggression was evident in the stories reported by The Daily Gleaner on February 16, 1972. 
Kenrick Anglin was stabbed and Charles Kennedy received a head wound after stones were 
thrown at a public PNP meeting; yet, despite the reported injuries, PNP supporters rallied to 
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defend their community by forcing JLP supporters to flee the area. Such conflicts were a 
common element of Jamaican politics.542 The PNP, however, had more ammunition in the 
political campaign when PNP leaders accused the JLP of taking Jamaica to the brink of 
bankruptcy due to an absence of responsible development planning with expensive public 
works projects that exceeded their budgets and were incomplete. The PNP asserted that the 
sheer fiscal irresponsibility resulted in a debt that had increased to $320.3 million, some of 
which was poorly managed and stolen by corrupt politicians. According to The Daily Gleaner, 
the legacy of the JLP in the 1972 general elections was a “public debt of approximately five 
times what Jamaica has been able to incur in its entire previous history.”543 Ultimately, the 
PNP’s ability to successfully exploit the Rasta culture, religious symbolism, black pride, poverty, 
high unemployment, problems with the JLP’s corruption, and local frustration with the 
incumbent government, resulted in a victory for the PNP in the 1972 general elections. 
At 47 years old, Manley became the new Prime Minister of Jamaica. The PNP claimed 
victory in the 1972 elections with thirty four seats as against the JLP’s seventeen seats in the 
house.544 Manley himself asserted that “the people voted in 1972 for the change which we 
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symbolized more than specifically promised.”545 According to The Daily Gleaner reports, the 
1972 elections were relatively peaceful: “a press release from the headquarters of the joint 
police and military command said that fifteen major incidents were reported, nine arrests, and 
four persons detained.”546 Decreased incidents of political violence were attributed to intra-
party conflicts within the JLP leadership as Hugh Shearer was replaced by Edward Seaga as the 
leader of the party. 
Economic Contributions to Violence 
In order to understand the endemic nature of political violence in the 1970s, I will 
explain a number of extenuating circumstances that contributed to the problem. The first 
dilemma of the Manley regime was the failing economy, which was not immediately apparent 
due to his success in attaining more revenue for Jamaica via the increased bauxite levies. 
Secondly, the PNP government had to contend with an aggressive U.S. government that was 
determined to contain or eliminate communism/socialism around the world.547 After the 1972 
elections, Manley initiated a series of controversial reforms aimed at improving Jamaica’s 
economy through the nationalization of several public service industries, and the government’s 
conversion to democratic socialism. The problem with Manley’s reforms was that Jamaica 
lacked the funding to make the country economically independent of what he considered to be 
an exploitative capitalist market. Manley exacerbated this situation by turning to the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for a financial bailout for Jamaica. This 
ultimately undermined his own government’s authority when the banks demanded the 
implementation of several austerity economic measures in return for granting the loans. The 
problem with the IMF and World Bank demands was that the banks wanted Manley to reduce 
civil service sector jobs and decrease government spending at a time when Jamaica suffered 
from an unemployment rate of 23 percent. These demands precipitated an economic crisis for 
the country in the late 1970s.548  
In 1972, the PNP government initiated reforms aimed at expanding the role of the state, 
whereby the government could more effectively serve the needs of the people. Consequently, 
the PNP government introduced and enhanced a series of programs designed to alleviate 
economic problems. These programs, according to Carl Stone, included the “New International 
Economic Order (NIEO), a program to reduce the gap between the rich and poor; the Special 
Employment Program Community; public housing program; civil service reclassification; JAMAL, 
a literacy program; and land lease.”549 Manley believed that any economy which remained 
dependent on foreign sources would fail and Democratic Socialism was necessary to unite the 
people and change attitudes.550 Consequently, Manley argued that the government should 
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serve and be controlled by the people. Political parties within that system should act as 
mediators between the people and government; and towards that end, the people have the 
power to determine the future of the country via the ‘politics of participation.’551 As an 
ideologue, Manley saw the colonial influence within Jamaican society as destructive of true 
democracy; therefore, the stratification of class and color had to be eliminated if true reforms 
were to occur.552 Manley’s decision to return to Democratic Socialism in 1974 was an attempt 
to reform the established system of capitalism, which was designed to benefit the colonial 
bureaucracy and big business. Arguably, in 1974, Manley was attempting to make both the 
political parties and government responsible to the people of Jamaica, and his return to 
Democratic Socialism was representative of this belief. Conveniently, what Manley failed to 
address was the role of the government and political parties in establishing a connection with 
the disenfranchised youths who were involved in gang violence.   
Manley’s reforms were not limited to the local government. He wanted to expand and 
transform Jamaica’s relationship with other Third World countries in an effort to promote trade 
and cooperation between nations since Jamaica was connected to the global economy where 
multinational capitalistic rules dominated and also controlled the price of sugar and the stock 
exchange. Consequently, Manley’s foreign policy focused on economic development in order to 
combat endemic poverty while reducing Jamaica’s economic dependency on nations such as 
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the United States and Britain, which owned half of all business interests in Jamaica.553 Manley’s 
efforts to assert Jamaica’s independence and sovereignty explain his decision to extend 
diplomatic relations to Cuba in 1972 despite obvious conflicts with the United States’ 
oppressive Cold War foreign policies. According to Darrell Levi, “Manley’s efforts were 
problematic because not only was Jamaica economically dependent on foreign investors, but he 
underestimated the fact that the power of the United States was enormous and that the 
Jamaican people still harbored positive images of the U.S. as a source of opportunity and 
money for many of them. A tremendous problem was that for the masses of the Jamaican 
people, values were disseminated through a system of propaganda and entertainment that 
poured out of Washington, New York, and California.”554 Consequently, the Manley 
government was negatively impacted by U.S. foreign policies, which were made more 
problematic by the leader of the opposition party, Edward Seaga, who encouraged 
misinformation and gang violence.  
In the first two years, the Manley government focused on initiating domestic policies 
aimed at transforming a failing economy. The PNP inherited pre-existing problems such as 
increased interest on international loans, decreased tourism, increased taxes on imports, the 
end of bauxite expansion, and international recession.555 Manley, therefore, planned to use 
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government revenues to fund expanded welfare programs through the restructuring of 
capitalism. He began this process by assembling a cabinet that incorporated capitalists, liberals, 
professionals, and leftist leaders.556 For example, Eli Matalon, a local businessman, was 
appointed as Minister of Education. Despite the controversial personalities of the new 
government, Manley focused on eliminating illiteracy through the adult education program, 
JAMAL. In an effort to equalize the system of education so that all children had proper access to 
it, the PNP government’s reforms created free secondary and university education.557 
With an unemployment rate rising from twenty three percent to thirty percent, the 
Special Employment Program (SEP) was initiated to reduce unemployment. Members of the 
Opposition party criticized the program because SEP was used to reward PNP supporters who 
had been victimized and excluded by the previous JLP patronage system.558 Through SEP, “the 
equivalent of 20,000 full-time jobs was created, particularly in street cleaning, road 
improvement, painting public buildings, agricultural infrastructure projects, etc.,” the 
Department of Statistics reported in 1973.559 Jamaica’s economic problems were complicated 
by an ‘international economic crisis,’ which resulted in increased prices for imported products 
like oil that multiplied the local deficit. “The deficit in the balance of trade rose quickly from 
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J$189.1 million in 1972 to J$249.8 million the following year.560 The Manley government also 
raised excise taxes in order to nationalize public utilities such as Jamaica Telephone Company, 
Jamaica Public Service, and Jamaica Omnibus Service, to gain control over Jamaica’s 
resources.561 Manley was determined to reform the country’s economic dependency and these 
programs were designed to create a level of local independence that would alleviate its 
vulnerability to the U.S.’s foreign policies.  
Although the PNP claimed victory in the 1972 elections, the party suffered through an 
increase in post-election political violence as JLP supporters continued their efforts to 
destabilize the Manley regime. In 1973, violence in west Kingston claimed the lives of six 
prominent citizens, forcing Manley to comment on the problems of Seaga’s control over the 
west Kingston constituency. Manley claimed that “a one-party state had been built in Tivoli 
Gardens, the center of Seaga’s west Kingston constituency. When the Ministry of Housing had 
tried to place a few families there that had earlier been bulldozed out by political tyranny, a JLP 
gang was organized to keep them out.”562 Even before the outbreak in order to combat the 
problem of rising violence in west Kingston, Manley created the Home Guard Volunteers in 
1972—a voluntary program designed to help the police efficiently patrol communities, and one 
that potentially had the means of empowering the people. The JLP, however, generated fear 
about the role of the Home Guard and argued that the guard “was being established to replace 
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the regular police force as the first step in an elaborate communist take-over.”563 The JLP 
continued to exploit communist fear after the election and utilized the creation of the Home 
Guard to raise localized concern about the government’s ability to control ordinary citizens 
patrolling the streets, or more importantly committing violence in JLP communities under the 
guise of protection. As nationwide violence continued to rise from 1972 through 1973, Manley 
created the Gun Court, which “was a special court established to deal with any crime involving 
a firearm including illegal possession of a firearm or ammunition and was to try anyone charged 
with a firearms offense within seven days of arrest.”564 The creation of both the Gun Court and 
the Home Guard under the Manley government was indicative of an increase in the use of hand 
guns to commit politically motivated violence. 
U.S. destabilization efforts 
The decline of Manley’s popular PNP began by the middle of the 1970s with the U.S.’s 
destabilization efforts after a series of conflicts between Jamaican and U.S. authorities. The first 
problem emerged locally with increasing anti-American and anti-capitalist sentiments 
expressed by some PNP leaders; second, the U.S. government was concerned about Manley’s 
attempt to establish democratic socialism and the impact that the PNP had on national policies; 
third, Americans objected to Manley’s arrogance and aggression in re-negotiating with the 
major bauxite companies for increased taxes that would benefit the government via needed 
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revenue; and finally, the U.S. government was distressed by the Cuban influence in Jamaica via 
the various exchange programs, which U.S. analysts believed was necessary if the PNP wanted 
to make Jamaica a one-party state.565 The U.S. responded to the socialist ‘corruption’ of the 
Jamaican government through “actions to undermine the Manley government and help its 
opponents in the form of reduced aid, negative news reports damaging tourism, and in all 
probability, covert funding of the opposition.”566 The U.S. Ambassador to Jamaica from 1969–
1973, Vincent De Roulet, and former CIA operative, Philip Agee, stated that the U.S. 
government was engaged in a destabilization program in Jamaica because the Manley 
government refused to submit to their demands to abandon democratic socialism and sever 
diplomatic relations with Cuba. Arguably, Manley refused to let the U.S. dictate Jamaica’s 
foreign policies and was angry that yet again the country was vulnerable to American economic 
reprisals.  
International tension between the United States and Jamaica resurfaced in 1973 when 
Vincent De Roulet testified before a Senate subcommittee that he attempted to destabilize the 
Jamaican government because he believed that Manley was a threat. “De Roulet claimed that 
he tried to influence the elections of 1972. He believed that Manley was more of a socialist 
dedicated to an egalitarian society than Shearer and thus a greater threat to U.S. interests.”567 
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Since  destabilization failed to contain Manley’s popularity, De Roulet testified that the 
opposition party was funded via the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to 
undermine the PNP’s political machine. For example, the Shearer government received $20 
million in pre-election aid to effectively challenge the PNP’s socialist ideology.568 Manley’s 
victory in 1972 failed to prevent the United States government from attempting to control his 
domestic policies, such as his decision to nationalize the bauxite industry. These policies 
prompted the U.S. Ambassador to subtly threaten Manley’s political platform. According to 
William Blum, “Ambassador De Roulet warned Manley not to make the U.S.-owned bauxite 
industry a nationalization issue; otherwise, he would ‘oblige’ the opposition labor party to make 
nationalization an issue in the upcoming elections.”569 Despite Manley’s attempt to make 
Jamaica economically independent, the country obviously remained vulnerable to U.S. 
influence. This situation was emphasized by Ambassador De Roulet, who essentially threatened 
to use the opposition party to destabilize government’s programs if Manley did not acquiesce 
to U.S. demands. As Ambassador, De Roulet recognized that the endemic partisan conflicts 
utilized by the political parties could be manipulated by the U.S. to disrupt Manley’s 
government via nation-wide violence that served to embarrass and destabilize the government, 
create fear about the state of internal security, and raise doubts about Manley’s foreign policy 
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decisions. Ambassador De Roulet’s recognized threat was arguably symptomatic of the 
fragmented state apparatus. 
The year 1974 represented a pivotal one for the PNP as the country suffered from 
severe economic problems, precipitated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC)’s imposing higher oil prices in 1973. The PNP lost support among members of the 
middle class who expressed dissatisfaction with the higher prices, the government’s uneven 
economic progress, and the decision to return to ‘Democratic Socialism’ to stabilize and 
equalize the economy. This decision created controversy about Jamaica’s future in a capitalistic 
world market and Manley’s strategy.570 In 1972, the Manley government supported a bauxite 
levy designed to aid Jamaica’s development. Due to World War II, Jamaica had become a 
significant producer of bauxite. However, the industry produced little financial benefit for 
Jamaica since the industry was controlled by powerful multinational corporations such as the 
Aluminum Corporation of America (ALCOA), Aluminum Company of Canada (ALCAN), Kaiser 
Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, and Reynolds Metal Company, all of which exploited 
Jamaica for its natural resources without any type of investment in the county’s 
infrastructure.571 Evelyn and John Stephens write that “the whole bauxite strategy was aimed at 
taking more control of this natural resource and directing it to development ends decided by 
the people of Jamaica not by the multinationals.”572 In an effort to alleviate some of the 
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country’s economic problems, on May 5, 1974, Manley imposed a bauxite levy, which was part 
of his attempt to make Jamaica economically independent.573  
Manley became the driving force behind the International Bauxite Association (IBA), an 
organization designed to reduce the monopoly exercised by multinationals over the industry 
and raise support among bauxite-producing countries for the tax.574 Consequently, bauxite-
producing countries such as Australia, Guinea, Guyana, Jamaica, Sierra Leone, Surinam, and 
Yugoslavia were encouraged to join and act uniformly to protect their resources.575 The 
problem that Manley and the IBA encountered was that the bauxite-producing countries 
continued to negotiate independently with multinationals, thereby, undermining the purpose 
of the IBA. The other bauxite-producing countries “established low taxes which undermined 
Jamaica’s rates, thus securing a competitive advantage. Whether this was because of the 
pressure of a contracting market, because they out-bargained, or because of an attempt to 
increase their market share is still an open question to the Jamaican people.”576 Despite the 
controversy among bauxite-producing countries, Manley successfully negotiated a 7.5 percent 
production levy for Jamaica. The money was to be used for Jamaica’s capital development.577 
Ironically, Manley’s attempt to expand social welfare reforms allowed Jamaica to become 
                                                          
573
 Levi, Michael Manley, 148; Staff Reporter, “Better Never Come,” 24–25. 
574
 Huber-Stephens, and Stephens, Democratic Socialism in Jamaica, 78; also referenced in Moran, “Multinational 
Corporations and Dependency,” 79–85; O’Flaherty, “Finding Jamaica’s Way,” 137–158. 
575
 Huber-Stephens, and Stephens, Democratic Socialism in Jamaica, 78. 
576





‘more entrenched in international capital network,’ as the government sought financial 
assistance from organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
in essence a continuation of the JLP legacy.578 This was a process which only served to 
encourage further economic dependency on international agents. 
Because of the corruptive impact of polarized partisan politics, Manley’s second term 
was marked by a campaign of destabilization. It was organized by the U.S. through the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), JLP propaganda via anti-communist rhetoric, and media that 
fabricated stories such as “articles describing Cuban troops on the island and Jamaica as the 
catspaw of the USSR.”579 The U.S.-increased intervention in Jamaican politics escalated in the 
1970s as the government, in an effort to fight the Cold War, battled to keep the Caribbean (the 
gateway to the U.S.) free from communist influence, and Jamaica was vulnerable to such 
destabilization efforts since their protection as a colony ended in 1961. However, since Jamaica 
was governed by a JLP government that was pro-U.S. and economically committed to the IMF, 
the need for intervention in local policy before the election of Manley in 1970 was un-
necessary. Arguably, the American media coverage of Jamaica fabricated stories about Manley 
and his association with Cuba. Random violence without any motive and increased acts of 
violence demonstrated that an actual destabilization campaign existed. Scholars such as 
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Michael Kaufman, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens agree that destabilization occurred.580 
This conclusion was based on the local intensity of violence in Jamaica, IMF austerity demands, 
and Philip Agee’s testimony that the United States, through JLP supporters, attempted to 
destabilize the Manley regime. 
Violence 
Despite denials from both political parties over their involvement, political violence 
continued and escalated to levels of open warfare. Even Manley’s denials that the PNP paid 
gunmen in their service was questionable when, in 1975, he participated in a funeral procession 
of a known gunman, Winston “Burry Boy” Blake, who had been prosecuted and acquitted 
several times for murder—someone whom the Jamaican people acknowledged as a criminal.581 
Winston Blake was a notorious PNP gangster whose affiliation with Michael Manley was well 
known because he saved Manley from a JLP gunman who shot at him while campaigning in the 
west Kingston constituency. In addition to saving Manley’s life, Blake and other such gangsters 
frequently acted as protection for PNP party leaders as they campaigned in dangerous areas of 
the city, where guns were needed for defense. The controversy and conflict about Winston 
Blake occurred when Manley led the funeral procession through Blake’s west Kingston 
constituency on the border of JLP-dominated Tivoli Gardens, where the procession was fired 
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upon. According to Manley, “the marchers in the procession were restrained by myself and 
others from retaliating. It seems evident that the residents of Tivoli Gardens are well armed 
with guns and are being masterminded to carry out political violence at all times. This was 
obviously a blatant act of political violence aimed at me, members of the cabinet of the PNP, 
sympathizers, and members of family of the deceased.”582 Although Manley was correct in his 
accusation, the PNP was just as guilty because PNP members were also armed and briefly 
returned fire although a physical pursuit was prevented. By refusing to acknowledge the role of 
the PNP as participants in violence, Manley was part of the process of the institutionalization of 
violence in politics.  
Carl Stone, political commentator for The Daily Gleaner, eloquently described the local 
political situation in the 1970s when he said that “the first round was one of the JLP using 
armed thugs to destabilize the PNP’s popularity prior to the 1976 election. In the second stage, 
the PNP organized retaliation but mainly as defensive responses. In the third wave, both were 
on the offensive and pushed the country to the verge of civil war.”583 Whether defensive or 
offensive, the outcome was the same: nationalized political violence was spiraling out of 
control, and politicians refused to accept responsibility for the problem. The grim reality 
remained that by the mid-1970s, the nature of violence had adapted and become stronger, and 
was removed from the political sphere to become militarized with younger criminals using 
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firearms to commit crimes. The state of political violence fulfills the ominous reality that was 
articulated by scholar, Anthony Bogues, who argued “that violence is not a means-end 
instrument but logic that accompanies power.”584 This is a statement that explains continued 
violence in Jamaican politics today despite a third generation of politicians who had no direct 
relation to the violence of the 1940s through 1980s. 
As the 1976 general elections approached, reported incidents involving the PNP and JLP 
increased. Manley accused the JLP of instigating violence and issued a call to arms. He 
“reportedly referred to the thugs and murderers of the JLP and to these people trying to bring 
fascism to Jamaica. I have made up my mind if they come with the gun then he who lives by the 
gun shall be buried by the gun.” The JLP denied involvement in the violence and The Daily 
Gleaner called on Manley “to produce evidence to support his allegations.”585 Manley’s call to 
arms was representative of the problem of endemic violence within the system of government. 
With local politicians denying any participation in gang violence but fueling it with their 
rhetoric, the cycle of politically instigated violence continued.  
In 1976, the political climate was marred by endemic violence that began in 1975 when 
local gunmen launched a campaign of terror. Michael Manley retrospectively wrote that “the 
doors of well-known PNP supporters would be kicked down at night and the one-room shacks 
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in which they lived shot up. Sometimes, the occupants were killed.”586 The problem with 
Manley’s assessment was that the Orange Lane community to which he referred was divided 
into JLP and PNP enclaves respectively. JLP Minister of Parliament Pearnel Charles claimed that 
the tension between the gangs was created by the government’s attempt to displace JLP 
supporters in the area via a housing scheme that required bulldozing the homes of members of 
the opposition. Violence first erupted when a member of the JLP gang was killed. The gang 
retaliated by attacking members of the PNP community. Violence reached dramatic heights in 
1976 when the Orange Lane Fire occurred. A total of 500 people were left homeless and eleven 
people died, among them “five children and two babies,” who perished when rival gang 
retaliation resulted in the destruction by fire of several homes.587 “They were trapped in the 
flames and died as their parents listened helplessly to their pitiful screams.”588  
Manley argued that the Orange Lane violence represented an early attempt to 
destabilize his government through the calculated effort to create confrontation between local 
gangs, thereby generating localized panic via riots that occurred between JLP and PNP gangs 
following the fire. The Orange Lane incident was followed by escalating violence in July 1976 
when a gang, armed with machine guns, attacked a PNP-affiliated club, killing six and wounding 
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fifty.589 The increase in the use of guns in political conflict represented a shift in the political 
environment that started in the late 1960s. As a result of escalating political violence, Manley 
declared a state of emergency on June 19, 1976. “Under the state of emergency, the security 
forces were authorized to arrest and detain all persons whose activities are likely to endanger 
the public safety.”590 During the year, approximately 593 people were detained. Three JLP 
leaders, among them the prominent Pearnel Charles, were arrested as well as PNP candidates. 
The JLP and The Daily Gleaner condemned the enforcement of the state of emergency and 
implied that Manley was abusing the process for partisan purposes. According to JLP minister, 
Pearnel Charles, the PNP’s declaration of a state of emergency was a plot aimed at persecuting 
those affiliated with the JLP.591 
Charles raised concern among the opposition leadership that the PNP-led government 
was abusing its power. He failed, however, to adequately explain why he had in his possession 
at the time of his arrest recordings of police and military transmissions dated from May 4. Just 
as puzzling were the documents labeled ‘Operation Werewolf,’ confiscated from his fellow JLP 
candidate, Peter Whittingham. These controversial documents outlined a guerrilla operation, 
which contained detailed information on trained local gunmen, anti-government propaganda, 
and stockpiles of ammunition. The purpose of this was a concerted effort by the JLP to 
destabilize the Manley government. According to Michael Kaufman, “there was also a pamphlet 
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of an unknown group, the Anti-Communist League, which talked of the military hierarchy that 
would be established during Operation Werewolf.”592 Charles’s arrest provided support for 
Manley’s claim that the opposition party was using subversive means to undermine his regime. 
Arguably, the exposure of ‘Operation Werewolf’ also brings into question the role of the U.S. in 
the 1970s in providing the funds for the opposition party’s attempts to violently overthrow the 
Manley government. However, it does not resolve the problem with intra-party conflict or 
explain the problems with violence adapting and becoming stronger outside of the political 
sphere. 
Pearnel Charles further stated that the state of emergency could be attributed to a 
vengeful JLP executive, Herb Rose, who was threatened with termination from the party for his 
poor job performance and sexist comments. It was Herb Rose who publicly announced that the 
JLP was planning to disrupt the upcoming elections through organized violence, which resulted 
in the 1976 state of emergency.593 Manley contended that the reason for the declaration of a 
state of emergency was the murder of the Peruvian ambassador in his own home on June 14.594 
The problem with Charles’s argument about former JLP organizer, Herb Rose, was that Rose 
resigned from the party on June 18, 1976. He publicly accused the JLP of “training young men to 
commit violent crimes as part of its strategy to undermine confidence in the government. It was 
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giving ammunition to half-starved and maltreated youngsters and encouraging them to take up 
a life of crime and violence in an effort to win the election.”595 Although Charles failed to 
respond to this accusation in his books, Detained and A Cry from the Grassroots, the reality of 
political violence was that by the 1970s, both political parties had established garrisons within 
local communities, which were used to instigate violence on their behalf. And the CIA 
supported the JLP political aspirations through its destabilization policies. Despite his personal 
dilemma with the JLP, Herb Rose was just articulating the problem with party politics at the 
time, whereby the parties manipulated partisan conflict and utilized the U.S.’s Cold War policies 
to undermine the authority of the Manley government. 
In the height of the Cold War world, Manley’s decision to return to ‘Democratic 
Socialism’ in 1974 and controversial foreign affairs policies were complicated by his decision to 
establish a closer relationship and support of Fidel Castro’s communist Cuba.596 Manley further 
alienated U.S. support when he not only visited Cuba but also openly supported the Cuban 
government and its intervention in Angola on November 14, 1975. The Cuban intervention 
prevented a coup by South Africa’s army over the Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (MPLA).597 The consequences of these decisions emerged in early 1976 when the U.S. 
continued its efforts to destabilize the Manley regime. Although Manley claimed ‘no smoking 
gun was ever found,’ the evidence was obvious via a reduction in U.S. foreign aid, increased 
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violence, reduction in tourism due to U.S. media coverage, and a failing economy.598 Manley’s 
concern was justified when former CIA operative, Philip Agee, exposed the agency’s activities in 
Jamaica in his book Inside the Company. In an interview in Playboy, he condemned the United 
States government for acting to destroy the regimes of countries which acted contrary to the 
U.S.’s Cold War policies. The Daily Gleaner reported Philip Agee’s assertions that “the CIA and 
multinational companies were working with the Opposition Party in an attempt to destabilize 
the Manley government. This process would allow multinational corporations to continue 
exploiting underdeveloped countries.”599 Agee further wrote that the media were also 
manipulated by the CIA, which had several reporters on the payroll—a position that was 
supported by The New York Times, which reported on December 27, 1978, that “the CIA’s 
efforts to mould foreign opinion ranged from tampering with historical documents to 
embellishing and distorting accounts that were otherwise factual to outright fabrication” to 
destabilize regimes.600 Agee’s accusations served to highlight that the U.S. was acting against 
Michael Manley’s government which intentionally challenged U.S. authority by converting to 
democratic socialism.  
Evidence of a subtle destabilization campaign was represented in the United States 
media where Time Magazine, Newsweek, and others published inflammatory articles 
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exaggerating reports of violence in Jamaica. For example, The New York Times reported in 1976 
that Edward Seaga, the leader of the Opposition Party, was shot at but escaped injury. This 
story received full coverage in The New York Times and was, in reality, completely fabricated. 
Yet, it played a significant role in deterring tourism, which grossly affected the local economy 
which relies on the tourism industry. Michael Manley also pointed to the local anti-PNP The 
Daily Gleaner as a source for concern. In 1975, Manley argued that the paper had launched a 
media campaign designed to “sow the seeds of discord and suspicion wherever it could” by 
exaggerating incidents of reported violence.601 Despite his popularity, Manley was the subject 
of frequent attacks by The Daily Gleaner which criticized his attempt and democratic socialism 
and his failure to effectively reform the economy. 
Further CIA agitation produced increased violence, decreased foreign investments, flight 
of local capital, and a declining tourism industry. Widespread reporting in the United States 
media during the 1970s stated that Jamaican political violence was out of control and that 
communist infiltration of the Jamaican government had devastated the island’s economy. The 
idea of a pending civil war was a serious cause of concern for tourists, resulting in a steep 
decline in tourism. “In 1976, the number of long-term guests fell by seventeen percent.”602 
According to Michael Kaufman, “President of the Jamaica Tourist Association, Mr. Cliff Burt, 
reported that holiday bookings were reduced due to sensationalized news of violence in foreign 
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newspapers, which negatively affected the island, in spite of the Tourist Board’s attempt to 
assure visitors that the island was safe.”603 This was just another way to punish the island for 
refusing to submit to U.S. Cold War demands.   
The political environment of Jamaica was further destabilized by the JLP propaganda 
campaign for re-election in 1976. Edward Seaga accused the PNP of being a communist puppet 
of the Cuban government and using subversive activities to undermine Jamaica’s 
independence. When propaganda failed to elicit the expected response from the populace, 
Seaga heightened local hysteria when he claimed that over 5,000 agents of Russia and Cuba 
were currently in Jamaica working jointly with the PNP government to oppress the people and 
establish Cuban hegemony over Jamaica. Seaga’s accusations coincided with U.S. Cold War 
strategy to globally destroy communism or socialism wherever it emerged, which effectively 
agitated the populace against the Manley government. Michael Manley was compelled to 
address the crisis and dismiss Seaga’s claims as one hundred percent fabrication. Manley stated 
in 1976 that “the leader of the opposition tends to set new standards of dishonesty or is sinking 
to new levels of irresponsibility. His anxiety to create excitement and tension in Jamaica for the 
purpose of harming the chances of investment of economic recovery has led him to attack the 
Cuban persons in Jamaica more than once.”604 Seaga also pointed to Manley’s creation of the 
Brigadista Program in 1975 to justify his anti-communist position and Manley’s corruption. 
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Manley’s alleged guilt was reflected in over a thousand Cubans working in Jamaica to help 
rebuild the country’s infrastructure. 
According to the government, the Brigadista Program was created as an exchange 
program between Jamaica and Cuba to reduce unemployment through training and education 
via construction methods and technology courses in Cuba.605 Cubans also traveled to Jamaica, 
where they worked in local hospitals and served as advisors on construction projects and 
trained the local police force in security techniques.606 The program began in 1975 and over 
one thousand Jamaicans participated that year. From the program’s inception, Edward Seaga 
argued that “the participants in the Brigadista Program were being trained in guerrilla tactics, 
the use of arms and subversive activities while in Cuba.”607 Seaga also managed to efficiently 
place the blame for localized violence on the Brigadistas when he asserted that “incidents of 
terrorism and violence had taken on a new dimension with daily killings and the illegal 
importation of weapons and ammunition was now fairly nationalized.”608 Seaga implied in his 
statement that Manley, as the leader of Jamaica, was responsible for the weapons being 
smuggled into the country. Seaga’s willingness to use slander to undermine the Manley 
government marked the apex of political irresponsibility because such action frequently 
resulted in more violence. 
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The JLP’s propaganda campaign effectively persecuted and vilified the Brigadistas who, 
upon their return to Jamaica, were susceptible to suspicion and possible violence. Seaga’s 
distrust of the Brigadista Program was supported by Colin Denis, who claimed to have been a 
member of the program. Colin Denis, a former PNP supporter, wrote that he was recruited by 
two friends of the Communist Party of Jamaica (CPJ) and that they convinced him to travel to 
Cuba via the Brigadista Program. According to Denis, every recruit had to maintain the secrecy 
of the program and if he disclosed any information on the Brigadistas, he was subjected to 
death, a statement that was highly suspicious.609 Denis claimed that there were two levels to 
the program: one level dealt with education and job training. However, in the second level for 
which he volunteered, he was trained for urban guerrilla warfare, and he was told that upon his 
return to Jamaica, he was expected to train the young people in PNP-dominated communities. 
Colin Denis said that he wrote his autobiography because he was concerned that the escalation 
of violence was the result of the PNP’s training and providing weapons to its supporters. These 
claims were refuted by Michael Manley, who defended the program for its educational 
benefits.610 However, since Denis was the only so-called Brigadista to ever publicly state that he 
was a guerrilla soldier and the timing of his book coincided with popular anti-PNP sentiments, 
his memoir is somewhat questionable. Unfortunately, the controversy surrounding the 
Brigadistas remained as the polarized populace’s response was based on party affiliations. With 
the Manley government encumbered by the economic crisis, U.S. Cold War policies, and 
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increased political violence, the controversy surrounding the Brigadistas only received marginal 
attention. Denis’ memoirs raised questions of credibility since no other Brigadista has testified 
in support of Denis, nor have Edward Seaga and the JLP found any irrefutable evidence to 
condemn the Brigadista Program. The suspicion generated by the Brigadista Program 
remained, however, because after the JLP’s victory in 1980, Edward Seaga claimed that all files 
relating to the program were destroyed. 
Utilizing fear generated by the JLP propaganda machine, Seaga used the failure of 
democratic socialism, anti-communist paranoia, failing economy, fiscal mismanagement, and 
rising political violence to win office as a Minister of Parliament in 1976. Seaga constantly 
attacked the PNP’s programs and frequently accused the government of promoting violence 
and corruption via political garrisons. While campaigning in St. Ann in preparation for the 
upcoming elections, Seaga claimed that calculated attacks against JLP supporters and 
candidates by PNP gangs resulted in injury to innocent bystanders, further proving that the JLP 
suffered from victimization in relation to PNP aggression.611 The PNP responded to the JLP 
attacks with a general statement that denounced violence and focused on their 
accomplishments during the last four-and-a-half years. Manley continued to defend democratic 
socialism and argued that this system of government was not dictatorial or aggressively 
destructive in attempting to reform capitalism; rather, his system tried to find a balance 
without fully relying on capitalism to run the economy.612  
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Political scientist, Carl Stone, has argued that the PNP’s success in the 1976 elections 
was rooted in the fact that “the socialist theme tapped a deep popular desperation and 
aspiration for an end to the old decaying order and the creation of a new and just society.”613 
By exploiting his popularity and using his personal charisma, Manley traveled extensively to 
rally support for the PNP’s political platform, forcing critics to acknowledge that “there is no 
doubt about it; this man is the most effective public speaker we have ever had. He outshines his 
father and Bustamante. He plays his crowds like a conductor and they respond to him like 
violins.”614 The PNP highlighted the moderately stable economy, education reforms, the 
nationalization of public utilities, the bauxite levy, and housing projects accomplished as a 
result of democratic socialism to show how the PNP government helped to uplift the working 
class poor and provided a more equitable economic system. In spite of a volatile political 
environment, the PNP won forty seven seats while the JLP claimed thirteen.615 
In the post-election environment of Jamaica, the PNP government had to contend with 
intra-party struggles between the right and left wings, a failing economy, IMF austerity policies, 
external domination by the United States, and a death toll of over five hundred, which was 
attributed to increased political violence that claimed national attention. Historically, the 
various governments used public housing such as Rema, Tivoli Gardens, and Arnett Gardens as 
a form of political patronage, rewarding loyal party supporters for their commitment to the 
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party. This tactic was used in the Rema Housing project, which consisted of 16,000 houses built 
between 1962 and 1972. In 1977, the incumbent PNP government promised in the election 
campaign to make housing for the poor a priority by continuing to expand the Rema Housing 
project.616 In February 1977, the JLP dominated constituency, the Rema Housing project, was 
the scene of a bitter political struggle as the PNP candidate, Tony Spaulding (Minister of 
Housing), attempted to establish a grassroots support base in the southern St. Andrew district 
by destabilizing the JLP support base and populating the district with PNP residents.617 The crisis 
erupted when the government decided to evict Rema residents for non-payment of rent and 
others for being squatters. According to government reports, “the trouble started when the 
police and army fired shots at armed tenants. In the violence that followed several people were 
wounded. The conflict was further aggravated by PNP loyalists who used this opportunity to 
displace the previous JLP residents; this situation ignited localized gang violence.”618 Both JLP 
and PNP gangs rioted in the streets, looking to exact retribution against the other for the Rema 
conflict. The violence surrounding the Rema incident justified JLP claims that they were 
victimized. This conflict generated resentment against the PNP government since the JLP 
charged that the Rema incident was the PNP’s aggressive attempt at territorial expansion. In 
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this instance, the wider Jamaican public agreed that the government was the aggressor, 
willingly using violence via the police force to enforce order.  
With a failing economy due to IMF austerity economic measures, alienation from the 
U.S. via Cold War policies, rising political violence, and declining local popularity, the Manley 
regime struggled to maintain control. A tumultuous political environment was further 
exacerbated by continued PNP aggression, which became evident in the ‘Green Bay Massacre’ 
on January 6, 1978. According to media reports and witness testimony, the conflict began when 
a splinter group of the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF), headed by Major Ian Robinson, who was 
loyal to Manley and concerned about the police department’s affiliation with the opposition 
party, plotted to destroy JLP gangs such as the Laborite Skull crew and Nesbeth brothers’ 
stronghold in the south central Kingston constituency.  In late 1977, the JDF circulated a rumor 
that they needed ‘armed men to guard a worksite.’ Men desperate for work turned to 
alternative sources to buy illegal hand guns in order to apply for the job.619 Fourteen JLP 
supporters, some of whom were gang members, were promised guns that were to be sold to 
them at the army firing range at Green Bay. When the men arrived at the assigned area, 
violence ensued although the men were unarmed. The fourteen men were accused of being 
gun smugglers and were fired upon. Five men were killed at the range and nine others escaped 
into the hillside and swampy undergrowth.620 According to survivor, Roddy Nesbeth, “he was 
already down on the ground, and started crawling for his life towards the dense macca-thorn 
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bushes that surrounded the cove. He heard his friends dying as he crawled. As Nesbeth met up 
with another survivor Anthony Daley, he realized that the soldiers had shot out one of Daley’s 
eyes.”621  
Once the victims of Green Bay Massacre were rescued and in police custody, 
controversy erupted over what was reported by local newspapers. Witnesses to the crime, 
Delroy Griffith and Junior George Douglas, charged that the men murdered at Green Bay were 
set up, ambushed, and murdered. The military claimed that their action at the range was 
legitimate and aimed at preventing a “plot to smuggle weapons into the island at Green Bay.” A 
government inquest was initiated to uncover the truth.622 On May 22, 1978, the inquest 
produced a verdict, which determined that “members of the JDF were criminally responsible for 
the killings”; however, no military personnel were ever prosecuted for the crime. 623 This 
controversial verdict became more problematic when Michael Manley defended the JDF and 
condemned the victims. He argued that “the largest and most vicious criminal gang in Jamaica 
resided in the Southside, a JLP stronghold that had been the scene of various violent conflicts 
against PNP supporters.”624 Manley continued to alienate the people with his arrogant 
condemnation of the fourteen victims, claiming that these men should not receive any 
sympathy because they were alleged gunmen. Manley’s position on the Green Bay murders 
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served to further enrage an unhappy public; and continued acts of violence, coupled with a 
failing economy, weakened the PNP’s ability to motivate support among its party members. 
According to Carl Stone, the economic stability precipitated by the 1974 bauxite levy 
created a false sense of financial security. By 1977, the financially crippled Manley government 
encountered a GNP decreased by six percent, negative cash flow of $102 million, declining 
investment, higher interest on loans, and debts that were due.625 Manley attempted to use his 
diplomatic relationships with Russia, Latin America, and the Caribbean basin to help resolve the 
crisis. He tried to persuade the Russian government to purchase more bauxite, the price of 
which was in decline. When all other sources failed, Manley agreed to secret negotiations with 
the IMF for a financial bail-out. The IMF’s structural adjustment policies were designed to bring 
indebted nations into the global economy. The problem with this approach was that the IMF 
frequently demanded “devaluation of the local currency, free market capitalist system, 
increased taxes, and a decreased domestic budget.”626 The first agreement negotiated in July 
1977 with the IMF was flexible and allowed the country to maintain a dual exchange rate and 
price controls. When the Jamaican economy faltered, however, due to capital flight which had 
intensified by December 1977, the IMF renegotiated.627 The second agreement was more 
austere and called for currency devaluation, reduction in domestic spending, and limited price 
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controls. The adjustment failed to help the economy recover and it resulted in further 
negotiations with the IMF until September 1979. 
Due to the consequences of IMF aid, PNP leaders created an alternative plan called the 
Emergency Production Plan, designed to revive the Jamaican economy via cut backs, bypassing 
the IMF.628 The plan called for the reduction of manufacturing jobs, a third of the workforce, 
which Darrell Levi writes, “proved problematic since many of the manufacturing workers were 
PNP supporters, and loss of jobs had serious political implications for the PNP government” and 
fostered a form of desperation among the working class.629 Many Jamaicans viewed Manley’s 
decision to seek assistance from the IMF as a betrayal which proved that democratic socialism 
was a failure. Edward Seaga used the crisis precipitated by the IMF to successfully attack the 
PNP government for its failure to reform the economy and taking the country to the brink of 
bankruptcy. 
Endemic violence erupted when local protests against high oil prices resulted in local 
demonstrations, which were uncontrollable due to the police force’s refusal to control the 
crowds protesting against the government’s reduction in civil service jobs. Economic decline 
became one of the greatest concerns for the Manley regime in 1979, especially with workers’ 
dissatisfaction at an all-time high. This situation was further aggravated by Edward Seaga and 
the JLP propaganda machine that became very vocal about PNP abuses, failure, and 
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corruption.630 In April 1980, further violence occurred via the Gold Street massacre in the east 
central Kingston constituency. According to eyewitness reports in The Daily Gleaner, an 
estimated number of twenty to thirty men affiliated with the PNP dressed in military fatigues 
attacked a JLP dance at which point four people were killed and eleven were wounded. The 
fallout from the massacre was that Manley and the PNP once again were held responsible for 
the various incidents of pre-election violence.631 With increased workers’ dissatisfaction, a 
failing economy, and rising political violence, Manley was forced to call the next general 
elections for 1980. Stories of endemic violence dominated the local media on July 25, 1980. The 
Daily Gleaner reported that 114 murders had occurred within twenty four days. Even more 
frightening was the quality of arms being uncovered. On August 1, 1980, “a Soviet AKM 
automatic assault rifle, four fully loaded, and 32-caliber magazines with 120 rounds of 7.62 
millimeter bullets were found on Friday at a resort villa at Runaway Bay.”632 This raised the 
question of how these sophisticated weapons were coming to Jamaica, and who was 
responsible. Arguably, the obvious answer was that these weapons could have been coming 
from the U.S. and Cuba to supply members of the various political parties and the drug trade.   
Despite local concern about the chaotic political process, violence entered a new phase 
of terrorism when PNP candidate, Roy McGann, was murdered. According to Michael Manley, 
Roy McGann had just concluded a campaign rally and was driving home some PNP supporters. 
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On arriving in the Gordon Town district, McGann encountered a road block set up by rival JLP 
supporters. A confrontation then ensued between JLP and PNP supporters. Upon arriving, the 
police began firing into the crowd and McGann and his bodyguard, police corporal Errol White, 
were killed.633 The McGann killing was dramatic because McGann had a radio transmitter that 
allowed the entire incident to be broadcast live on the local radio and his final words were “the 
police are firing on us!” 634 Manley asserted that “suddenly party radios could hear McGann’s 
voice calling over and over, I am Roy McGann, the minister, do not shoot! A further burst of 
gunfire was heard and he was silent.” Michael Manley and MP D.K. Duncan were also involved 
in a conflict when they were stopped by police officers and prevented access to the town 
square. When both Manley and Duncan refused to leave, gunshots were fired into the crowd. 
“At this point witnesses claimed that Duncan drew his own gun and returned fire. By the time 
PNP supporters had recovered from the shock and rushed to the scene, McGann was being 
transported to University Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.”635  
The murder of PNP candidate, Roy McGann, represented a relevant turning point in 
local politics because it signaled two important changes: this was the first time that a party 
leader had been publicly assassinated; and second, McGann’s murder signified the parties’ 
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failure to fully control the various gangs responsible for the public assassination of a political 
candidate protected by local police. These two dilemmas meant that political violence had yet 
again adapted, became stronger, and had been removed from the control of the political 
sphere.    
With political violence escalating, pre-election violence resulted in eight hundred people 
dead. It should come as no surprise that in the October 1980 elections the JLP claimed fifty one 
seats to the PNP’s nine.636 This loss for the PNP meant an end of the democratic socialism 
experiment as the Jamaican populace gave Edward Seaga the chance to prove that he could 
revive the economy. In his next book, Jamaica: A Struggle in the Periphery, Michael Manley 
could now reflect on what went wrong for his government and decide who was to blame. 
Conclusion 
My argument is that far from being exempt from violence, the PNP was an integral 
participant in the transition and escalation of violence in Jamaica in the 1970s. On the one 
hand, there was an increase in incidents of violence and an increase in the use of sophisticated 
weaponry in Jamaica. On the other hand, violence became ideologically framed within the 
wider political debate of capitalist versus socialist ideologies. In this chapter, I have discussed 
several of the events that factored into this development. Manley’s decision to “return to 
Democratic Socialism” in 1974 situated Jamaica at the center of United States Cold War policies 
via CIA covert action on the island. This had negative political and economic consequences for 
Jamaica. We have seen that Manley’s attempt at democratic socialism generated intense 
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opposition, both locally and internationally. He experienced difficulties in merging democratic 
socialism with capitalism in an effort to reform the system, and this situation made Jamaica 
vulnerable to U.S. attempts at destabilization, and ultimately cost him the 1980 elections. The 
Rema incident in 1977 demonstrated local desperation generated by increased poverty, making 
political patronage even more relevant to party supporters. In the case of the Rema Housing 
project, PNP supporters expected to be rewarded with housing in their constituency, even if 
that reward was to be paid for with death and homelessness for opposition supporters. In my 
view, the Rema incident was part of the transitional process in this period because political 
violence underscored the ineffectiveness and weakness of the patronage system to fully control 
party supporters. 
Although the Rema incident created images of governmental victimization, the political 
process became further complicated by the Brigadista Program, which increased local suspicion 
about the level of the PNP’s involvement in political violence. Of course, the leaders of the PNP 
claimed the program to be one of defense. Whatever the truth of this claim might be, the 1970s 
represented a transition to more intense gun violence through the use of more sophisticated 
weapons and the random and senseless types of violence perpetrated. Edward Seaga 
manipulated this situation when he condemned the Brigadista Program as an agency for 
communist Cuba to infiltrate the Jamaican government by usurping Jamaica’s democracy. Colin 
Denis contributed to this debate in his autobiographical exposé on his purported military 
training in Cuba. The controversy with the Brigadista Program was exploited and became a part 
of the debate because political violence became part of the ideological framework that linked 
the Brigadistas to Cuba—a connection for possible revolutionary action in Jamaica, a process 
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that threatened the country’s democracy. Denis’ account of the contribution of the Brigadista 
Program, in my view is an important lens through which to see the transition in political 
violence. 
In short, the political reality was that Jamaica of the 1970s can be described as having a 
viable gun culture. In part, this was connected to the ganja trade, which—because it was 
lucrative—made controlling political violence ultimately difficult for politicians connected to the 
impoverished state. This was especially evident since in contrast, the U.S. government funded 
the Opposition Party in an effort to create a political environment hostile to the Manley regime. 
JLP propaganda, coupled with external support, resulted in a political climate that evolved into 
new levels of terrorism which proved uncontrollable.  I have argued that this was evident in the 
killing of Roy McGann. McGann’s murder symbolized a transitional period in political violence 
because it represented a loss of control over local gangs, beginning in the 1970s. The political 
situation continued to deteriorate even when Edward Seaga claimed victory in the 1980 
elections. Seaga’s inability to control political violence or resolve Jamaica’s economic problems 









Seaga: Devil or Savior? 
Introduction 
The decade of the 1980s was a turbulent time for Jamaican politics. As has already been 
indicated in the previous chapter, the 1980 general elections marked a watershed in the 
number of deaths resulting from politically motivated violence. The general elections of 1980 
signified the continuation of political violence. Approximately 800 people died as a result of 
pre- and post-election violence and a total of 1,175 gun-violence cases were reported. The 
character of violence in the 1980s was different because it was fueled by anger and drug use 
and dominated by premeditated attacks against helpless people with reckless disregard for 
human life.637  
Evidence of politically motivated violence across the nation, such as the fire at the 
Eventide Home for the destitute, old, and physically handicapped on May 20, 1980, was 
routinely documented in The Daily Gleaner. Arsonists started a fire that completely destroyed 
the 1870s wooden structure that housed 708 destitute people. According to newspaper 
reports, “at least 153 destitute old women, some blind and many physically handicapped, 
perished in Jamaica’s worst fire at the Eventide Home. There were 52 survivors, 144 bodies 
were recovered at press time and 9 of the old women at the infirmary which is run by the St. 
Andrew Corporation are missing, presumed dead. 9 of the survivors have been admitted to the 
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Kingston Public Hospital suffering from burns, smoke inhalation, and shock.”638 The fire was 
labeled suspicious for two reasons: firstly, eye witness reports claimed that at 1:20am, four 
men were seen fleeing the scene of the crime at the time the fire began; secondly, there were 
reports that the telephone wires to the compound had been cut. Neither Fire Chief, Allan 
Ridgeway, nor the police department would comment on the cause of the tragedy. Controversy 
was generated when Prime Minister Michael Manley stated that “the first reports from the 
security forces indicate strongly that this may have been the work of arsonists.”639 Manley’s 
comments generated conflict between JLP and PNP garrisons because the Prime Minister’s 
claim implied that the fire was a retaliation against the innocent people residing at Eventide 
Home since they voted for the PNP in the previous elections. Consequently, PNP supporters 
staged a rally at the Parliament building with “placards which suggested that the fire was 
caused by arsonists and that the JLP was responsible for setting fire to the home.”640  
But, perhaps, the most flagrant instance of political violence was the unprecedented 
killing of the politician, Roy McGann, on October 13, 1980. However (in a familiar pattern that 
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this dissertation has sought to explore), the political leaders on both sides—rather than engage 
the problem of political violence—engaged in accusations and counter-accusations and denials 
and counter-denials other than their respective roles in the reproduction of political violence. 
The McGann killing turned out to be an excellent illustration of this entrenched position on 
issues. For example, on Monday October 17, 1980, The Daily Gleaner reported that Edward 
Seaga called for the prosecution of Michael Manley for his handling of the Roy McGann affair. 
As I indicated in chapter four, McGann was a PNP candidate who was publicly murdered by the 
local police; Seaga claimed that the Manley government attempted to hide the truth of the 
ballistic report, which allegedly revealed that the gun had been used in a previous incident in 
which two other JLP supporters were murdered. Seaga created controversy when he said that 
“Mr. Manley’s conduct in the McGann affair was ‘the most dangerous’ act carried out by a 
Prime Minister of this country and it shows that he is not the proper person to lead the 
country.”641 Such assertions only served to inflame the already tense climate in which political 
violence occurred. But whether or not Seaga’s accusation had any merit, his party was not 
exempt from association with the trafficking in guns and the perpetration of violence. On 
October 29, 1980, The Daily Gleaner reported the seizure of weapons, ammunition, and a 
Cessna twin-engine plane at the Sangster International Airport belonging to local businessman, 
Mr. Athol Chin, who was a member of the JLP.642  
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The exaggerated political violence, the JLP anti-communist rhetoric, failing economy, 
coupled with severe IMF austerity programs, and the United States’ destabilization campaign 
enabled Edward Seaga and the JLP to come to power in 1980. During the 1980s, the JLP 
portrayed Edward Seaga as a ‘financial wizard’ and the right man to resolve the country’s 
economic crisis which, they argued, was precipitated by Michael Manley’s and the PNP’s fiscal 
mismanagement of the economy and the corrupt experiment in democratic socialism, leading 
Jamaica to the brink of financial bankruptcy. In the 1980 political campaign, Seaga exploited his 
image as an expert manager of financial affairs to overshadow the charismatic personality of 
Michael Manley in order to prove that he was the better candidate because of his strong sense 
of fiscal responsibility. Seaga stressed that he acted with his ‘head not his heart,’ as compared 
to Manley’s destructive socialist governmental policies in 1974. 
Early in his political campaign, Edward Seaga aligned himself with the United States’ 
Cold War policies and, once elected successfully, courted the Reagan administration for 
financial assistance to restore the Jamaican economy. Seaga manipulated U.S. fears that they 
would lose their hegemonic control over the Caribbean due its paranoia that Cuban 
communists would infiltrate and corrupt democratic regimes in the region. (Jamaica, like the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti, is strategically located in the Caribbean, which the U.S. regards 
as its own geopolitical territories under its control.) The Cuban presence in Jamaica, as a result 
of Manley’s ‘Brigadista’ program, provided justification that a coup supported by the radical 
left wing of the PNP was, at least, possible. Seaga’s strong support of the United States 
remained important throughout the 1980s since the Caribbean became a focus of U.S. Cold 
War foreign policy as it attempted to rebuild its prestige. In an effort to demonstrate his 
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commitment to the U.S., Seaga accused the Cuban ambassador, Ulises Estrada, of interfering in 
Jamaica’s political affairs and severed diplomatic relations with Cuba. Seaga then implemented 
economic reforms, with a policy of ‘industrialization by privatization,’ and promised to reduce 
the bauxite levy and restore negotiations with the IMF, a tactic that resulted in close to one 
billion dollars in financial aid for Jamaica.643 
In order to revive the economy, Seaga resorted to large-scale borrowing to generate 
foreign capital for purchases and to counteract a negative GNP that resulted from the economic 
crisis. Due to the flight of capital, increased migration, and divestment, the JLP government had 
to reconstruct an economic environment that had collapsed. Adhering to the monetarist 
policies implemented in Latin America and the Caribbean during the 1980s, Seaga initiated 
reforms centered on rebuilding the economy via free-market policies, promotion of 
multinational business, tax incentives, and reduction in nationalized political violence. In 
establishing a closer relationship with the United States, Jamaica became the “Caribbean 
showcase” and gained full international financial assistance via loans which proved disastrous in 
the long run, while Seaga and the Reagan administration negotiated the creation of the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which was designed to provide Caribbean countries with a 
“competitive advantage” over other Third World nations via duty-free exports to the United 
States. Unfortunately, Seaga’s economic reforms were also detrimental to the poor and the 
Jamaican middle-class who had to pay the highest interest, even as the government decreased 
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funding for social welfare programs such as educational services and health programs. A 
consequence of increased poverty and a thirty percent unemployment rate during the 1980s 
resulted in escalating violence. 
This chapter investigates Edward Seaga’s efforts to control nationwide political violence 
against the backdrop of his attempt to avert the economic crisis. The economic stability of 
Jamaica remains relevant to this study because the JLP’s success in the 1980 election hinged on 
the party’s promise to reform the economy. Consequently, Seaga’s negotiations with the IMF 
determined the future of Jamaica’s economic policies as well as the JLP’s ability to remain in 
office in the next general elections. However, economic reforms were overshadowed by the 
escalating rhetoric over political violence in the 1980s. Seaga said that Michael Manley should 
be prosecuted for his participation in the massacre at the Top Hill constituency in St. Elizabeth, 
where property was destroyed and two children were killed and others wounded.644 The tragic 
political reality in the 1980s was documented by the local media. For example, as reported in 
The Daily Gleaner in October 1980, the PNP government seized an arms shipment at Sangster 
International Airport which consisted of 10 automatic rifles, 19 silencers, and over 12,000 
rounds of ammunition. This arms cache seized by the government raised the following 
questions: Who was responsible for this arms shipment? And how were these weapons going 
to be used? Increased gun violence, coupled with violent clashes between JLP and PNP 
supporters involving dynamite and other such weapons, illustrated a political system that was 
                                                          
644
 Timothy Ashby, Missed Opportunities: The Rise and Fall of Jamaica’s Edward Seaga (Indianapolis: Hudson 
Institute, 1989), 1–20; Patrick Bryan, Edward Seaga: And the Challenges of Modern Jamaica (Jamaica: UWI Press, 




fragmented due to an endemic structure that fostered inter-party conflict and a patronage 
system that could not adequately support the gang culture. As violence adapted these gangs by 
the early 1980s had been removed from the political sphere as a consequence of their 
participation in the increasingly globalized drug trade.645 
Biography 
Edward Seaga was born on May 28, 1930, in Boston, Massachusetts, to Phillip G. Seaga 
and Erna Maxwell, who were visiting the United States at the time. The middle-class Seaga 
family operated a small travel agency. According to Seagas’ unofficial biographer, Timothy 
Ashby, “the Seagas were predominantly of Lebanese and Scottish ancestry, members of the 
small white Jamaican middle class who stoutly denied any African blood for years until their 
aspiring son decided black antecedents were politically expedient.”646 Edward Seaga attended 
Wolmer’s Boys School in Jamaica where he received his primary and secondary education, 
based on the British system. By September 1948, Seaga returned to Boston, where he attended 
Harvard University in Cambridge, graduating in 1952 with a B.A. degree in sociology. Timothy 
Ashby argues that ‘ironically,’ in light of his later rhetoric against Michael Manley, “according to 
senior members of the Jamaican business community, Seaga’s early philosophical outlook was 
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socialistic, with an innate distrust of the private sector due to his father’s lack of success in 
running a travel agency.”647 
Upon returning to Jamaica in the fall of 1952, Edward Seaga initially began the medical 
program at the University College of the West Indies (UCWI), but he later switched his major to 
the Institute for Social and Economic Research. At UCWI, Seaga had developed an interest in 
Afro-Jamaican folk lifestyle and religious rituals (Pocomania religion that promoted spiritual 
interaction with the dead via dancing, possession by spirits, and animal sacrifice) in urban and 
rural communities where he could learn more about the lives of working-class people. Edward 
Seaga said that “I went into small Jamaican communities and lived. I do not mean driving in a 
car or going out at night. I mean living, taking a house, living in the house as a villager would, 
and over a period of months participated in every aspect of life within the community, and 
therefore thinking, feeling, and becoming part of the community as if you were always there. I 
did this in both urban and rural communities and that has given me the background to 
understanding which I treasure today.”648 By integrating himself with local communities such as 
Buxton, Denham, and Trench Town, Seaga eventually created a grassroots support base that 
would remain loyal to him. However, by early 1956, Seaga had completed his study, he and 
approached Dr. Dudley Huggins, Director of the Institute of Social and Economic Research, for 
approval of his thesis. Due to the focus of Seaga’s study on Pocomania, the department 
declined his thesis, which resulted in Seaga’s attending London University in May of 1956 to 
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acquire his Masters degree. His experience in London was unfortunate because Seaga had little-
to-no-contact with other students since he could not afford to dorm and engage in campus 
activities. Coupled with culture shock and the University’s demand that Seaga repeat graduate 
work that he had already done, he left London and returned home in September 1956 to work 
for his father at a time when Philip Seaga had a successful travel service.649   
After withdrawing from college, Seaga dabbled in local politics and turned his scholarly 
research into a business. As a student at UCWI, Seaga had researched local Kumina revival 
music and became responsible for the recording of popular folk music on the Folkways label. 
According to Seaga, getting his business started was difficult because of the PNP’s policies that 
restricted imports of records. After 1956, Seaga turned his love of local music into a successful 
business when he founded his own record label, West Indies Recording Limited (WIRL), and 
signed popular ska artists such as Joe Higgs and Byron Lee and the Dragonaiers. As an 
entrepreneur, Seaga represented an outstanding personality in the music business because he 
insisted that his artists should be paid well. The WIRL experienced major success in 1959, with 
the first of many singles, “Manny O.”  
Despite launching a successful business, Seaga embarked on a political career in 1959, at 
the age of 29 when Alexander Bustamante announced that Seaga had been appointed to the 
Legislative Council, representing the JLP.650 Already recognized as a passionate defender of the 
poor and a fiery orator capable of moving voters or his fellow legislators, Seaga became an 
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elected member of Parliament in April 1962, representing western Kingston.651 As a member of 
the House, Seaga was also appointed as the Minister of Development and Welfare, a post that 
he used to facilitate the diffusion of ska music.652  
Seaga used the opportunity provided by his position as Minister of Development and 
Welfare to promote the international exposure of ska music, such as the 1964 ska artist Millie 
Small’s pop music hit “My Boy Lollipop.” To further advance the industry in 1965, Seaga 
arranged for local entertainers Byron Lee and the Dragoniers, Peter Tosh, Roy Willis, and others 
to perform at the New York World Fair to not only gain access to the American market, but also 
to introduce international audiences to ska music.653   
Despite the international success of ska music, Seaga’s business venture was short-lived. 
“Seaga’s WIRL remained profitable and influential as a source of popular, mainstream-oriented 
ska. Sometime after the World Fair showcase took place, Seaga sold WIRL to Byron Lee, who 
renamed it Dynamic Sound Recordings, and turned it into one of the most popular studios in 
the country. Seaga’s formal involvement in music was over after the mid-1960s, but the impact 
of his work has extended for decades.”654 The sale of WIRL in 1965 allowed Seaga to 
concentrate on his political career. In spite of an active political career, Seaga married former 
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Miss Jamaica, Marie Mitsy Constantine, on August 22, 1965. The couple would later raise three 
children—Annabel, Christopher, and Andrew.655  
Early in his political career, Seaga ideologically was considered a radical leftist within the 
JLP government, “eager to apply his Harvard sociology training to the task of nation building in 
Jamaica.”656 Being a shrewd and discerning politician in 1967, Seaga won re-election and was 
appointed Minister of Finance and Planning, a post from which he could draft and implement 
financial reforms. 
This was one of the most important policy positions in the cabinet, for it gave the Minister responsibility 
for both social and economic change in Jamaica. As Finance Minister Seaga was largely responsible for 
promoting import substitution industries, justifying this policy by citing the need to reduce heavy overseas 
borrowing and build up Jamaica’s foreign exchange reserves. Seaga also initiated the ‘Jamaicanization’ 
program, designed to transfer foreign ownership to majority Jamaican ownership in the areas of banking, 
insurance, utilities, and agriculture.
657 
Ironically, Seaga’s economic policies, at least, insofar as Jamaicanization is concerned, were 
reminiscent of Michael Manley’s efforts in the 1970s to initiate democratic socialist policies 
designed to reduce the control of multinational corporations over Jamaican-owned businesses. 
Despite Seaga’s aura of success as Finance Minister, he remained overshadowed by 
other popular JLP politicians such as Donald Sangster and Hugh Shearer.658 This transitional 
period was confusing for the JLP as prominent political figures, such as Edward Seaga, began 
jockeying for control of the party. By exploiting the political opportunities generated by the 
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JLP’s instability, Seaga won the opportunity to become the leader of the opposition party in 
1974, thereby setting the stage for his campaign in 1980. “Initially seen as a man of the left 
when he began his political career, Seaga moved to the right when he took over the JLP from 
Hugh Shearer in 1974, in a sustained attempt to wrest political power from the rival PNP led by 
Michael Manley. In this regard Seaga promoted a culture of political terror that bordered on 
civil war in the 1970s.”659 
Throughout the 1970s, Seaga was upstaged by a charismatic Michael Manley, who used 
his dynamic personality and knowledge of popular culture to win widespread support among 
the poor, altering the JLP’s historic command of the working-class vote.660 In spite of the PNP’s 
victories in the 1972 and 1976 general elections, Seaga continued his attack on the incumbent 
government through a political platform that emphasized anti-communism, supported a free-
market economy, increased foreign investment, and promised competent fiscal management of 
the economy.  
Seaga also challenged Manley’s commitment to democratic socialism and the alleged 
corrupt influence of communist Cuba in Jamaica through the Brigadista program.661 The 
destabilization generated by the JLP propaganda machine, coupled with increased violence, 
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attained its zenith in the 1980 general elections. According to Evelyn Huber-Stephens and John 
Stephens, “the level of violence in the society assumed unprecedented proportions in 1980. 
The same forms of violence which had terrorized the country in 1976 recurred. Acts of violence 
directed at innocent people, such as shooting and arson, created fear and panic. In addition, a 
new violent phenomenon occurred, the operation of well-organized para-military like groups, 
equipped with semi-automatic weapons.”662 Although many scholars acknowledge that political 
violence was institutionalized by the late 1960s, what they often overlook is the inter-party 
conflict exploited by leaders as they took it to the streets to maintain power. The total number 
of murders reported in 1980 was 889, 538, more than in 1979, a number which has to be 
attributed primarily to politically motivated violence due to the constituencies where the 
murders occurred and the people who were killed. The destabilization of the economy, 
escalating violence, and the PNP’s inability to gain international financial assistance resulted in 
the JLP’s victory in the 1980 general elections.663 
As Prime Minister, Seaga initiated reforms aimed at restructuring the economy and 
designed to stimulate the system through domestic programs, such as divestment of state-
owned enterprises, reduction of the bauxite levy, tax-free zones to promote multinational 
capital, and foreign investment. Seaga also created the Jamaica National Investment Promotion 
(JNIP) to foster foreign investment by eliminating local bureaucratic requirements for 
multinationals to conduct local business and privatization, which conditionalities for IMF loans 
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and U.S. support required. The impetus for economic growth through these domestic policies 
was based on “Seaga’s promise that the economic policy of his government would rely on the 
private sector as the ‘engine of growth’ with the role of the public sector being regulated to 
providing essential services as well as economic and social infrastructure.”664 My contention is 
that the essential dilemma for the JLP and PNP governments was that the Jamaican economy 
lacked the necessary manufactories and infrastructure for agriculture to develop local industry; 
therefore, any opportunities created by the government would ultimately fail to reform the 
economy. In order for Seaga’s policies to work, the economy needed to be restructured. This 
required a high level of entrepreneurship, whereby, the domestic market redefined its role and 
aggressively pursued non-traditional agricultural and manufacturing exports that would 
generate higher incomes. This solution was difficult to implement because the economic 
infrastructure did not possess the capacity necessary to produce real change. This problem was 
further exacerbated by the country’s dependency on foreign capital, which was an important 
factor in Seaga’s efforts to reform the system. 
Jamaica’s dependence was evident when Carl Stone argued in the mid-1980s that “the 
Seaga government shifted emphasis towards making exports the priority in place of the PNP’s 
major emphasis on self-reliance and import substitution.”665 Consequently, the sphere of 
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foreign policy became consequential in attracting multinational investments in Jamaica. Edward 
Seaga’s decision to align himself with the United States resulted in a successful collaboration 
with the Reagan administration through agencies such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), a 
type of “Marshall Plan” for the Caribbean, “which created trading opportunities in the region in 
exchange for anti-communist allegiances.”666 Seaga’s relationship with the U.S. allowed him to 
not only receive $40 million from USAID but also to negotiate favorable agreements with the 
IMF and World Bank for Jamaica, where the previous PNP government had failed. However, 
Seaga’s limited economic success was based on his compliance with U.S. policies which 
demanded an end to any type of socialism in Jamaica and withdrawing all political affiliations 
with Cuba. On these issues, the Manley government of the 1970s refused to compromise, but 
Seaga was willing to acquiesce because, in return, he was granted financial assistance from not 
only the U.S. government but also the IMF, which allowed him to appear initially as the savior 
of Jamaica.    
With the support from the Reagan administration in March of 1981, Seaga negotiated a 
three-year agreement with the IMF via the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the World Bank. 
The agreement required a reduction of the domestic budget, tax on imports, and a freeze on all 
employment with government civil service jobs. The financial package that Seaga negotiated 
was surprising to many of his critics because the agreement was very lenient and there was no 
demand for devaluation of the Jamaican dollar or wage and price controls, which had been 
                                                          
666
 Ibid; Staff Reporter, “We built it; We paid for it. It’s ours,” 25–35. 
260 
 
demanded of the Manley government.667 However, in order to receive $600 million in 
international loans, the Jamaican government had to implement certain restrictions such as 
reduced budget deficits, reduction in both government employment and expenditure.668 Carl 
Stone argued that Seaga deferred to the IMF’s adjustment policies despite the effects on the 
country:  
Indeed, the government fully embraced the World Bank-IMF structural adjustment policy package which 
seeks to combine drastic stabilization measures with trade liberalization in order to promote 
competitiveness in exporting capabilities. This includes slashing the huge budget and deficit, currency 
devaluations, import liberalization, wage controls, reliance on free-market mechanisms for resource 
allocation, and drastic deregulation of the states’ high profile controls over private sector initiative. High 
interest rates and tight monetary policies, combined with drastic cutbacks in areas of public spending, 
were used to curtail domestic demand further and reduce the balance-of-payments pressures caused by 
excess demand for imports.
669 
The problem with the IMF’s measures was that its models for reform were unrealistic and failed 
to consider the differences within Third World economies that are unique and not comparable 
to the First World framework. Despite the IMF crisis and Manley’s assertions that Seaga was 
creating an economy of dependency, a Carl Stone poll reported that 29.9 percent of Jamaicans 
supported renegotiations with the IMF for better terms and only 10.6 percent of the populace 
wanted to stop dealing with the IMF.670 The problem with the IMF and the Seaga government 
was that priority was given to acquiring loans and funding rather than exploring the long-term 
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effects of these measures on Jamaica, which meant drastic deregulation of the Jamaican dollar, 
higher cost-of-living expense, and firing thousands of civil servants at a time of increased 
unemployment. The result of these agreements between Seaga and the IMF made a stagnating 
economy worse.  
Although IMF loans did generate short-term economic growth, the innate weaknesses 
within the economy resurfaced, forcing the government by late 1983 to renegotiate with the 
IMF. Seaga’s management of the economy produced limited growth. In 1982 through 1983, the 
GDP increased by 4 percent from 12.6 percent to 18.7 percent; consumer prices decreased 
from 28.7 percent to 12.7 percent in 1981, and increased foreign investment in Jamaica.671 This 
economic growth was deceptive because capital investment by multinationals was short-term 
and continued dependency on foreign capital meant that the local economy suffered whenever 
the international markets faltered. According to Darrell Levi, “the economy stagnated in 1982, 
as agriculture declined by nearly 8 percent, mining suffered nearly a 30 percent decrease, and 
the trade gap widened further and foreign debt increased to above $1.8 billion. Like Manley, 
Seaga was troubled by shortages of foreign exchange, lack of managerial talent, a sluggish 
economy, and unreliable utilities. Seaga’s government continued to stimulate exports through 
the Jamaican National Export Corporation, an agency modeled on state capitalism rather than 
‘free-market’ problem and Seaga began to experience problems with the IMF.”672 Arguably, 
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Seaga’s attempt to re-build Jamaica’s economy confronted problems with underdevelopment 
and economic dependency, which made it difficult to create lasting changes in a system that 
demanded a complete restructuring. 
By late 1983, Jamaica had failed the first of the IMF’s performance tests and had to 
renegotiate. The IMF demanded devaluation, increase in interest rates, and tax on imports, 
which had an adverse impact on the prices of imported and local food items.673 “In anticipation 
of IMF deliberations, Seaga introduced a series of austerity measures such as 10 percent 
cutback in foreign exchange allocations for imports, new taxes, and a shift of many new items 
such as gas, air fares, drugs, educational books, edible oils and soaps to the parallel market 
rate.”674 The IMF’s policies negatively affected the poor, who could not afford basic food items 
and became discontented with the JLP government and resorted to political protests and 
violence to voice their dissatisfaction. 
In November 1982, a Carl Stone poll reported and predicted that the JLP’s popularity 
would decrease from 59 percent to 53 percent. The key to understanding this decline was local 
dissatisfaction with the government’s slow response to improving the economy.675 This 
situation was exacerbated by local opinion that the JLP government favored the ‘big man.’ Carl 
Stone asserted that “moreover the JLP is increasingly coming under public suspicion for not 
sufficiently protecting the interests of the ‘small man’ and for seeming to favor the interests of 
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the more powerful classes.”676 Multinational investors also expressed dissatisfaction with 
Edward Seaga, who they believed had failed to fulfill his promise to the United States with the 
creation of a true free-market economy. Timothy Ashby writes that “five years after Seaga had 
taken office, the state remained the dominant force in the Jamaican economy by exercising 
direct influence on resource allocation through ownership of assets and its associated role as a 
producer of goods and services.”677 Ironically, Manley was condemned for creating a similar 
economic environment; however, the significant difference was that Manley labeled his 
program democratic socialism and Manley was seen by the U.S. as a threat to its hegemony in 
the Caribbean. International dissatisfaction coupled with local protests about rising 
unemployment and poverty fostered a destructive environment, as desperation resulted in 
increased acts of political violence increasingly organized through the parties. 
Political Violence and the Rise of Drugs 
Although Edward Seaga came to power claiming that he would bring gun violence under 
control, this was not to be. Under his tenure as Prime Minister, gun violence escalated and was 
even transformed. Two incidents particularly highlight the character of gun violence: the “Rema 
incident” in 1984 and the fuel increase riots in 1985. The problem with gun violence that Seaga 
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confronted in the 1980s was connected to the evolution of the drug trade.678 Jamaica’s 
proximity to the North American mainland transformed the island into a trans-shipment port 
for smuggling various illegal drugs into the United States. However, the drug of choice in the 
1970s was marijuana, a lucrative trade for local gangs and small farmers, because the density of 
the rural terrain offered these farmers a certain level of protection for the various operations 
and provided the privacy needed for the drug planes to land. According to the McNair Report, 
“apart from landing on strips designed or adapted for drug operations landings have been 
made on roads, in cane fields, and on legal air strips owned by bauxite and sugar companies. 
The Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) has destroyed close to a 100 illegal air strips, but given the 
heavy limestone in many of the popular landing areas, operators are often able to make fields 
serviceable within ten days.”679 Consequently, in the 1970s Jamaica became the second largest 
supplier of marijuana to the United States after Columbia. This reality was reflected in the 
number of reported prosecutions for marijuana cultivation. From 1972 through 1975 a total of 
147 persons were arrested for the possession of marijuana; however, there are no statistics for 
drug dealers who paid off local police to ignore their illegal activities.680 The escalation in 
marijuana production resulted in Michael Manley’s seeking U.S. assistance in 1974 in curbing 
the traffic of illegal narcotics. In a joint ganja eradication program with America’s Drug 
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Enforcement Agency (DEA) codenamed “Operation Buccaneer,” Manley acquired U.S. 
technological support via helicopters and other types of military-related assistance.681 Arguably, 
since the program had some initial success, with the seizure of 325 tons of marijuana, various 
other drugs, and weapons, the Jamaican government would frequently revive “Buccaneer” in 
an effort to combat ganja production in the country.682  
In the 1980s, Seaga initiated his sequel to the “Buccaneer” program when he launched a 
massive crusade against local ganja producers who had been lured into the cultivation of the 
marijuana because of the deteriorating and fragile economy.683 However, by the mid 1980s, 
drug trafficking and production was more diversified with the local gangs controlling the lion’s 
share of the trade, a fact supported by Geoff Small when he stated that “in what remained a 
highly corruptive business, Jamaican ganja barons managed to maintain their ranking by 
substantially upping their cultivation and shipments of the ‘herb’. In fact towards the end of 
1984, U.S Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officials placed Jamaica (14%) a distant second 
behind Columbia (60%) as the major exporter of ganja into the U.S.”684 Jamaica’s active role in 
the drug trade negatively affected the island’s relationship with the U.S. when tons of ganja 
were discovered on various scheduled flights into the U.S. For example, in February 1984, an Air 
Jamaica air bus A-300 bound for Miami from Kingston was impounded by the American 
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government after three tons of ganja were found hidden in the cargo hold.685 With a systematic 
increase in the tonnage of ganja being smuggled into the U.S., the Seaga government was 
pressured into addressing the illegal production of ganja in Jamaica, after the Reagan 
administration threatened to eliminate the $125 million in annual aid to the country and also 
instituted the highest fines in aviation history of $29 million against the government for failing 
to address the ganja trafficking problem.686  
Seaga’s ganja eradication program was initiated in 1984 when he ordered, among other 
things, the destruction of all illegal air strips, and introduced more effective monitoring of 
international airports, ordered the dismissal of over 100 security personnel and baggage 
handlers at local airports, and ordered the destruction of all ganja farms.687 His crusade against 
ganja producers was relatively successful although it resulted in major losses for many local 
farmers who relied on the crops to survive financially. Geoff Small claimed that “in 1985, the 
government reported that it had seized just over 200 tons of cured ganja double the quantity 
seized in 1983. Additionally, more than 1,000 acres of ganja crops were eradicated, and 4,500 
drug-related arrests were made. By the end of October 1985, the security forces had wiped out 
1,700 acres of ganja.”688 The irony surrounding Seaga’s use of the marijuana-eradication 
‘Buccaneer operation’ was that it targeted explicitly ganja producers, which resulted in the 
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gangs’ experimenting in other networks of the drug trade, specifically in the trafficking of 
cocaine.689 With the explosion of cocaine and other such hard drugs in the 1980s, Jamaica 
became a trans-shipment port to the U.S. and the movement of cocaine through Jamaica 
contributed to an increase in the crime rate as local gangs fought each other to dominate the 
trade. In his study of trends in the Jamaican murder rates, Anthony Harriot found that murder 
per 100,000 in 1983 through 1997 escalated and shifted from the political sphere to gang 
domain. 
 1997 1993 1988 1983 
Political 0.20 (4) 0.57 (14) 0.51 (12) 1.42 (32) 
Gang Rivalry 14.10 (340) 7.04 (174) 3.61 (85) 3.12 (70) 
Undetermined 10.90 (273)     6.35 (257)         3.43 (81)           3.75  (84) 
Total Conflict 25.2 24.0 6.55 8.29 
690
 
A dilemma that proved problematic for the Seaga government arose from the political party’s 
relationship with the local gangs. The shift that Harriot points to reflected a new dilemma as  
violence adapted and became militarized in Jamaica. 
Although partisan politics effectively polarized grassroots supporters into political 
garrisons that were controlled by party patronage, the 1980s was an era of evolution as the 
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limit on state resources, coupled with the failing economy, transformed the local gangs into 
quasi-independent armies. In order to highlight the connection between the political parties 
and local gangs in the 1980s, I will sketch the shift in politics and violence between the mid-
1970s and 1980s by focusing on the contrast between three of the most notorious gang leaders 
in Jamaican history: Winston “Burry Boy” Blake (PNP), Claude Massop (JLP), and Lester Lloyd 
Coke, aka Jim Brown (JLP). 
One of the many predatory gang leaders of east Kingston in the Arnett Gardens 
constituency was Winston “Burry Boy” Blake, a PNP gunman. In the 1970s, Blake’s gang, known 
as the “Spangler’s,” allegedly enabled Michael Manley to secure his central Kingston 
constituency and this in return allowed Blake to acquire a larger and larger share of political 
patronage, facilitating the growth of his gang. Blake’s “Spanglers” posse seemed almost 
indispensable to the PNP in the 1970s. On one occasion, Blake is said to have saved Manley’s 
life while providing protection for Manley as he traveled and campaigned in dangerous 
communities where his entourage was fired upon by JLP gunmen.691 According to The Daily 
Gleaner reports, between November 1974 and January 1975, the “Spanglers” posse was 
involved in a series of violent confrontations aimed at disrupting JLP organizing efforts as the 
general elections approached, such as shooting at JLP loyalists; assaulting union organizers 
representing the rival left-wing University and Allied Workers Union who were attempting to 
recruit disgruntled workers with the National Workers Union (NWU); and attacking the JLP 
constituency of Rema, attempting to seize the area for the PNP. In January 1975, “the posse 
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wreaked havoc by invading the JLP’s headquarters in South West St. Andrew. They assaulted 
JLP organizers and supporters, pillaged the JLP’s office there, and stabbed the guard. All this 
occurred with hardly any interference from police in the area.”692  
Despite a public outcry against the posse’s violence, no police action was initiated, even 
when Claude Massop’s gang responded to the PNP assault with a counter-attack against PNP 
supporters and the isolated constituency of Lizard Town.693 In the west Kingston war that 
erupted, Winston “Burry Boy” Blake was killed in a drive-by shooting on March 14, 1975. Gray 
stated, since Blake “was shot dead during frontline political duty, his funeral was attended by 
none other than Prime Minister Michael Manley, and a high powered party delegation.”694 In 
choosing to attend the funeral of a notorious gunman, Manley seemed to acknowledge a 
sanctioned connection between the PNP and the Spanglers. Yet, Blake’s action in launching 
another uncontrolled war in West Kingston also suggests politicians were losing control of the 
gangs.  
Claude Massop, Winston Blake’s counterpart on the JLP side, was born in 1949 in 
Kingston during the height of partisan politics. Like many young men who grew up in the 
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ghetto, Massop engaged in hustling and pimping prostitutes to visiting tourists and sailors.695 
However, being a resident of Denham Town in West Kingston, a JLP stronghold, Massop was 
drawn into partisan politics because of benefits of political patronage. According to Geoff Small, 
“his independent popularity would have caught the attention of the canny Edward Seaga, then 
member of parliament for the west Kingston constituency. By tapping into these networks, 
Seaga no doubt hoped to harness for politics the independent popularity of personalities such 
as the young Massop. This was the case because as parties struggled to gain political control of 
territories they brought inexorable pressures to bear on residents in neighborhoods, streets, 
enclaves, and whole constituencies by demanding their loyalty in exchange for material favors,” 
all of which served to further entrench institutionalized gang culture in politics.696  
Arguably, from the 1960s through the 1970s, Massop successfully helped Seaga to 
maintain his hold over the constituency by repelling PNP political challenges from the area. 
Massop’s success for Seaga allowed him to secure his position as leader of Tivoli Garden’s 
garrison in West Kingston.697 It was Massop’s responsibility to distribute gifts to the poor in the 
community, find employment for the unemployed, and serve as armed defense for the area by 
being the enforcer and recruiting the fighting men. The irony about Massop and other such 
gang leaders was that despite his power within West Kingston and his untouchable status, 
Massop remained economically dependent on the political parties, thereby, making his power 
limited within the confines of his constituency. In the end, the state could eliminate them, as 
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indeed happened in the case of Massop when on February 4, 1979, he was killed in a shoot-out 
with the Jamaican police force.698  
Unlike political gunmen, Claude Massop and Winston Blake, Lester Lloyd Coke aka “Jim 
Brown” (the JLP strongman of the Tivoli Gardens enclave in 1980) was the first Jamaican don to 
become politically independent of the patronage system by becoming involved in the trafficking 
of cocaine. Jim Brown honed his skill as a hustler during the politically turbulent era of the 
1970s and served a few months for murder.699 The economic fallout of the 1980s, coupled with 
the chaotic political environment, allowed Jim Brown to break the bonds of political patronage 
by exploiting the anti-marijuana “Buccaneer” policies by investing in other kinds of drugs. 
However, according to Obika Gray, “unlike earlier top ranking gang leaders, Brown and others 
like him became patrons in their own right as the cocaine trade brought new wealth that could 
not be matched by state sponsors. They, too, possessed the key resources once monopolized 
by politicians: guns, money, violence, and the social power of community support. As the new 
don in Tivoli Gardens, Brown therefore juggled the management of the drug trade and his 
political obligations in the west Kingston garrison. Politics and drug crime now fed each other in 
Tivoli Gardens.”700 Brown’s success as a don was possible because the “Shower Posse” was 
international and the gang’s drug activities allowed him to frequently travel to the United 
States to maintain his empire and to truly become untouchable to U.S. and local authorities. In 
May 1984, Brown orchestrated a massive attack against the neighboring Rema enclave, which 
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resulted in the deaths of twelve men. Before Brown could be charged, he fled to the U.S., only 
to return to Jamaica in 1987 to escape prosecution in the U.S. On his return, Brown was 
arrested and charged with the Rema murders; but through witness intimidation, he was 
acquitted  of all charges at which point a contingent of Tivoli supporters gave Brown a ‘gun 
salute’ in front of the court house.701 “The gun fire affirmed the consolidation of a rival and new 
power in the ghetto with its challenge to the political bosses and the society at large,” Gray 
writes.702 
Although Brown transformed party politics, he was once again arrested in 1991 as he 
awaited extradition to the U.S. for crimes he committed in the 1980s.  He died in a fire that 
began in his “maximum security cell” in 1992.703 The mystery surrounding Jim Brown’s death 
has led to speculation that Seaga had him killed because Brown could reveal incriminating facts 
about the drug trade being a state-connected operation. This rumor was exacerbated when 
Brown was given a statesman-like send-off that was attended by Edward Seaga, other leaders 
within the JLP, and 20,000 mourners. Seaga gave a eulogy that celebrated the life of Lester 
Lloyd Coke, a man labeled a terrorist, murderer, and drug don. Seaga’s action was openly 
criticized by The Daily Gleaner reporter, Dawn Ritch, who stated that “a politician cannot claim 
to have any moral authority whatever, when he openly associates with and gives praise to 
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organize crime leaders.”704 Arguably, despite the criticism, Seaga’s decision to attend Brown’s 
funeral could have been based on fear and the realization that he had to appease the 
community/constituency that was just as loyal to Jim Brown as to the JLP. 
With an increase in gang violence via murder, intimidation, social power, and the rise of 
drug dons such as “Jim Brown,” Edward Seaga needed to do something drastic. In 1981, he had 
established the special police squad called the “Eradication Squad” to bring gun crime under 
control. The “Eradication Squad,” as it was called locally, was controversial because it involved 
alleged extra-judicial killing. For example, the most notorious police officer of the squad, Keith 
“Trinity” Gardner, Seaga’s personal bodyguard, was legendary for his shoot-first ask questions-
later mentality. “Trinity” was frequently seen dressed in full black with two guns strapped to his 
hips and a rifle hung over his shoulders, driving a black car or riding a motorcycle.705 However, 
“Trinity” was feared because “he left a trail of death and destruction in his wake.”706 According 
to an Americas Watch Committee (AWC) report “Trinity’s” violent behavior was evident in 
various shoot-outs in which innocent people were hurt. In one such incident, a man was 
repeatedly shot by “Trinity” and had to have his legs amputated, a crime for which the courts 
awarded the victim $80,000 in compensation.707 In another such incident, “Trinity” shot a 
jogger, whom he supposedly had mistaken for a suspect fleeing the crime scene. “Trinity was 
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about to execute the man, when the victim called out and Trinity recognized him as someone 
he knew.”708  
Such brutality on the part of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) of which the 
Eradication Squad was affiliated attracted the attention of organizations such as Americas 
Watch, a U.S. based human rights advocacy group. Police actions were further complicated by 
local reports that insinuated that “this highly-trained, forty strong unit—the Eradication 
Squad—was created by, and answered exclusively to, Edward Seaga. Its members were accused 
of carrying out numerous murders, and it was insinuated that one of the squad’s tactic 
functions was to intimidate and kill the residents of PNP strongholds.”709 This reality was 
reflected in the Americas Watch report, which documented an increase in a higher number of 
police killings, only some of which were reported in local newspapers. 
Police Killings: Dead 
                           1980         1981  1982       1983            1984    1985 
             206           319             101            196                  288               210 
710
 
Despite Seaga’s mandate against gun violence, even his administration was unable to 
fully control gang activity. For example, in 1984, Jim Brown’s ‘Shower Posse’ participated in the 
Rema incident in which twelve residents of the constituency were killed. According to 
newspaper accounts in May 1984, Jim Brown allegedly led a contingent of armed men from 
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Tivoli Gardens against neighboring Rema. Although Rema and Tivoli Gardens were both JLP 
garrisons, a dispute over the dispersal of political patronage generated dissatisfaction among 
residents of Rema.711 Rema gunmen contemplated one of two possible actions: either they 
would attack the Tivoli enclave in order to gain a larger part of local patronage or they could 
choose to form an alliance with the PNP for protection and to protest political neglect.712 
However, before the gunmen of Rema could act, they were attacked by the ‘Shower Posse’ and 
twelve men were killed in the ensuing shoot-out to bring the community back under control. 
Jim Brown then fled the country before he could be prosecuted for the Rema killings. Upon his 
return to Jamaica in 1987 when he evaded U.S. authorities, he was arrested on an outstanding 
warrant.713 Jim Brown’s legal victory in 1987 signaled a break in the system of control via 
political patronage and a rise in his personal economic, social, and political power within the 
Tivoli constituency. Consequently, the final transformation of political violence was represented 
in the local politician’s loss of control of the various gangs. According to Obika Gray, “Seaga 
faced a new situation in which Jim Brown had resources of his own and did not rely exclusively 
on the politician for dispersing benefits to the poor. A power structure linking the political 
world and the criminal underground had emerged in Tivoli Gardens. But evolving relations in 
                                                          
711
 “The Cokes then and Now,” The Jamaica Observer, September 6, 2009; “Jim Brown,” January 27, 2008, 
JamaicaObserver.com; “The Jim Brown Story”; “Prisoner Who Set Self on Fire Dies in Hospital,” The Daily 
Gleaner, Vol. CLVIII. No. 55, February 26, 1992, 1; Gray, Demeaned but Empowered, 290–294.  
712






this citadel and beyond were putting Jim Brown less and less in Seaga’s debt while raising the 
don’s stakes among the rank and file.”714  
The rise of drug dons, such as Lester Lloyd Coke, signaled the beginning of the decline of 
political control of the various local gangs and the escalation of gun violence. The dilemma that 
began with the economic upheaval under the Manley regime in the 1970s was just as 
problematic for the JLP in the 1980s. For example, protests against economic austerity erupted 
in January 1985 after the JLP announced a fuel price increase of $1.91, raising the price of gas 
to $10.90 per gallon. Hundreds of protestors converged on the streets, demonstrating against 
fuel prices. Security forces had to use teargas to disperse the demonstrators and to break up 
roadblocks that were erected throughout the city. The demonstrations interrupted local 
businesses and public transportation, and effectively forced the closure of schools as road-
blocks were erected to prevent travel. “The demonstrations also showed its partisan face,” 
Gray writes, “JLP gunmen from the Southside enclave in Central Kingston assaulted Browns 
Town residents who were manning road blocks there. Pro-PNP residents in East Kingston threw 
up barricades and fought with JLP invaders. Such was the fury of these partisans that four of the 
seven deaths from the disturbance occurred in the East Kingston area alone.”715 The fuel riots 
initially began as a protest movement by the poor Jamaicans, concerned about the increased 
cost of living generated by the IMF and World Bank’s austerity measures. However, after the 
first day, the riots degenerated into gang violence by the second day with snipers shooting at 
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police trying to break up roadblocks. The newspapers reported that gangs were responsible for 
roadblocks “and they offered to clear debris to allow motorists to pass if they paid a small 
amount of cash such as $10. Snipers and rock throwers frustrated police as they frequently 
rebuilt roadblocks.”716 With the demonstrations continuing, Manley and Seaga appealed to 
protestors to stop the violence for the sake of ‘national interest,’ suggesting yet again the 
extent to which the political leadership lost control of the gang once under their authority.  
Ironically, although Seaga won the 1980 elections, a poll conducted by Carl Stone 
revealed that Manley remained more popular than Seaga, whose autocratic personality and 
dictatorial tendencies made him seem unapproachable and cold. The optimism that helped 
Seaga win in 1980 was short-lived. By early 1983, local polls revealed that the economy had 
declined and Seaga’s manipulation of the early elections allowed the JLP to dominate the 
government for the next five years. The snap elections called in 1983, coupled with the PNP’s 
boycott of those elections, resulted in an election season where the death toll decreased and 
the gang violence that erupted utilized the general election process to settle old scores 
between rival communities. 
Conclusion   
It can be argued that in Jamaica, violence accompanies political power, and whichever 
party dominates the local government, political violence tends to be used to polarize local 
constituencies in order to maintain hegemonic power. Michael Manley’s economic and political 
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failure in the 1970s was a reflection of his efforts to polarize the Jamaican masses into two 
armed camps, resulting in an escalation in gun violence. This political environment allowed 
Edward Seaga to rise to power, promising both economic and political reforms. Although Seaga 
came to power claiming that he would bring gun violence under control, gun violence escalated 
and even transformed under his leadership, a reality that empowered hardcore gunmen such 
as Winston Blake, Claude Massop and Lester Lloyd Coke. The rise of the dons under Seaga’s 
tenure signaled a radical change in the system of political patronage as political leaders 
scrambled to regain what little control of the gangs remained via the Eradication Squad, which 
utilized extra-judicial means to bring gun violence under control. Ultimately, the continued 













Modern Jamaican politics 
The general thesis of this dissertation has been that violence is endemic to the modern 
political apparatus in Jamaica. I have traced the emergence of political violence from its 
beginnings in the 1940s to the institutionalization of gang violence in the 1980s. The central axis 
on which this dissertation has turned has been the role of political leaders in enabling—if not 
legitimating—violence, especially during electioneering periods. My argument has been that 
the existing literature on the formation of modern Jamaican politics, while often acknowledging 
episodes of violence, has tended to see this violence as largely contingent or external rather 
than as endemic to the political structure itself. This tendency, it seems to me, has had the 
effect of shielding the country’s most revered leaders from charges of political corruption and 
the advocacy of violence. 
To recap, in chapter one, I addressed the process of labor unionization out of which 
modern political parties emerged in the wake of the labor rebellion of 1938. I suggested that 
the union violence that developed in relation to employer intransigence was reproduced in the 
antagonistic relationship that developed between the two principal political parties—the 
Peoples National Party of Norman Washington Manley and the Jamaican Labor Party of 
Alexander Bustamante—that emerged in the aftermath of the rebellion. I was especially keen 
to show how this process of antagonism was exploited by Bustamante who, (in my view) in his 
drive for power, polarized the populace through inflammatory rhetoric and agitation aimed at 
undermining the popularity of his rival, Norman Manley. What emerged within this framework 
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of antagonism was a political process in which violence was entrenched, and in which party 
leaders exhibited a willingness to use armed gangs to accomplish their goals or, at least, turned 
a blind eye to the activity of these gangs. Chapter two continues this theme because, as the 
party system developed, the conflict and antagonism associated with the union movement 
shifted to the political sphere. This divisive political structure was exploited by both political 
parties, the PNP and JLP, as they mobilized grassroots supporters within constituencies in order 
to win elections and gain power.717 One of my concerns was to dispute the view that Norman 
Manley is exempt from the taint of political violence. This has been one of the great legends of 
Norman Manley, and I have tried to suggest that even if he was not himself an instigator of 
violence, he colluded in the emergence of a style of politics in which the use of violence was 
becoming one of the instruments by which political parties established and maintained 
influence. Arguably, Norman Manley may have been a victim of the internal rivalry of the party 
system that he helped to create; but arguably too, he did very little to restrain the emergence 
of political violence. 
Chapter three addresses the era of the 1960s, which was a period of political 
transformation as the old guards of Alexander Bustamante and Norman Manley were replaced 
by younger and more aggressive party leaders such as Hugh Shearer and Edward Seaga, on one 
side, and Michael Manley and Dudley Thompson, on the other. During the 1960s, violence 
escalated; it signaled an increase in political conflict and a transition to open political warfare 
between the parties as well as the nationwide spread of violence that engulfed and further 
                                                          
717
 Sives, “The Historical Roots of Violence in Jamaica,” 53. 
281 
 
polarized the country. The 1960s represented a turning point for Jamaican politics as the 
transition from localized violence in constituencies to a nationwide process evolved. This 
transition remains relevant because it signified the evolution of political violence and identified 
party leaders as the impetus of this dilemma.  
While the third chapter examined a political system in transition, my argument in the 
fourth chapter is that far from being exempt from violence, the PNP was an integral participant 
in the transition and escalation of violence in Jamaica. This process was reflected in events such 
as the Rema incident in 1977 when the PNP leader’s use of political patronage precipitated a 
conflict about which party would have control of the west Kingston Rema constituency. The 
Rema incident was part of this transitional process because political violence underscored the 
way in which the patronage system of the emerging party political structure depended upon a 
confrontational mode of political activity that could easily tip over to open aggression.718 
Although the Rema incident created images of governmental victimization, the political reality 
of the 1970s was that Jamaica had a viable gun culture connected to the ganja trade, which 
made controlling political violence very near impossible.  
The final and fifth chapter explores the turbulent decade of the 1980s. The general 
election of October 1980s signified both the continuation and transformation of political 
violence, and the rise of Edward Seaga as prime minister. Approximately eight hundred people 
died as a result of pre- and post-election violence; and a total of 1,175 gun-violence cases were 
reported, making this election one of the most notorious in Jamaica’s history because of the 
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level of media sensationalism and violence involved. Coupled with the memorable and 
senseless violence of 1980 (from evidence in the fire on May 20, 1980, at the Eventide Home 
for the destitute old and physically handicapped) was the rise of a new breed of gang leader, 
the first of whom was Lester Lloyd Coke (also known as Jim Brown), which transformed the 
relationship between the political party and the gangs. Essentially, this is the movement of the 
emergence of the don, someone who is a perpetrator of violence and community leader. In a 
context in which the patronage system could not adequately provide for all grassroots 
supporters, gang leaders such as Jim Brown developed connection to the drug trade that 
allowed them to operate in a quasi-independent fashion.719 This ceding of power had two 
significant consequences: the first is that there was an increasing detachment of the political 
parties from the gangs; and the second is that of the diminishing ability of the state to maintain 
law and order.  
The thread that I have sought to trace is the way in which political leaders have formally 
or informally, directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly fostered a political system in which 
violence has appeared as a necessary component. Within this framework, the political system 
has failed the people and has been fully usurped by the political elite who then used the 
resources of the state to maintain security. In my view, the character of modern Jamaican 
politics has evolved into a process that operates more like a police state than a system of 
popular representation. During the course of the labor rebellion of 1938 and its aftermath, 
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Jamaica’s leading agitators for change (Bustamante and Manley) had the opportunity to create 
a more representative process. However, what happened instead was that they utilized their 
charismatic personalities, flair for sensationalized rhetoric, and mass loyalty to polarize the 
Jamaican populace. This process has had a debilitating effect on Jamaican politics in which 
people readily identified with dynamic political leaders as people who would protect their 
interest. Their loyalty has been rewarded with a system of political patronage, making success 
in general elections an imperative for political survival because political leaders shelter the 
commission of violence, if not to directly support it. In this way, it has seemed to me that 
political violence has become an entrenched and, therefore, inescapable reality across the 
entire course of modern Jamaican political history. 
This study is relevant in showing how the fragmented nature of the modern state 
apparatus in Jamaica has maintained a political structure of violence. This problem became 
evident on May 25, 2010, when members of the Jamaican police force attempted to arrest 
Christopher “Dudus” Coke, son of Lester Coke, the notorious leader of the Shower Posse. 
According to The New York Times, “Mr. Coke’s case shed light on a longstanding practice in 
Jamaica of politicians and gang leaders sharing power, for the benefit of both. Which was 
evident in 2007 when Bruce Golding representing Tivoli Gardens was elected as prime minister, 
and Coke’s influence in the community grew as his company was granted lucrative government 
contracts.”720 For Dudus, as Coke is locally known, problems began in New York in August 2009 
when he was indicted for operating an international drug ring that committed various murders 
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and shipped drugs to the U.S. Diplomatic relations between Jamaica and the U.S. were strained 
over the extradition of Dudus, who was hiding out in Tivoli Gardens. Violence erupted when 
members of Tivoli blockaded local roads to prevent the police from finding and arresting Dudus. 
In a stand-off that lasted in almost two months where seventy three people were killed and 
millions of dollars lost in property damage, Dudus would finally surrender to the police on June 
22, 2010.721 The drama involving Christopher Coke highlights the failure of the Jamaican 
government and flawed nature of the political structure that the founding fathers of Jamaica 
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CHARTS REFLECTING POLTICAL VIOLENCE 
These figures reflect an escalation in the levels of homicidal and political violence from 
the 1960s through the 1980s. 
Total number of violent incidents recorded, 1960-69 
Year  Incidents  Incidents  Total  Percentage of 
                     without reported                     with reported                           incidents              total 1960-69 
                          Casualties                      Casualties 
1960    16     17     33     1.70 
1961    27     37     64     3.30 
1962    58     46   104     5.37 
1963    57     57   114     5.89 
1964    22     85   107     5.53 
1965    34   112   146     7.55 
1966  107   156   263   13.59 
1967  115   352   467   24.13 
1968    55   213   268   13.85 
1969    53   316   369   19.07 
 
Total  544              1,319               1,935               100.00 
 
 
Total number of casualties recorded in violent incidents, 1960-69 
Year  Killed  Wounded  Total  Percentage of 
       Casualties total 1960-69 
1960    19      8     27     1.38 
1961    13    38     51     2.61 
1962    13    97   110     5.62 
1963    41    64   105     5.36 
1964    65    46   111     5.67 
1965    67    85   152     7.61 
1966    99  203   302   15.43 
1967  148  309   457   23.35 
1968  128  118   246   12.39 
1969  153  246   399   20.39 
 
Total  746              1,214                                  1,960               100.00 
 
Total true reports of crime, 1960-66 
Year March 31   Total   Increase/decrease 
1960    31,255            - 
1961    36,458    +5,203 
1962    39,851    +3,393 
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1963    37,336    -2,515 
1964    41,258    +3,922 
1965    41,254            -4 
1966    45,493    +4,239 
 
Total                272,905                                                    +14,238 
 
 
Crime, 1973-1981 (reported Cases) 
Year Murder   Rape Manslaughter Felonious       Robbery Burglary  Firearms & 
     Wounding           shooting with intent 
1970 152  553     57  364  2241    5403    NA  
1971 154  544     68  609  2595    4722    NA 
1972 170  571     52  450  2605    4782    293 
1973 227  671     81  395  2944    6589    305 
1974 195  460     93  395  2387    5668    332 
1975 226  540     57  411  2964    7828    304 
1976 367  672     42  384  2895    7557    791 
1977 409  829     58  522  3511    8853  1960 
1978 381  709     52  476  3990    9150    855 
1979 351  730     35  538  3654    8484  1749 
1980 889  767     29  652  4731    8292  3882 



















Dr. Anthony Harriott, senior lecturer in the Department of Government at the University of the 
West Indies, and contributes to the established scholarship by investigating crime and violence 
in Jamaica (July 2005). 
Dr. Edwin Jones, lecturer in the Government Department, and Dr. Ivan Crukshank a lecturer in 
Public Sector Management, agreed to an interview about the role of government in political 
violence (July 2005). 
Robert MacFarlane and Eric Williams both custom agents for the government agreed to discuss 
the role of the political parties in their communities (March-August 2000).  
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